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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the United States' relationhip with Portugal and its
significance for past, present, and future U.S. use of basing facilities in the Azores.
The U.S.-Portuguese relationship is grounded largely in U.S. geostrategic
imperatives and Portuguese military needs. Several factors, including changes in
the USSR and Eastern Europe and Portugal's economic revitalization and
increasing ties with Europe, justify a reappraisal of certain aspects of Portugal's
military relationship with the United States. It would be advantageous on many
grounds to cultivate improved social, political, and economic ties between the
United States and Portugal and thereby complement the security relationship,
including U.S. access to Azorean bases. This thesis also analyzes Portuguese
relations with France and the Federal Republic of Germany - the two other nations
granted base rights in Portugal. This allows an extensive comparative analysis of
French, West German, and American basing relations with Portugal. Finally, theV
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The end of the 1980s witnessed unparalleled changes in the international
environment. From the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe to the crushing
of democracy in China, the impending reunification of Germany, and the apparent
unraveling of the Soviet society, the United States' international security agenda
for the end of the 20th century was re-ordered by profound events that no one could
have predicted. Most importantly, the waning of the Soviet threat forced both the
United States and NATO leaders to reevaluate their operating principles for the
defense of Western Europe. This thesis offers an analysis of an important
dimension of this much larger Western security issue, namely the past, present,
and future options for U.S. overseas basing. The thesis devotes special attention to
the U.S. military presence in Portugal and the options available for enhanced and
mutually beneficial relations between the two countries.
U.S.-Portuguese relations are not rooted in a longstanding friendship along
the lines of the British-Portuguese alliance dating from 1373. Instead, the United
States intere-t in Portugal grew out of threats to U.S. national interests,
beginning in World War 11 and then followed by the Cold War. The United States
maintained harmony and a commonality of interests first by encouraging
Portuguese membership in NATO, and more recently by aiding the Portuguese
conslidation of democracy through large security assistance packageb.
Unfortunately, the forging of friendships by security concerns is probably not the
most stable form of international cooperation. Today, with the diminishment of
c1
the threat from the East, there is growing aversion on the part of some U.S.
policymakers in Congress to meet the "best efforts" security assistance
commitments mandated in the 1983 U.S.-Portuguese basing agreement and
reaffirmed by the 1988 consultations. The Portuguese reaction has become one of
dismay and disenchantment with the credibility of U.S. foreign policy
commitments. This is an inherent vulnerability of relationships that have been
politically justified largely in geopolitical and military terms.
Coincidental with the apparent demise of the Warsaw Pact is the emergence
of a new Portugal, a Portugal which has cast off its cloak of reclusion and appears
confident of its potential to eventually catch up economically with its European
neighbors and reassert itself on the international stage (be it in Europe or in
Africa). Economically, the most recent indicators support this national feeling of
confidence. Economic data from 1989 showed a growth rate of 5.4 percent, $1.5
billion in new foreign investment, $1.17 billion in the form of EC grants, and an
unemployment rate of just 4.9 percent, which is below European Community
average levels.1 Politically. Portugal is enjoying the first majority government in
its young demoLcratic history under Prime Minister Cavaco Silva. Internationally,
the country has gained acceptance to the European Community (EC) and the
Western European Union (WEU), has chosen to participate in the European
Research Coordination Agency (Eureka), and has expanded ties with its former
colonies in Africa. Portugal is proud to see itself as a more deeply involved and
IAlan Riding A', krwuai i. Leaving its Poor Past Behind," The Neu, York Times, 7 May 1990. p
(.7
2
committed player in European politics as well as in events on the international
scene after the relative isolation of the pre-1974 period.
Yet, problems in present day Portugal are far from over. The country still
holds one of the lowest GNPs per capita in the Atlantic Alliance, despite its
econom~c advancements in the last four years. Its bureaucracy remains perhaps
the most archaic and inefficient in all of Europe. Many feel that the constitution,
despite revisions in 1982 and 1989, needs further changes to allow the successful
consolidation of democracy, for instance in the electoral system. Most importantly,
the government has failed to completely normalize civil-military relations.
Portugal's Armed Forces historically lack a tradition of true participation in
Western security, due in the past to more pressing concerns in Africa, and more
recently because of inadequate resources. The Armed Forces remain underfunded
and lack sufficient amounts of modern equipment, naturally leading to a decline in
morale. Unrest in the military's ranks is exacerbated by the lack of a coordinated
political-military long-range plan, one that both the government and the military
fully support. With the hlss of the "Ultramar," Portugal's overseas empire, the size
of which equaled some 27 mainland Portugals,2 many feel the military lost its
strategic mission. Thus. the military finds it difficult to define its role in society.
The Armed Forces mode Portugal's rebirth possible with the 25 April 1974
Revoluti,,n which ended 48 years of dictatorial rule, but today this once proud and
highly politicized Portuguese institution languishes in frustration and increasing
2Thllh, C Isrinr ii .a& I'd %lt-\ Mac'led. IAihti:. in ('Conlhi ?t,.rir Portugal. Part,,'; and l/I.




isolation. The possibility of a military backlash, while remote, should not be ruled
-out altogether.
The United States, together with other European countries and NATO, has
attempted to assist Portugal's transition to democracy. Through political backing,
economic assistance, and military aid, the West has served as a guarantor of
Portugal's democratic institutions. This Western support has been based in part
on concern about the future government of this geostrategically important NATO
ally.
It seems that Western aid has so far failed to alleviate the shortcomings of
Portugal's Armed Forces. In all fairness, however, the Portuguese government is
partly to blame in this regard. Since coming into power in 1974, successive
governments have displayed great reluctance to improve the military's standing
and have refused to allocate the funding necessary to implement a long-term
modernization package. Instead, the government has sought outside assistance to
make modernization possible. NATO as a whole has offered little support. The one
large NATO project designed to aid Portugal, the MEKO frigate program, took
over ten years to be finalized. Portugal has, therefore, relied primarily on those
who can be referred to as its "base-rights" countries for military assistance:
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States. All of these
countries have bilateral agreements with Portugal allowing the stationing of their
servicemen in military facilities on the mainland or in the Portuguese archipelago
of the Azores and Madeira. These three countries also provide quid pro quos to
Portugal for continued access to these facilities. But, as is explored further in this
thesis, these agreements are not without their pitfalls. both in expectations and
4
actualizationb. It seems that only Portugal's commitment o building a credible
military establishment can make modernization a reality; noone else can do it fur
the Portuguest.
This thesis suggests that Portugal's apparent move toward closer alignment
with Europe dues not preclude the possibility of greater U.S.-Portuguese
cooperation in the social, cultural, economic, political, and military fields. Despite
the perceived decrease in the Soviet threat, enhanced U.S.-Portuguese relations
are as important now, if not even more, than in the past. In order to come to this
conclusion one must delve into the numerous factors which together comprise the
totality of bilateral relations between the two countries. The necessary
juxtaposition of seemingly unrelated topics in this thesis is intended to shed light
on the prospects and problems in achieving a mutually beneficial U.S.-Portuguese
basing agreement in 1991.
This thesis is divided into six main parts, with Chapters I and VIII being the
introduction and conclusion. Chapter U reviews the historical development of the
U.S. overseas basing system. It examines the basis for what critics refer to as an
overstretched U.S. worldwide position and explores possible future trends. The
latter half of the chapter deals specifically with the development of U.S. interests
and facilities in the A zures and Madeira. Chapter IMI serves as a linkage between
the U.S. need for access to overseas bases and the security assistance program.
Particular attention is given to the growth of Congressional influence in the
foreign policy agenda of the executive branch. This chapter does not focus on
Portugal, but serves as a more generalized approach to the hotly contested issues of
U.S. foreign aid and wecurity assistance. Chapter IV introduces the reader to the
end of Portuguese dictatorial rule and the rebirth of Portuguese democracy. It
traces the somewhat uneven pursuit of democratic consolidation and
normalization of the Armed Forces. This chapter ends with Portugal's movement
toward closer alignment with Europe in the EC, WEU, and Eureka. Chapter V
explores the growing alignment of Portugal with its European neighbors, namely
France and the Federal Republic of Germany. These two countries hold a unique
relationship with Portugal in that they are the only European countries with
basing rights on Portuguese territory. This circumstance provides an opportunity
to compare the similarities as well as the differences that distinguish European-
Portuguese base negotiations with those between the United States and Portugal.
Chapter VI complements Chapter V by highlighting the same variables explored
in Chapter V affecting European base negotiations and seeing how they measure
up to those from a U.S. standpoint. This chapter includes an outline of the role the
United States has played and will continue to play in the future of the Portuguese
military modernization effort. Finally, Chapter VII examines the internal
nuances in Portugal since 1987 which might frustrate the implementation of
coordinated U.S.-Portuguese plans, particularly in respect to the Portuguese
military. Particular attention is given to the recent political-military schism that
appears to be growing. This chapter also offers reflections about the probable
future orientation of Portuguese foreign policy as well as judgments about which
course of action may best suit U.S. national interests.
This thesis is based upon a wide range of resource material, both formal and
not so formal (including unpublished sources). In particular, extensive use was
made of the Foreig.. Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Congressional records,
6
and the works of James R. Blaker and Katherine T. Walter (as yet unpublished),
Thomas C. Bruneau, Robert E. Harkavy, and AlvaroVasconcelos. Special thanks
are also in order to the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, especially Fernanda Andrade and
all those in the Economics Department as well as the MAAG without whose help
much of Chapters IV and V would not have been possible. Additional invaluable
help in the field of cultural affairs was provided by M. L Asquino of the United
States Information Agency (USIA). For ease of reading, all figures are gathered in
the Append*% and will be referred to in the text simply by their figure number. It
is the author's hope that this thesis will lend some insight to the wide range of
issues that must be considered if the formalization of lasting and mutually




II. TIlE UNITED STATES OVERSEAS BASING SYSTEM
A. INTROI)UCTION
Following in the footsteps of other great maritime nations, the United States
developed a massive array of overseas bases in the post-World War 11 environment.
But, unlike its predecessors, the United State,: went overseas not to colonize, but to
contain the expansionist tendencies of another power, the Soviet Union. Before the
onset of World War UI, the entire number of U.S. overseas bases totaled fewer than
100. By the end of the war, there were 2,000! This was an unmatched feat. Never
before had a country built so much so quickly.1 Numerous bases provided obvious
benefits. By and large they were inexpensive, allowed redundancy, and gave the
U.S. strategic flexibility.2 Then, with the war over, the U.S. no longer felt a need
to maintain the large war-imposed basing system. By 1949, the United States had
closed three-quarters of its overseas bases. It took Soviet expansionism and the
Korean War to push the United States back into large-scale overseas basing. The
number of overseas base sites grew correspondingly with a 40 percent increase
during the 1950s and a 20 percent increase during the Vietnam War. After a
moderate constriction, the present number of U.S. overseas bases stands at
roughly the same level as that during the Korean War. 3
dieHs R. BMaker and Katherine T Walter, U.S. Overseus Buaing: An Anatomy f' the




This chapter does not attempt to establish a definitive count on the number of
overseas base sites. Numerous approaches have been used in the past, and it is
inconsequential to the ct;nclusions of this thesis. What is important are the trends
and their effects on the present basing network. The two most noteworthy
differences between the present system and that which existed in the immediate
post-war are that the greatest number of bases is in Western Europe (80 percent)
and therefore tend to be lucated in industrialized natioasrather than in the poorer
non-industrialized countries Ithe more traditional pattern). 4 The first part of
Chapter U is dedicated to an evaluation of the present overseas basing system.
The second half focuses on the Atlantic side, and in particular, on the past, present,
and future contributions of the Azores to Western security.
B. RECENT UTIILITY OF'rIlE OVERSEAS BASING SYSTEM
There are other areas of interest besides Europe where the use of basing
assets is crucial -for example in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Far East, South
Pacific, Caribbean, and even Africa. The United States has historically been
extremely weak in its ability to project power into certain areas because of the lack
of nearby bases. In an effort to upgrade its position the Rapid Deployment Force or
RDF (today referred to as the U.S. Central Command, US CENTCOM) negotiated
agreements with Portugal, Spain, and Morocco. Through the agreements with
Spain and Morocco, the U.S. obtained complementary facilities in Saragoza,
Moron, Torrejon, and Rota, and in the air-naval base of Kenitra. There are obvious
problems with a heavy reliance on the latter two countries. Spain, as of yet not a
4flaker and Walter, V'S Overseas Basing, p 60
9
m/
member of the integrated NATO military structure, is not amenable to unlimited
U.S. use of its facilities and Morocco, as an Arab country, cannot be expected to
cooperate fully in U.S. actions against Arab states which threaten U.S. security
/
interests. 5 Portugal, however, according to an informed source, agreed to allow the
use of Lajes by the RDF in support of moderate Arab states.
The Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, exposed the lack of U.S.
overseas basing facilities in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Only with great
difficulty and at considerable expense did the Administration maintain a naval
presence in the region. Past agreements with countries like Bahrain proved to be
invaluable, but not independently sustainable. Due to logistics, resupplies
originating in either the United States or Europe had to pass through one or more
bases before arriving at their ultimate destination. In f! ct, a large number of
American resupplies throughout the war came via the Azores. 6 Therefore,
"Portugal, while 4,500 miles from the Persian Gulf, contributed significantly tu
U.S. power projection in that troubled region.
The Middle East during the 1980s remained the most volatile -area in the
world. The Future of[Containment, report for the Commission on Integrated Long-
Term Strategy outlined the following causes of the imbalance: (1) the political
instabilities in the region which put in question the likelihood of a strong and
timely defense if the Soviet Union were to move militarily; (2) the lack of interest
-'Alvaro Vasconcelos, "Portugal in Atlantic - Mediterranean Security," in Politics and Security
in thle Southern Region o! tM, Atlantic Alliance, edited by Douglas T. Stuart (IBaltimore: T.'e Johns
llopkinu University Press, 1988), p 121.
"Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign OperatLon~s.
Extp,rt Financing. and Related Programs Appropriations for 1990: Hearing before a Subcommittee
of the Committee of Appropriations, Part 7, 101st Cong., Ist sess., p 446.
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by our European and Japanese allies in defending the area (seen as "out-of-area"
"by NATO); (3) the unwillingness of most of the Arab governments to have a U.S.
military presence on their territory; and (4) the long distances for our forces to
travel and uncertain access to the bases our forces would need to reach the area
and operate in it.7 Whether the scenario be a Soviet incursion, another Iran-Iraq
war, or a possible ballistic missile exchange, it is likely that the United States will
be involved in some manner. The '"Tanker Wars" in the Persian Gulf necessitating
"U.S. intervention constitute just one example. With the current U.S. security
guarantee to Israel, the possibility of future involvement in the region is
heightened. Therefore, while the threat of a Soviet invasion into the Middle East
might be diminished, the regional instabilities are equally troublesome to long-
term U.S. national security interests.
C. Al)VANCENIENTS IN TIIE OVERSEAS BASING NETWORK
According to the authors of the Discriminate Deterrence report, "The United
States must develop alternatives to overseas bases...."8 The main arguments in
support of this perceived need are that foreign bases are not as reliable as they
once were, and they have become more costly. This increased resistance by U.S.
allies and friends has led many to question the viability of the present system and
the way in which the Administration has conducted base negotiations. Thomas E.
Crocker proposed three essential lessons to be learned from the United States'
7Th, h'uture iif Cuinziunm,'nt, America•s Options for Defending its Interests (n the Sovitt
Peripherl, Repoxrt by the )ffense-Defense Working Group, Submitted to the Commission on
Integrated Long 'lTrm Stritcgy, October 1988, p 23.
SDscrtninzit, Deterrence,', Report of the Commission of Long-Term Strategy, Co-Chairmen Fred




expulsion from the Torrejon base in Spain. These lessons, while perhaps
intuitively obvious, deserve recognition:
/
* Simply because a base has existed for 30-odd years does not mean that it will
continue to do so indefinitely. The United States must display flexibility and
imagination in its approach to base negotiations.
* The United States must review the im ortance of each facility under
negotiation de novo and in light of changing strategic and tactical
considerations. The goal should be to compose realistic categories of bases
that are and are not essential to U.S. security.
* The United States must give full credence to the political ramifications in the
host country that U.S. bases engender. The importance of these factors
argues for a continued lead role for the Department of State (DoS) in
conducting base negotiations. 9
Not only are changes in the threat raising questions about the continued viability
of certain overseas bases, but improvements in technology are also making certain
facilities obsolete, much like the jet airplane did to the many small post-war
Pacific bases. For example, the proliferation of satellite communications will
reduce the function of many communication stations to reserve status. These
bases would only be necessary in the event of satellite neutralization by a Soviet
(or third-party! ASAT system. The same trend is visible in moves to preposition
material (POMCUS) in allied nations.in order to offset the necessity of large
airlifts of equipment the heaviest material - in times of crisis. Another
continuing initiative involves expanding th. number of forces and equipment
afloat which would be available to respond to crisis situations. Presently, 13
Marine Prepositioning Ships (MPS) supporting a total of three Marine Amphibious
9Thomas E. Crocker, "European Base Negotiations," in The Washington Quarterly, Spring
1989, Volume 12, Number 2, p58
12
/' Brigades (MAB) of 1,600 men each are being formed. This force will complement
Ji
"the Near Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) at Diego Garcia and the two Marine
Amphibious Units (MAUs) regularly deployed in both the Pacific Ocean and the
Mediterranean. 1O
"Recognizing the strategic foresight behind developing contingency plans for
overseas basing, the above argument must nevertheless be judged carefully. In an
enormously large overseas basing system there are only a handful of countries
which both receive security assistance from the United States and allow access to
U.S. troops. These so called "base rights" countries are listed below in Figure 1.
Although the matter will be discussed in detail in the following chapter,
historically, the United States spends little in terms of security assistance for the
benefits received. While permanently stationed troops offer the best guarantee of
an American security commitment, I they also allow U.S. forces the most
advantageous position in which to defend or intervene rapidly and decisively.
However, there are critics, such as the noted historian Paul Kennedy, who have
expressed reservations about the scope of the U.S. worldwide commitment and
refer to it as being "at full stretch."1" But, all matters taken into consideration, it
seems rather that the United States can support its global presence. As Harold
Brown summarized so well,
I"lRumrt E ilarkdvs, Bnus'e. Abroad. Tht, Gl(ha! Foreign Military Presence, Stockholm
Ifl~t'rIatiodl Peace Reserch Institute, (New York Oxford University Press, 1989), p 3 12
I INatinal Se•urity Strategv of he Lnited States, The White House, March 1990, p 26




"...the recent widespread concern about U.S. "imperial overstretch" is itself
something of an overstretch...Thus the problem is not one of economic
"exhaustion by our present level of military and foreign aid commitments. It is
rather a question of balance among U.S. capabilities - between our
commitments and the degree of risk that we are willing to accept.... 13
"The bottom line is that a prioritization of national interests must be developed so
that present political realities are reflected in the disposition of U.S. forces
overseas.
I1). A NEW AGENDA
Despite differences of opinion over the degree of U.S. "overstretch," a new
trend towards constriction of overseas basing is apparent today. As one author
concluded,
The patchwork quilt of overseas bases that the United States has stitched
together since the end of World War II is slowly fraying at the seams. 14
What then are the factors affecting the future utility of overseas basing system?
What future threats might the United States expect to encounter? What are the
most effective means of projecting power in foreign countries? Does the decrease in
East-West tensions indicate an end to the cold war, or is the international system
only being "defrosted?" The answers to these questions dictate the future strategic
policy of the United States. The possible gains as well as costs are therefore
enormous. The prevalent thesis in comparative studies of overseas basing options
1311urold BroA n, "Choices for the 1990's: Preserving American Security Interests through the
Century's End," in Americu's Global Interests, A Neu, Agenda, edited by Edward K. iamilton,
(New YorL & London: W W Norton & Company, 1989), p 163.
14Crocker, "European [ase Negotiations," p 55.
14
is that the value of a base cannot be understood alone, but only in its
interrelationship with other bases. Such studies concentrate on the factors which
connect and reinforce the overseas basing network. The Future Security
Environment, a report of the Future Security Environment Working Group,
recommended that a,
.. comprehensive audit of America's basing infrastructure is needed, with a
view not merely to economy, but to strategic demands and the politics of
basing issues, abroad and even at home. 15
The current fiscal and political realities necessitate a change in the overseas
network system. In terms of the Atlantic, and in particular Europe, the two main
e prerequisites that foreign base sites will need to fill in the future are an airfield
capable of handling large numbers of missions and port facilities. It is likely that
the Navy will be tasked with a greater share of the overseas security burdens in
the future. In part, what Alvin Cottrell and Thomas Moorer predicted back in the
mid- 1970s appears validated today:
Thus. of necessity, naval forces will increasingly become the key - if not the
only - service capable of projecting U.S. influence abroad, given the political
and military environment for the future. This will have to be achievedlargely
from bases or facilities on the coasts of the United States, with recourse to only
a few scattered facilities abroad. 16
15The Future SSecuritYv Environment, Report of the Future Security Working Group, submitted
to the Com mission on Integrated I Ang'Terin Strategy, October 1988, p71.
tiAilvin J. Cottrell and Thomas Ii Moorer, U.S. Overseas Bases: Problens of Projecting
American Military Power Abroad, The Washington Papers, Volume V, #47, The Center for
Str.t,.gic and lnt(*rnatonal Studies, Georgetown University, Washington l).C dieverly Hills ;
lAImdn Sage Publications, 1977), p 63.
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The crucial decision will be which "few scattered" bases shall be among those
chosen. As it appears certain that the United States will decrease its presence in
Western Europe through a combination of unilateral cuts and treaties, there will
most likely be a subsequent shift in the United States' contribution to collective
security from forward defense to strategic reinforcement. This is Senator Sam
Nunn's opinion, and as head of the Senate Armed Services Committee it is safe to
say that it he is not alone in this respect. In outlining his five essential elements of
a new military strategy, Senator Nunn stressed that,
Our forward deployed forces should be reduced consistent with the changes in
the threat while placing much greater emphasis on increased specialization
among allied nations and much greater reliance on reinforcement with
deployable U.S. combat forces to support our allies (emphasis added).17
Senator Nunn's views seem to be quite similar to those of President Bush with
regard to the future of overseas basing. In the 1990 statement of the National
Security Strategy of thy Uni•ed States the following point is made:
...adjustments in our overseas presence will be made. Yet-even as the total of
U.S. deployed forces is reduced-we will work to maintain a U.S. presence
where needed. And. where appropriate, we will work to ensure continued
access to to facilities that will permit a prompt return of U.S. forces should
they be required.l 8
It appears that leading American politicians as well as public opinion are
interested in reestablishing the United States' post-war resupply role and
distancing itself from a fu:ther commitment of US troops overseas in peacetime. If
IT'Sen. Nunn on Vision of.Military," in The; New York Times, Friday, April 20,1990, pAl0.
ISNational Securirý Strutegv of the United Slates, p 26.
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this is indeed the case, it ought to be recalled that during World War U airlift
provided less than three percent of all inter-base transfers during the war and less
than one percent of total tonnage movements.19 While there is no substitute for
the rapid movement of "high value" men and equipment by air, if the United
States adopts a retrenched position and relying more on massive reinforcements,
then the majority of the lifts will have to come by sea. Since it is the combined air
and sealift capabilities of the United States that distinguish it from the USSR or
any other power,20 Western security will continue to rely on access to overseas
base sites, regardless of future alignments -with or without NATO.
E. THE CURRENTIMllIEMMA
It is increasingly difficult to predict changes in the international security
environment. There are no easy answers and each policy decision must also have
the latitude to adjust to the unexpected. As one author drew the comparison,
In the British game of cricket, after a particular successful "at bat," a team can
voluntarily "declare" its turn at bat over and play defense against the
opponent's batsmen, and thus hope to win the game. Were it possible for the
United States to stand down on the record of the postwar period, one could be
tempted to do so. It is not likely that our batsmen will be successful in their
next inning. But international relations provide no such option. The game
continues without respite, bringing an unending succession of new opponents
with new pitchers and new batsmen never encountered before. 2 1
14BI-B ,ker and Waltcr, I *S Or,'r.,as llas•g, p 31.
20lbtd, p 71.
"21 (;.ahIdn Alli.,on, "Natti,,lad Security Strategy for the 1990's," in America's Global Jnter,,st.. A
N.'e. Agnda, edited by Edward K Iiamilton (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Conipn.x.
19891, p 211
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Unfortunately, the real world of the 1990s does not hold open any of the
options of the game of cricket. With the Soviet Union in a state of continual flux,
long-term U.S. strategic planning becomes extremely difficult. It is because of this
uncertainty that the United States should resist drastic changes in its overseas
basing system and shun isolationist tendencies. It is simply in the national
interests of the United States to play a central role on the international stage.
While the intoxicating effects of Eastern Europe's political rebirth are delightful,
they may also sway some American policymakers to act unwisely. Public opinion
questions why it is necessary to maintain large numbers of servicemen in Central
Europe when there is no longer a perceived threat from the Soviet Union, and point
to the windfalls that a "peace dividend" would bring. "Bring the boys home" is the
reborn. rallying cry of the new "post-Cold War nationalists."22 A recent poll found
that 47 percent of the people interviewed agreed with the following statement:
We should bring our troops home and limit our mr.litary involvement to
defending our own borders - and we should gradually end our treaty
commitments and let our allies take care of themselves. 23
22 According t, d recent work, the lack of political consensus with regard to foreign affairs in the
post-Vietnam environment ha-. given birth to three identifiable groups: 1. Thuse who accept the
Cold War norms and see all international conflicts along East-West lines: 2. The post-Cold War
internationalists who support an active U.S. role overseas, but prefer a policy less heavily
orientated toward the military: 3 The post-Cold War nationalists who advocate an almost
complete I.U.S dis•ngagemtmt from world affairs with priority given to domestic concerns. lFor
further reading _ee Robert Bi \lMahoney and David L. Wallace, "The l)omestic Constituencies of the
*_curity Assistance Program," in America's Global Interests, A New Agenda, edited b'% Edward K.
Hamilton tNe% York and London: WV.W Norton & Company, 1989), p 157
23John .Marttila, "American Public Opinion: Evolving Definitionb of National Security," in
.A:m,,rica's; Global Interests..1 Neu, Agenda, edited by Edward K. Hamilton (New York and London:
W.W. Nurton & Company, 189). p 306.
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These tendencies, although disturbingly isolationist. may not be entirely without
justification. East-West tensions occupied U.S. security concerns for so long that
they alone became the tool for measuring the state of international stability and
security writ large. It is therefore increasingly difficult to make the general public
understand the continuing prospects for instability and potential conflict in
international relations. Unfortunately, those who proudly proclaim that the cold
war is over and along with it a diminished threat are visualizing international
security in the myopic framework of that purportedly bygone era. While this is
perhaps a gross oversimplification, the point is that a decreased threat from the
Soviet Union is not the sole yardstick by which to measure America's overseas
basing needs. The emphasis in creating a new overseas basing posture should not
depend solely on American-Soviet relations. There are numerous other potentially
explosives scenarios in the Middle East and Central America, for example, which
warrant a worldwide American presence. In this regard, it is precisely the
multifaceted capabilities of the Azores, not limited to East-West contingencies,
which distinguishes and sets it above other overseas bases.
F. INTROI)UCTION OF THE AZORES TO WESTERN SECURITY
While U.S. interest in the Azores dates back to World War 1,24 the islands
became increasingly viewed as a strategic necessity during World War I1.
Although technically neutral throughout the war, Portugal eventually acceded to
the demands of Britain and the United States to allow allied base rights in the
24Anibi,,.adpr Calvet dt .1agahaes, "Purtugal and the United States--Their Relations in the




Azores. In return, Salazar received-the guarantee Lhat the United States and
Britain would respect Portuguese sovereignty over its overseas colonies. There
were, in reality, few other options for Salazar. Alignment with Nazi Germany,
although offered, was out of the question. Salazar believed that he risked an
armed takeover of the Azores if he either resisted Western demands or aligned
with the fascist powers. His beliefs were correct. As early as 1940 the British
cabinet developed plans to occupy the islands and in 1943, at the Trident
Conference, b(th the United States and Britain agreed to a joint occupation plan if
Portugal rebuffed their demands.25 Salazar delayed negotiations as long as he
could, fearing both German and Spanish reprisals.26 Once the German threat had
receded to a manageable degree in 1944, Portugal granted the United States access
to the island of Madeira (the British formally received access in 1943). One of
Salazar's legitimate concerns was the length of stay of his American guests.
Initially designed as a temporary agreement lasting through the end of the war,
the United States' presence in the Azores remains to the present day.
Fears of a successful communist revolution in Greece allowed the United
States to allocate direct financial aid to Greece and Turkey under the auspices of
the Truman Doctrine. President Truman's speech before Congress on 12 March
1947 urged Americans "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." 27 The Truman Doctrine
"25 Kenneth G Weiss, The Azores in Diplomacy and Strategy, 1940-1945, Professional Paper
#272, Center for Naval Analysus, Alexandria, Virginia, March 1980, p 12.
261bid., p 15.
"
7`Quoted in Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States (Boston: Twayne Publishers,
i988), p 185.
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presaged the United States' establishment of a string of overseas base across the
Mediterranean basin, extending from Turkey in the Near East out to the Azores in
the mid-Atlantic. There appeared to be little doubt that without an American
presence, Soviet expansion would proceed un~checked into the battered countries of
post-war Europe. The strategy of containment necessitated this extensive
American overseas presence; this was a legitimate as well as a necessary
instrument of American power, which was morally justifiable and a symbol of the
American role in the world. 28 The Azores, located approximately 850 miles west
of the continent, constituted a vital link to containment along NATO's southern
flank. From this outpost in the mid-Atlantic, the United States could project both
its naval and air arms as a means to reinforce Europe and the Mediterranean
countries. The Azores were not the only stop along the way. Basing agreements in
Spain and Italy also provided follow-on stations toward ultimate destinations
farther east, but the Azores were the first stop. The Azores allowed strategic
flexibility. Instead of routing trans-Atlantic resupply via Iceland and the United
Kingdom or across the South Atlantic by way of the costly and slow Latin
American basing network, the air base at Lajes could be reached directly from all
East Coast points of embarkation. 29
G. FACI I'l'IrES IN PORTUGAL AND THE ARCHI IELAGO
The United States has developed extensive facilities over the 46 years it has
enjoyed access to the Azores and Madeira. The most significant facilities are those
related to ASW, communications, POL (Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants) storage,




and of course, the airfields. The Azores and Madeira, as seen in Figure 2,
encompass two points of Portugal's strategic triangle and are ideally situated to
accomplish a variety of missions. This shaded area in Figure 2, is under the
jurisdiction of CINCIBERLANT, a NATO operational command, headed since
September 1982 by a Portuguese three star Admiral.30 The area bounded by this
strategic triangle effectively covers all of the Atlantic routes allowing access to the
Mediterranean Sea via the Straits of Gibraltar. It is held that, "in an emergency
one of these can substitute for the others."3 1 It should also be noted that in
addition to military traffic, two-thirds of the merchant shipping bound for Europe
must transit Portugal's strategic triangle. 32 Perhaps the most significant
contribution of this sector is the surveillance of Soviet submarines and surface
traffic transiting the Mediterranean, as well as the South Atlantic and the North-
South runs off the Nujrth Atlantic coast. Surveillance missions art performed
primarily by U.S. P-3 aircraft operating mostly out of Lajes on the island of
3oVAI)M J. N. Cardo.-, Tadvares, "CINCIB ERLANT: The Key to NATO's Southwestern Flank,"
in Naval Forces, No. IV, Vol VI, 1985, p35.
31 Albano Nogueira, "Portugal's Special Relationship: The Azores, the Briti.sh Connection, and
NATO," in NATO and the Mediterranean, edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W Clawson, and
Raiinando Luraghi (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985), p 94.
3
'l'avures, "CINCIBERI.ANT," p 35.
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Terceira and a SOSUS facility on the island of Sarts Maria.3 3 P-3s are not
permanently stationed in the Azores, but rather rotate through on 179-day
deployment cycles. The SOSUS net off the Azores is just one of the many
hydrophone arrays the United States positioned throughout the world to detect
and trail Soviet submarines, as seen in Figure 3. The array's best detection area is
that east of the Atlantic ridge.34 In addition to the SOSUS facility, Santa Maria's
Azores Fixed Acoustic Range also carries out research dealing with LF (low
frequency) sonar. 35
The communication facilities are also an integral component of the Azores
bases. One aspect is the HF (high frequency) capabilities. HF communications are
used primarily for communications with surface vessels and, despite the
proliferation of UtlF ,atellites, it is considered to be the most survivable radio
cmmunication frequency in time of war. The HF communications are part of the
Global Command and Control Station network with a transmitter at Cinco Pincos
on Terceira and the receiver at Villa Nova, also on Terceira. 36 The HF capabilities
at Cinco Pincos also include the SAC (Strategic Air Command) 'Giant Talk'/Scope
Signal III global system which provides fur the positive control and recovery of
SAC bombers.--7 Finally, the United States began negotiations with Portugal
•l;3llarkavy, I~a.%es A br•,uJ, p 237.
34Cotlrill and Moorer, l',tI,/,m.s ,fProjec'tingPowerAbruiad,p 14.
3 51lark aY, Bases A broud. p 237.
U3 Simni,1 l)uLk, (jnil,.J Shit,'s Mihaarv b'orres and Installations in Europe', Stockholm
hItcrnational PIr'te Rescarch Institute il.indin: Oxford University Press, 1989). p 250: and
William M1 Arkin and Richard W Fitldhousc, Nuclear Battlefields Global Links in the Arm. Hace
(,anihridgt, Ma..sachusett.- Haitlinger Publishing Company (a subsidiary of llarptr & RHw,
l'Llblishers. Inc.). 1985), p "2'
3711  rk, v. r ases A l,,ia, p 164
23
concerning the deployment of its fifth and final GEODSS (ground-based electro-
optical deep space surveillance) system station. 38 Negotiations began in January
1984 with an agreement signed two months later on 27 March 1984,39 but
difficulties over payment of VAT (value added tax) building costs impeded progress
until just recently. Once in operation the station will link up with existing
facilities in Hawaii (Maui), New Mexico (White Sands), South Korea (Taegu), and
Diego Garcia. 40 This facility will be unique in that its location on the mainland
will be the first of its kind for the United States on mainland Portugal.
The United States maintains large amounts of POL and ammunition
"throughout the archipelago and on the mainland in support of NATO war plans.
In particular, fuel storage sites are located on the south side of the Tejo River in
Lisbon, 41 at Porto Santo on Madeira, and on the island of Faial. Ammunition
depots are located on the mainland along the Tagus River, as well as on the islands
of Madeira and Terceira. 42 These facilities are well-established and capable of
servicing both ships and aircraft. Finally, there are numerous airfields available
for use by all sizes of U.S. and NATO aircraft. The U.S. air facility at Lajes on
Terceira is the largest and most active facility. However, those U.S. aircraft
operationally assigned to Lajes are also allowed to conduct approaches as well as
landings on the islands of Santa Maria, Faial, Sao Jorge, and Graciosa to stay
3 bCongress, [iluse, Committee on Foreign AfTairs, Staff Study Mission to Portugal, Spain,
("Greece, and Turk'y., United States Political-Milhtary Relations with Allies in Southern Europe,
I O0th Cong , 1 sti ess-, June 1987, Cummittee Print, p 6.
3"de Magalhaei, "Portugal and the 'nitel States.- p 15.
401 Iarlkavy. Buses A hroud. p 186.
4 1ra . " ....INCIBERI.A.1,' p 372
r- 4 2 lliarhavy, l~haMes A broad, p309.
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proficient in case an emergency landing is necessary.4 3 The commercial airfield
on Madeira is also open for use by military aircraft. On the mainland, available
air bases include those at Ovar, Mont!jo, and Monte Real.
Despite its rather small territorial size, Portugal offers the United States and
NATO an immeasurable number of diverse military facilities. The following is a
review of the American basing investments in the Azores and Madeira:
Base Units ' hardware 'personnel
-K-gra do Heroismo, NSG unit (USN).
Terceira Island
Lajes, Terceira Island Units: HQ, US Air Forces Azores / Naval Forces Azores
* Naval Air Facility: Patrol Squadron Lajes: supports
full time rotational nuclear capable P-3 operations,
command facilities include ASW Operations Center,
will become deployment site for 32 nuclear depth bombs
in wartime 0 1605th MASW (MAC) 0 57th ARRS * 1936
Comm Squadron, AFCC * GEODDS Site 5 (part of
SPADATS) * ASW Ops Center * Meteorological and
Oceanographic Center 0 Missile Tracking
Instrumentation System, Army Trans Terminal Unit,
Azores
Hardware: HC-130s, HU-16Ds, P-3 Orions (rotational),
HF transceiver.
Personnel: 1704 USAF, 539 USN, 1940 civilians.
Praia da Vitoria, Units: USN use of port facility for movement of cargo.
Terceira Island
Cinco Pincos, Terceira Global Command and Control Station and naval HF
Island Transmitter (receiver at Villa Nova) * SAC (Strategic
Air Command) 'Giant Talk'.'Scope Signal Ill global
system
431)ukc, Unit, d States .ILitarv Forces, p 245.
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Villa Nova, Terceira Global Command and Control Station and naval HF
Island receiver (transmitter at Cinco Pincos).
San Miguel Island Commander Azores, IBERLANT, NATO
"command.
Santa Maria Azores Fixed Acoustic Range: NATO ASW hydrophone
array used for submarine training and ocean
surveillance.
Pico de Barrusa Units: USN communications facility. 44
H. OUT-O F-AREA OPERATIONS
For strategic planners, the most contentious issue with regards to overseas
bases is the inability to acquire guaranteed use of basing facilities for what are
referred to as out-of-area interests. In the case of Portugal, these are more often
referred to as out-of-NATO interests. It must be remembered that overseas bases,
in practically all cases, are not U.S. bases. The facilities belong to the host country
who then permit U.S. access and use of the base. Accordingly, most countries with
whom the United States has bilateral agreements covering use of basing facilities
require the United States to obtain prior approval before conducting any out-of-
area activities. This is true with Portugal. It has been mentioned that,
...at the height of the Cold War, it would have been most unlikely that an
allied nation would have questioned the U.S. right to conduct a military
operation from a base in its territory if the United States strongly sought to doSo.45
While this statement is perhaps true, it is misleading. The level of East-West
tension was not the overriding reason why "base-rights" countries sought stricter
"44A compilation of data from Arkin and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields, p 229. Duke, United
Staus Midituryvi rces, p 250, and llarkavy, Bases Abroad, p 164.
451fichard F. Grimmett, "Current Issues with the 'Base-Rights" Countries and their
Impliwctions." (Washington D.C. Congressional Research Service, 5 December 1988), Report nol
88 726F, p CRS-7
26
control over U.S. out-of-area activities. Instead, West European countries like
Portugal were attempting at that time to strengthen re!ations with Arab and
Maghreb countries, thereby assuring themselves of crude oil imports. This
* aspiration came into conflict with American security interests involving these oil-
producing nations. The United States' military action against Libya is just one
example of divergences in national interests between a country with foreign base
rights and its host. Only when two countries' common interests are served is there
little argument over use of facilities, as Portugal demonstrated several times in
the past two decades. Most noticeable were: the American use of Lajes during the
1973 Arab-lsrneli war when the United States resupplied Israel 46; the French use
of the airfield on the island of Madeira during the April 1977 Shaba conflict 47 : and
the reported British use of the same base to recover two jets involved in the
7 Falklands conflict which landed in distress 48. Given its central location providing
access to numerous strategic avenues, it is no surprise that the Portuguese have
frequently been asked, and have agreed, to provide out-of-area support to friends
* and allies. As one author commented,
Allies treated as true allies are more likely to accommnodate the occasional
request for an extra-NATO mission.49
4,i1)uke, 1'nitid Stat,'s Militarv Forces, p 245
4
" Va.concelos, "Portuga! in Atlantic Mediterranean Security,' p 121
4 abntrovers.% Arises Over UK U1se of Airport, LD060222 Lisbon Domestic Service iin
P.,r usiw.e 2340 GMT5 MAY 82, tran.slated in FBIS VW'EU, 6 May 82, p U2. almk, for statement h*
Dlfens(- Minister Freita. do Amaral insi.encr "that British permission to ube the Azores would 1W
the .ubject of consideration following a concrete request, adding that London first has to make a
requu-t," see Defn., Afintster Vie'ws Role of Azore's Airbase, LDI91616 l.isbon in Portuguese to
Europu 1230 GMT 19 MAY 82, translated in FBIS WEU, 20 May 82, p U i.
4.Crocker, "European Base Negotiations," p 63.
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This is the reward which building consensus in overseas basing agreements with
Portugal has provided in the past and is necessary for future U.S. national security
interests. Without it, the United States could find itself strained in its ability to
project power and influence in critical areas.
1. CONCLUSION
The assets at the Azores do not appear to be dulplicatable. Moreover, with a
"decreasing defense budget, the ability to monitor a large area of water with a
relatively small cadre of personnel enhances their value. The facilities are also
cost effective. A 1977 study concluded that without the Azores and Iceland it
would cost the United States as much as $6 billion to ensure the same amount of
coverage. 50 The cost today, factoring in inflation, would surely be considerably
higher. Besides ASW, the Azores offers airfields from which the United States can
extend its influence to the Europe, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Africa.
"Finally, the communication facilities provide real time HF support to the United
States Navy. The Azores are able to satisfy all of the most important functions of
an overseas base: supporting ground force operations, combat air and tactical
airlift operations, naval operations (surface, subsurface, and air), long range air
operations, as well as communications. 5 1 Most importantly, the United States and
Portugal have a long standing and mutually beneficial relationship. There is no
reason to believe that the Portuguese would like the United States to leave the
Azores, now, or at any time in the near future. The Azores ranks at the top of the
5OCotIrell and Morrell, Problems of Projecting Power Abroad, p 14.
51 Blaker and Walter, U S. Oterseas Basing, p 145-
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list of overseas bases which ought to be preserved, but there is a growing concern
over just how much the United States should provide in terms of quid pro quos to
Portugal to ensure continued access to Lajes. Questions over levels of foreign aid




III. U.S. FOREIGN AMl) AND THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
A. BACKGROUND
It is difficult to analyze the development of the U.S. overseas basing system
without an understanding of the security assistance program. The two tend to be
married, together - especially as concerns the so called "base-rights" countries of
Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines. As explained by the
Department of State in recent Congressional testimony,
Given the issue of national sovereignty, and the common defense purposes that
aid and bases both support, a relationship between assistance and base access
is probably unavoidable. 1
Because of this perceived linkage of base access for foreign aid, the security
assistance program suffers from a case of poor public relations. Concerns with the
size of the budget deficit are increasingly outweighing the desire to help stabilize
the economies of friends and allies with security assistance. In many ways, this
recent rash of debate over levels of foreign aid appropriations is not unique to the
1980s. This chapter reviews the genesis and development of the U.S. security
assistance program. It suggests that the protests sometimes heard from Congress
concerning the size of the security assistance budget are largely unfounded. It
ICongress, House, Subcommittee or the Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations,
Export Finuncing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1990: 1learing before a Subcommittee
of the Committee of Appropriations, Part 7, 101 st Cong., 1st sess., p 506
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supports the conclusion reached by the authors of the Discriminate Deterrence
report that,
A case can be made that a dollar spent on security assistance buys more
security for the United States than a dollar spent anywhere else. In
comparison to the amounts involved in supporting our own forces in procuring
new weapons, security assistance is cheap, and we call on Congress to
recognize that modest expenditures in many third world countries can
dramatically improve our long-term strategic position. 2
Unfortunately, it is difficult for many Americans to understand the clear linkage
between the rather moderate security assistance program and U.S. national
security.
B. GENESIS OF SECU EITY ASSISTANCE
The threat of Communism preoccupied American post-war strategic
thinking. The immediate concern in the post-war environment was how to check
the advance of the Soviet Union into Europe.
The Greek Revolution, which began with the Nazi withdrawal of Army
Group 'E' from Greece, completed by 2 November 1944, required urgent military
aid from the West. In accordance with the Truman Doctrine uf 1947 the United
States shipped massive amounts of war material to Greece beginning in earnest in
1948 as the 20,000 communist rebels appeared to be gaining an upper hand in the
civil war. The eventual defeat of the Greek communists in 1949 was hailed as a
triumph for the United States and President Truman. This successful counter of
the Greek communist insurgency, made possible by urgent U.S. military aid,
"1)iscrhminabc I)Derre'nc,, Report of the Commission of Long-Term StrAtegy, Co-Chairmen Fred
C ilkh and Albert Wohlstetwr, January 1988, p61.
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helped to consolidate Western security and was the harbinger to the security
assistance program. 1949 also witnessed the creation of both NATO and the
Military Assistance Program. The Military Assistance Program gave a greater
degree of credibility to the NATO Alliance by creating a structured system for the
transfer of military assistance to needy NATO (but also non-NATO) nations.3 The
United States moved from its perennial position of nonintervention in European
affairs to that of being the undisputed leader of collective Western defense.
The price of leadership was enormous. It required the stationing of American
troops overseas and a large-scale economic aid package - the Marshall Plan. At the
height of the Marshall Plan, the late 1940s and early 1950s, the international aid
budget consumed roughly 12 percent of total federal spending.4 Despite the costs,
the Administration received widespread support for the European initiatives. The
promise was that the measures would be temporary; as soon as the West European
economies graduated to a stabilized level, U.S. assistance would be reduced.
Soon after the Mutual Defense Assistance Act'of 1949 came the Mutual
Security Act of 1951. It was this act, more than any other, which developed the
clear linkage between base access and security assistance. In accordance with the
Act, the United States agreed to provide both economic and military assistance to
those friendly countries with which it had signed mutual defense agreements or
with which it had specific defense arrangements. A noticeable relationship
SRetcipients in 1949 included Greece, Turkey (both which did not join NATO until 18 February
19521. Ko(rea, Iran, and tht Philippines. For more on the creation of the Military Assistance
Prtogrdln -ee Richard F. Grinimett, "The Role of Security Assistance in Historical Perspective," in
U S Security Assistance. The Political Process, edited by Ernest Graves and Steven A. lijldreth,
Massachusetts and Toronto Lexington Books, D.C. Hleath and Company, Lexington, 1985, p 6.
"4Ct, ngress, tluýue, Fort-irn Operations. Export Firtancing. and Related Programs, Part 5, p 488.
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developed; those nations that had such agreements with the United States were
also thos.. receiving the greatest amounts of aid.5
The United States soon thereafter, in 1954, established the Foreign Military
Sales Program (FMS) credit program. It became obvious that many of the le~s
developed countries where the United States had legitimate security interests
were incapable of paying off their assistance loans, even at a concessional rate of
interest. The credit program worked around this problem. The United States
provided large amounts of aid through this program, although in the military
aspect it tended to consist primarily of World War 11 vintage equipment.
By and large, throughout the height of the Cold War in the late 1950s and
early 1960s the Administration received whatever it requested from Congress in
terms of security assistance appropriations. In fact, on several occasions the
Congress appropriated levels in excess of those requested by the Administration.
The President's position was that of the unquestioned spokesman in articulating
the United States' national security interests abroad. The turning point began in
the mid-to-late 1960s with U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.
C. THE RISE IN CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE
As the Johnson Administration became increasingly entangled in Vietnam,
skeptics arose in Congress. A growing domestic opposition emerged which
challenged the United States' assistance programs and called for a greater role by
Congress. Watergate proved to be a critical blow to presidential prestige.
Hereafter, Congress would check presidential authority at each turn. Security
5Grirninet, "r~h Role of SecuritD Assistance," p 10
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assistance programs, in particular, would no longer pass without an excruciating
examination of the policies and benefits behind them.6
One early initiative by Congress in this governmental tug-of-war was the
attempt to arrest the president's power to sign executive agreements with foreign
countries without the consent of Congress. Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey
drafted Senate Resolution 214 on 16 December 1971 which stated that any
agreement between the United States and either Portugal or Bahrain for military
bases or foreign assistance "should be submitted as a treaty to the Senate for
advice and consent."7 Senator Case specifically addressed Portugal and Bahrain
because: 1. they were two countries which agreed to basing arrangements with
the United States based on Executive Agreements; 2. it was feared that further
"U.S. involvement with both countries might be detrimental to the U.S. national
interests. The Senate clearly wanted a greater role in foreign policy. Statements
suggesting that another Vietnam might be in the making arose many times during
hearings on the issue. The following excerpt from the hearing's opening statement
summarizes the Senate's perceived diminished power over foreign policy matters:
The lives and fortunes Uf our people are put in jeopardy by these agreements,
as we have so tragically experienced in the past few years. Much of the
committee's time and attention over the past several years has been devoted to
efforts to insure that the foreign policy role of the Senate should not be further
diminished by a failure to give detailed consideration to the dealings of our
Government with other countries. A number of issues on our agenda...give full
expression to this deep concern - which derives in our view from the existence
of a constitutional imbalance created in the past by legislative lethargy and
6Grinimet, "The Role ofSccuritv Assistance, p28.
7 Congrmss, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Agreements with Portu,,al and
Bahrain, tlearingh before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1,2, and 3
February 1972, p 1
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c/
executive branch aggressiveness induced to a great extent by war or the threat
of war over a quarter century.8
Resolution 214 received considerable support from such prestigious senators
as Harry Byrd of Virginia and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. The main
premise of the bill was not so much that the Senate sought to nullify each and
every executive agreement that the Executive had signed since World War II, but
rather it recommended that the Senate be allowed to play a part in the process of
considering the "implications of these agreements."97
An important development in the security assistance program was the shift
in the financing arrangements of economic and military aid. As mentioned earlier,
most of the assistance to developing countries was provided as grant aid. By the
late 1960s financing gradually worked toward a credit program and in the early
1970s Congress achieved a mandated end to all grant aid. 10 For many countries
the timing could not have been worse. The rise in interest rates, coupled with
OPEC's energy shock, placed the fledgling democratic governments in extremis if
they wished to maintain a viable economy as well as a capable military.
Another change involved the Carter Administration's policy of linking levels
of foreign aid to each country's human rights report card. The Administration
struggled to balance this policy against the strategic imperatives that tended to
dictate security assistance packages. The following statement by a Department of
"C(_,ingrebs, Slr,ate, Committee on Foreign RvItinh, Executive Agre'ements w-ith Prtugal and
lLuhruam, p I.
lnbd , p 5
IUStei.~n A Ilildrcth, "Pcrccptions of U.S Security Assistance, 1959-19831 The Public Record,"
in U S Securt' .Assistunvv, Th, Politicul Process, edited by Ernest Graves and Steven A. Ilildreth
(Massachusett.a dnd Toronto, Lexington Books, D C Ifeth and Company, Lexington, 19851. p 85
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Defense witness during a 1989 Congressional hearing on security assistance is
equally applicable to the 1970s:
...fromn the standpoint of the Department of Defense and, of course, the United
States, the strategic importance of the areas we are discussing remain to us to
be of extreme importance. And this underlies the fundamental reason for our
programs with these countries. I l(emphasis added)
These changes resulted in a perceived lack of U.S. support towards its allies and
friends and growing debts owed by recipient countries to the U.S. Treasury. 12
From the mid 1970s through 1984, the U.S. Government found it necessary to
make payments on $1.7 billion of unpaid scheduled guaranteed FMS loans owed to
the Guarantee Reserve Fund by foreign countries. By the end of June 1985, there
were 22 countries in default on their FMS loans.13 This trend continued through
the end of the decade with a growing number of FMS credits becoming forgiven
loans, as seen in Figure 4.
A Congressional initiative of the late 1970s and 1980s is the habit of
earmarking military assistance appropriations. Earmarks are guaranteed
appropriation levels. They are granted to a select group of countries in which
Congress has a particular interest, although quite often they are more the result of
intense lobbying than of actual needs. Earmarking has a deleterious effect on the
security assistance program. As seen in Figure 5, earmarks constrain Executive
flexibility by providing decreasing levels of aid to a greater number of hopeful
I 'Congress, house, Foreign Operations. Export Mnancing, and Related Programs, Part 7, p 461
1"James A. Russell, "Creative Finance: Options for Security Assistance," in The DISAM
Jturnul, Vol. 12; No. 1, Fall 1989, p 62.
13"Many Faces of FMS," in Defence Minister and Chief of Staff, No. 1, London: Defence Profile
Limited, 1986, p 33.
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recipients. The only winners are the earmarked countries. Figure 5 also
illustrates that Israel and Egypt are the greatest recipients of earmarked military
assistance. In 1989, $5.1 billion of the total $8.5 billion security assistance budget
(or 60 percent) went to these two countries. 14 Their large level of promised aid is a
largely a function of the 1979 Camp David Accords. In return for peace, both
countries receive a disproportional share of the total foreign assistance budget - of
which the security assisLance program is just one component. In terms of the
entire foreign assistance budget, FY 1990's request showed 36.2 percent of the
requested $14.6 billion earmarked for Israel and Egypt, as seen in Figure 6.15
The Executive branch did not initiate the earmarking phenomenon. On the
contrary, each year in testimonies before appropriations committees and
subcommittees Administration witnesses go on record against the perpetuation of
this unhealthy trend. The following 1989 testimony by H. Allen Holmes, Assistant
Secretary of State fur Pulitico-Military Affairs, underscores the damaging results
of earmarking security assistance:
Since FY 1985, security assistance has been cut in the aggregate by 33
percent, from approximately $12 billion to $8 billion in FY 1989. Along with
this reduction in funding has come an increasing tendency to earmark funds
for particular countries. In Fiscal Year 1989, 98 percent of ESF and 94 percent
14Congress, I Ihuse, For,i'gn Op'rations, Export Financing. and Related Programs, Part 5, p 378
Itttinwn. of Secr|tarv uf t.itc Jdnis A. Baker 1l11.
151 id . p 524 Ichart pi eented as part of statemct•t of LTGEN Charles W. Brown, D)irector,
Dlkknse Security Asis~tancc Agencyl.
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of military aid were earmarked. This continued a trend of increased
earmarking underway since the mid-1980s, when only about 50 percent of the
security assistance funds were earmarked. Overall, earmarking has reduced
the funding available for allocation by the Administration to non-earmarked
countries by over 90' in just five years. 16
Despite the negative effects of earmarking, there is little possibility that Congress
will alter its present practice. Having failed in its earlier initiative to require
senatorial "advice and consent" with regard to all executive agreements, Congress
will insist on using earmarking as one more method in the overall appropriations
process to check executive power. As one author pointed out, "The security
assistance process perhaps provides Congress' only real opportunity to do so.", 7
The Reagan Administration proved to be a firm and pragmatic supporter of
the security assistance program. President Reagan loosened the stringent human
rights constraints applied by the Carter Administration. In July 1981, Reagan
issued an Arms Transfer Policy Directive that supported
...the transfer of conventional arms and other defense articles and services...
[as] an essential element of [the U.S.] global defense posture and an
indispensable component of its foreign policy..the United States will evaluate
requests primarily in terms of their net contribution to enhanced deterrence
and defense.I8 (emphasis added)
The emphasis on foreign aid paralleled the Reagan agenda for greater defense
budgets and the overall results in terms of the United States' international
influence and superpower prestige were overall favorable. President Reagan's
leiCongress, House, Foretgn Operations. Export Financing, and Related Programs, Part 5, p 498.
171 lildreth, "Perceptions of U.S. Security Assistance," p 84.
thCongress, House, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science of the
Cummittee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Mliliary Stles and Assistance Programs: Laws, Rgulations,
and Procedures, 99th Congress, 1st session, July 23, 1985, p 7 .
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Administration did not solve any of the longstanding security assistance
appropriations problems, like earmarking, but overall he managed to protect
foreign aid from large budget cuts, despite widespread criticism that this came at
the expense of domestic programs. The most significant proposal in the security
assistance program under the Bush Administration is the 1989 request to return to
an all-grant military sales policy reminiscent of the late 1950s. This would include
the merger of FMS and MAP funds. According to Secretary of State James A.
Baker MI's prepared text presented to the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations,
For the first time, we are not seeking an allocation of MAP funds for specific
country programs. Instead, we are combining the MAP and FMS programs
and requesting that the total - approximately $5 billion - be provided in the
form of FMS grants. Use of FMS in lieu of MAP will enable countries capable
of doing so to apply defense assistance to commercial purchases. The all-grant
program initiative is part of our effort to strengthen new, fragile democracies
and ease the financial burden of countries whose economic health is vital to
our own. 19
This appeared to be a reasonable policy given the enormous outstanding debt
levels growing on the balance sheets of foreign aid recipients, as explained earlier.
It also matched the growth in the grant component of military sales which in FY
1989 reached a level of 91 percer.t.2o However, even Congressional acceptance of
all-grant appropriations would do little to lessen the unfortunate practice of
earmarking, which remains the greatest hindrance to the Administration's
pursuit of a flexible and more manageable security assistance program. There is
19Congress, H house, Fr,.ign Opwrations, Export Financrng. and Related Programs. Part 5, p 409
"-01lhd., p 5 !1 Ist-tement of L.TGEN Charles W. Brown, Director, Defense Security Assistance
Agency I
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an urgent need to correct this defect, especially in light of what appear to be
steadily decreasing foreign aid budgets.
1). EFFECTS ON FRIENDS AND ALLI ES
It appears that in an odd way the United States is now paying the price for
having successfully promoted democracy in Western Europe. Negotiating base
rights agreements with the likes of Salazar, Franco, and Papandopoulos, to name a
few, seemed far less problematic in comparison to those negotiated with their
constitutionally elected, democratic successors. Democratizing societies naturally
saw the United States as the great benefactor, a superpower keenly interested in
both their real estate and the well-being of their democratic experiments and
willing and able to financially support the same. Unfortunately, the United States
interest in these countries in which it maintained overseas bases and to which it
gave foreign aid was linked in part to the perpetuation of a credible Soviet threat.
Today, the credibility of this Soviet threat is being called into question and with it
the necessity for continuing what are perceived to be unreasonably high levels of
foreign aid through security assistance.
Recipients of U.S. security assistance are often puzzled by the manner in
which funds are appropriated for foreign aid and their connection, if any, to
American access to bases on their soil. It is as if little sense can be made of a
system that necessitates successful lobbying of both the Executive and Legislative
branches of government. How can the President, through his Secretary of State,
fail to live up to a "best efforts" pledge signed in a formal agreement? How can
levels of security assistance fluctuate so wildly from year to year? This type of
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arrangement certainly is not admirable, and indeed it holds numerous pitfalls bor
effective diplomacy. According to one author,
...the security assistance program is presented in a fashion that maximizes
diplomatic problems and exacerbates the negative effect of the congressional
review process...chan ges in figures [between Executive and Congress) are read
like tea leaves abroad, and the changes from the proposed to the actual budget
will cause each recipient country to peer into the tea leaves and try to fathom
why its funding was altered during the process, and how it fared vis-a-vis other
countries, and whether those differences are significant. 2 1
The end result becomes a spectacle of countries tabling outrageously high demands
and an Executive branch trying to placate those soon-to-be disappointed
recipients. Nations respond to self-interests. This simple enough statement is,
however, often overlooked in the course ofdebate over levels of security assistance.
Americans have a difficult time understanding why levels of security assistance
should be intuitively tied to overseas basing rights when the American presence is
helping to defend the host country. However, from a base-rights country's point of
view, some level of compensation is due them for the infringement on their
national sovereignty which cannot help but be an aspect of foreign troop basing.
This is especially true in the cases of the countries in the southern region, where
the Soviet threat never appeared as ominous as in central Europe. The latter
considerations, in part, satisfied "base-rights" countries' rationalization that
demanding security assistance, implicitly or explicitly, in return for basing access
was neither improper nor contrary to the guidelines of the North Atlantic Treaty.
These countries, as mentiored earlier, gained even greater negotiating leverage as
2Ifranklin 1) Kramer, "TThe Governments Approach to Security Assistance Decisions," in ' S
S,.r'urta, .A..%isiare',. The, I'Aditcal Prtpcess, edited bv Ernest Graves and Steven A. ilildri, th
(.Mla...achusetts anid Toronti L.ext.;gton Books, 1) C. fleath and Company, Lexington, 1985), p 12,
41
they made the transition to democratic governments, a cause the United States
could not help but support in every way possible. But perceived shortfalls and
inconsistencies in levels of funding turned collective defense into self-preservation.
This new thinking by the base rights countries was heightened by the Camp David
Accords and the subsequent repeated earmarking of roughly 60 percent of military
assistance funds to Israel and Egypt - two nations that were neither members of
NATO nor allowed the basing of American troops on their soil. The natural
response then became to "up the ante."
K. THE COSTS OF" SECURITY ASSISTANCE
Given the above cursory look at the evolution of the U.S. security assistance
policy and the reaction of recipients and hosts, attention shifts to the costs of the
program. Several difficult questions arise. For example, can the United States
afford to pay for overseas influence through the security assistance program? Are
today's levels of foreign aid out of proportion to those of the past?
</
In terms of dollars spent and gains achieved, security assistance is cheap.
"The United States, if it needed to, would have little difficulty increasing its present
level of foreign aid. In the immediate post-war environment the Marshall Plan
consumed nearly 12 percent of total federal spending. In 1989, the International
Affairs program's budget (of which approximately one-half is the security
assistance program) accounted for only 1.5 percent of the federal budget. Thus,
less than two cents of every budget dollar went toward this particular vehicle for
advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives, and this same level can be seen over the
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past ten years. 22 In historical perspective, the security assistance program today
is not large. Critics often point to the growing size of the federal deficit and, in a
desire to trim it, find the security assistance program a suitable target. However,
historically, there is no correlation between increases and decreases in foreign aid
appropriations and fiscal realities. This was proven in a study of the security
assistance program between 1950-1982 by Richard Grimmett, who discovered no
direct relationship between the growth and cyclic fluctuations in the U.S. economy
and the amounts appropriated for security assistance programs. Additionally,
Grimmett failed to find any direct relationship between the gross national product
growth per capita and that of the security assistance program. What appeared
instead were funding levels dictated by developments in the international
environment. 23 The point is that while diminutions in the perceived threat are a
valid reason for altering foreign aid appropriations, translating these savings into
a lowering of the deficit is far less certain. It seems imprudent to cut into an
accunt which, for its size, would have little impact on reducing the deficit, but
would have a profound impact on U.S. prestige and influence overseas.
If the debate is nut on the size of the foreign aid budget, it centers on how
wisely these funds are utilized. Aside from the earmarking problem, there is
concern from members of Congress that these funds are spent only with an eye
toward achieving political influence overseas. There is no question that security
assistance is an important means of attaining influence in foreign countries. But,
to a greater degree it promotes U.S. national security by improving the quality of
22C',pgrv.•s,. I Ituse, For,eign ()prations, Elxtirt htnancing, and Related Programs, Part 5. p 488.
2d-GriIIlctt, "The Role oi'Security Assistance," p 32.
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the recipients' defense forces. There can be no question that many lesser developed
nations could ill afford to contribute adequately to Western security without
sizable levels of U.S. foreign aid. The problem lies in the fact that expectations of
the program are inflated. Security assistance cannot guarantee cooperation when
national interests diverge. 24 Healthy relations between nations cannot be based
on bullying or other means of coercion. Paternalistic approaches to foreign policy
are fraught with danger. Nations which receive U.S. security assistance should
not be expected to comply blindly with U.S. requests. There ought to be
communality of interests, but these need not be, for in fact they can never be,
absolute. It is predictable, therefore, that the United States should find most
nations hesitant to allow the United States use of military bases on its soil in an
unrestricted manner regardless of the levels of U.S. security assistance."2 5
Instead of being perceived negatively, this hesitancy ought to be viewed as a
maturation of the political processes of young democracies and an invitation for
greater dialogue between them and the United States.
24Ernest Graves, "Implications for the Future of Security Assistance as an Instrument of
Dcfnsc and Foreign Policy." in U.S. Security Assisatrce, The Political Process, edited by Ernest
Chraves and Steven A. lijldreth (Massachusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, I).C. Heath and
Company, Lexington, 1985), p 167.
2 5 Richard F. Grimmett, "The Role of Security Assistance," p 31.
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F. THE POI.TICAI. ORPHAN
It is not surprising, given the above analysis, that security assistance is often
referred to as the political equivalent of an orphan.26 The general public does not
understand all of the nuances behind the foreign aid program and as one author
stated,
It may be human, but it is certainly American, to find all kinds of fault with
the way money is spent if one does not see clearly how one benefits from the
expenditures.27
A recent poll showed that 50 percent of the people surveyed picked the foreign aid
budget as one of the best places to cut the federal budget.2S Most Americans seem
to prefer foreign aid in the form of economic assistance to that in the form of
military assistance. A rLecent poll indicates that,
Once Americans are informed that two-thirds of U.S. foreign aid is security-
based assistance, decisive majorities support increasing the amount of
humanitarian foreign aid and decreasing the amount of military aid.29
Military assistance carries with it the onerous images of Vietnam and unwanted
entanglementb with corrupt regimes. The public misunderstanding is exacerbated
2,d{,hert B. Muhonety, Jr and David L. WVll.ice, "Tht I)ormestic Constituencies or the St-curitv
A.,i.,tnce Progr~in," in '.S. Security Ass•stance, Th'e Pilitical Process, edited by Ernest Graves
and Stfen A. IIildreth (Massuchusetts and Toronto: Lexington Books, DC. Ileath and Company,
Lu;inn, , 19851, p 126.
27 ;r,•ves, "iniplications fur the Future of.Security Azsistdnce," p 168.
"2hJ,,hn Nldrttila, "Amicrican Public Opinion: Evolving Definitions of National Security," in
A ,,-,rwiu' Global inlersts. A New Agenda, edited by Edward K. Hamilton (New York and London.




by Congressmen who fail to educate their constituents on the merits of the
program. According to Ernest Graves,
...members of Congress explain that they have to get reelected, that foreign
assistance is not a popular subject with their constituents, and that they do not
have the time to educate them.30
It makes political sense in America to demand budget reductions by reducing
international obligations rather than by touching domestic programs that might
directly affect constituents. This attitude is quite noticeable in the House of
Representatives, especially among the traditionally liberal-minded
subcommittees. Men like Representative David Obey, Chairman of the
"Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, favor sharp reductions in the
foreign aid budget, specifically in the area of security assistance to base rights
countries. Chairman Obey recently stated on this topic that,
...so help me, I will do everything within my power to prevent another dime
going to base rights countries because I think it is wrong. I think they are
taking us for a ride.3 1
Annual battles between Congressmen and their State Department counterparts
over levels of funding tu all countries, especially those in which the United States
retains overseas base rights, are the outgrowth of these divergent attitudes.
X"Gra'es, "Implications 1qJr the Future of Security Assistance," p 170.
-':Congress, I I use, Furwegn Operatins, Export Financing, and Related Prograrns, Part 7, p 499.
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G. 'TilE "BASE-RIGFHITS" COUNTRIES PROBILEM
According to recent hearings, some Congressmen are curious how much
longer the United States will need to appropriate security assistance for foreign
countries, especially those in which the United States is allowed base access. To
quote Chairman Obey,
...In what year will some Administration come to this Committee and say,
"Boys and girls, we don't have to ask you to provide base rights money
anymore?" 32
Predictably, this is a question that the Administration hesitates to put a time line
on. The Administration does not want to convey an impression to needy allies and
friends that the United States is ready to leave them out on their own. Instead, the
United States appearh to advocate waiting until the recipients decide on their own
that they no longer feel they require U.S. financial assistance. Along these lines,
the Spanish model is held up as the success story by the State Department. The
U.S.-Spanish 1988 base negotiations ended with the mutual desire by both parties
to end all assistance (save a minor International Military Education and Training
(IMET) fund). The State Department referred to this as "graduating."3 3 While
this might be the goal of the security assistance programzi, Congress is rightfully
concerned that. if this is the case, how does one measure a country's movement
towards this end? No suitable response is offered to this question. One possible
solution would be tying both FMS and ESF funding levels to some leading




economic indicator, like GNP per capita. This would allow the executive and
legislative branches a frame of reference by which to measure countries' elevation
-- up and out of the security assistance program, would keep Congress informed as to
countries' progress, and at the same time provide aid to the most needy. An
obviuus flaw of this approach is that it excludes recipients using their geostrategic
trump cards in negotiations. However, as seen in the case of Spain, base rights can
be preserved with or without security assistance. There are signs that other base
rights countries are also thinking along these lines. The Department of State
testified last year that,
During our recent bilateral consultations, it was the Portuguese position that
they wished to make assistance a less dominant feature of our relationship.34
An early graduation for Portugal and the other countries along NATO's southern
region is an ambitious goal, especially since their ascension is tied in part to a
healthy economy (like Spain's) which each of them still lacks.
Is it possible, or wise, to separate costs of overseas basing from levels of
security assistance? It is first necessary to define the two kinds of costs that are
invulved - fixed and "permission."35 Fixed costs consist of normal operating costs.
They represent both a stable and small portion of base expenses. Since the end of
the Vietnam Conflict, fixed costs never exceeded two percent of the defense budget
when measured in constant dollars. In fact, on the average the U.S. pays less and
less each year to meet these fixed costs involved in building, maintaining, and
a 4Cungre.s., H louse, Fwrctn ()Operations, Export F"imancing, and Related Progrumsi, Part 7, p 449.
36J.ame.- It llaker and Katherine T. WalterL,U.S. Ouerseus Basing: An Anatomy of the
Dilermu, 1989 (unpublished paperp 114.
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operating overseas bases.3 6  The problem lies in what are referred to as
"permission costs." These are basically the level of security assistance promised to
the host country in the executive agreement. Once again, however, the executive
branch does not have the authority to appropriate funds. Instead, the values that
are promised in the agreements are "best efforts" promises, subject to the consent
and approval of Congress. These "permission costs" are the source of friction
within the U.S. government. While their amounts are not relatively that high,
"their upward trend in recent years is troubling. One way of separating base rights
from security assistance would be to agree to pay rent for actual use of the
facilities. However, the official policy of the State Department is that,
"Rent"justification would have deleterious effects on our defense cooperation.
For one thing, basing countries could demand untied funds, which would allow
them to purchase weapons other than in the United States, or even to use the
fundb for purposes other than defense, thus reducing the defense value of the
money, and its impact on U.S. jobs. Furthermore, rents almost always move
in one direction - up. Security assistance in real, inflation-adjusted terms to
basing countries is down significantly from the both historical and the mid-
1980's levels, yet our operations remain unimpeded. 37
There is one significant flaw in this statement. It is widely believed that security
"N assistance is not designed to make money t'or the U.S., as the State Department
suggv.•ts. Instead, it is designed to buy more security and military flexibility.38
Perhaps the emphasib on money and jobs for the U.S. is intended solely to appeal to
Congressmen who are always conscious of political decisions that might affect the
defense industries within theirjurisdiction.
;"'Il,,akr and Walttr, U.S Ove'rsu.% a.sitng, p 120
.' Congress, Iouse, Foreign Operautions, Expirt Financing, and Related Programs. Puar 7. p 5 10
JmMAUktr and Vailter, p 129
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There is another plausible, but unlikely, alternative. One observer suggests
that "permission costs" be subsumed within the fixed costs and be paid out of the
defense budget. The danger here would be the encroachment by the Department of
Defense into matters belonging to the State Department.39 There is little
likelihood that either department would care very much for this proposal.
H. CONCLUSION
Congressional determination to whittle down the federal deficit is
commendable and necessary in the long term national security interests of the
United States. But prudence must be observed. It is difficult to mend torn
relationships between nations. Security assistance is the guiding principle by
which several lesser developed countries typically measure the closeness of their
relationship with the United States. The challenge for the United States will be to
develop a framework whereby it can measure a countries' progress toward the
eventual goal of graduating from the security assistance program, without souring
diplhn, tic relations. Bilateral relationships built solely upon largesse, whether in
the fiorms of economic or military aid, are often abused and inconsistent with the
goal of establishing mature partnerships. But, it needs to be stressed that each
country is unique. Generalized approaches designed to fit all cases will not
succeed. Like students, some countries will excel others and graduate before their
peers. This is to be praised. But, those who take longer must not be left without a
teacher. Security assistance has proven to be a successful instrument of U.S.
foreign policy, but its future is in the hands of Congress - a Congress that will tend
JýOff1ker and Walter, U '.S, Overseas Busing, p 170.
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to base appropriations to a greater degree on the number of successful marks the
program receives on its international report card.
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IV. PORTUGAIL EMBRACES [IEMOCRACY
A. INTROI)UCTION
Because Portugal is one of the oldest countries in Europe, it is often
overlooked that Portugal is in many ways a very young, underdeveloped nation.
Modern democratic Portugal is in fact just an adolescent of 16 years, but with some
of the "excess baggage" of an old and backwards state. It is with these
considerations in mind that Portugal is trying to mature towards consolidating
/
democracy. Unfortunately, there are no domestic precedents worthy of emulation.
Portugal holds a poor record with regard to attempts at democracy. It is generally
accepted that the First Republic (1910-1926) was the most unstable government in
Europe. During its sixteen years in power it underwent nine different presidents,
44 governments, 25 uprisings, and three counter-revolutionary dictatorships.1
Similarly, during the first 13 years of their current attempt at democracy (1974-
1987), Portuguese governments were once again the most unstable on the
continent. Up through 1986, 16 different governments held power. In this sense,
democracy for Portugal represents an experiment. In order to achieve its goal of
forming a true democracy, Portugal must overcome significant social, economic,
military, and political obstacles. This chapter will discuss the transition of
Portugal from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. Is it possible for Portugal
to overcome the legacy of the years of political and economic isolationism imposed
'Thonias C Bruneau, Politics and Nationhood (New York: Praeger, 1984), p 16.
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under Salazar? What are the impediments to the successful consolidation of
democracy? Who have been the principal actors? In which direction should
Portugal concentrate its efforts - the Atlantic or Europe? Are the two mutually
exclusive? These are just a few of the questions which will be considered here.
This chapter will end in 1987 with the beginning of the first majority government
in modern Portuguese democratic history, that of Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and
the Portuguese Social Democratic Party.
B. TItE AUTI 10ItORITARIAN   STATE
The First Republic wallowed through 16 years of ineptitude and turmoil until
senior military officers, frustrated by the political instability, overthrew the
government. The coup had the support of the population. Two years later they
turned power over to Oliveira Salazar who governed Portugal under authoritarian
rule.2 As one author put it, the most accurate term for conveying the sense of what
the Salazar regime was and how it operated is "a conservative and authoritarian
regime of personal rulership." 3 Authoritarian rule under Salazar meant a
repressive dictatorship. Except for maintenance of the colonial possessions of
Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Timor, and Macao, Salazar practiced
domestic isolationism. Portugal's limited foreign policy matched its remote
geographic position out on the edge of the Iberian peninsula. Salazar was
determined that Portugal's economic wealth would be derived independent of
outside, international manipulation. In this sense, preservation of the colonies
2 DoUgIds Porch, The Portuguese Armed Yorces and the Revolution IStanford, California: The
Ih mover Institution Press, 1977), pgs 18-22




became the strategic mission of the Armed Forces. When elements in Angola-
rebelled in 1961, followed by Guinea-Bissau (1963) and Mozambique (1964),
Salazar poured out the nation's wealth and resources to quell the uprisings. He
firmly believed that loss of the colonies would mean the collapse of Portugal as a
nation. In the end, failure to cut loose the colonial possessions brought about the
undoing of the authoritarian state he had hoped to perpetuate.
Salazar did not live to see the collapse of the Portuguese empire. After he
suffered a debilitating stroke in 1968, the leadership passed to his successor
Marcelo Caetano. Caetano proved unable to maintain control of a nation whose
moral fiber was unraveling. In contrast to Salazar, Caetano attempted to
introduce limited reforms, only to have them frustrated by an intransigent
bureaucracy anti a reluctant military. The ghost of Salazar kept the nation
moving along slowly on its old course. In addition to the domestic malaise,
international events catalyzeýd Caetano's fall. The 1973 Arab oil boycotts and price
increases greatly depleted Portugal's strained financial reserves. Furthermore,
the colonial wars were going poorly, at least in Guinea-Bissau. It was widely
believed throughout the military that the African wars were unable to be won, as
testified by General de Spinola, the Army's commander in Guinea-Bissau. These
two events together led to widespread strikes, demonstrations, rampant inflation,
and in July 1973 the first meeting of what would become the Captains' Movement.
C. REVOLUTIONS AND POLITICAL FACTIONALISM
Disenchantment with the government once again led the military to
overthrow the government, just as it had done 58 years earlier. The 25 April
Revolution overthrew the old regime with relatively little bloodshed. Fewer than
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100 people would be killed in politically motivated acts in that year and extending
through 1981.4 The significant difference between the 1974 coup and that in 1926
was that in the latter middle-grade officers under the rubric of the Armed Forces
Movement (MFA) led the movement. With their coup, the MFA dedicated
themselves to the three following principles: decolonization, democratization, and
development. Only decolonization was quickly implemented, and it was done in a
rather haphazard and reckless manner. Democratization and development proved
"to be far more elusive goals.
Successful democratization necessitates functioning political parties in free
competition with one another. In the immediate post-revolution period there was
only one well-organized political party - the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP).
The communists existed in hiding in Portugal almost since their founding in 1921,
as Salazar outlawed all political parties. The revolution brought them to the
forefront and with the popular support of the farmers in the South, workers, and
sectors of the MFA, they came close to gaining political control of Portugal. As the
MFA became disillusioned with Spinola, the PCP rallied to their cause. The end
result was Spinola's departure from politics in September 1974 and the ascension
of Vasco Goncalves (July 1974-September 1975), a far more left-leaning figure, in
his place. 5
4 Bruntau, Puhtics and Nutinhuod, p viii.
5FiFr more on Spinola's fjill and the expansion of MFA influence see Lawrence S. Graham, "The
Military in Politics: The Puliticization of the Portuguese Armed Forces," in Contemporary
PiprthuLJg.l The Revolution and Its Antecedents, Edited by Lawrence S Graham and Harry M
Mb.kler (Austin and London University of Texas Press, 1979j, pgs 236-241.
55
Following Spinola's aborted right-wing coup of 11 March 1975, there was an
"acute fear among Western nations that the Communists might seize political
control of Portugal. In NATO, Portugal was excluded from the Nuclear Planning
Group, despite the fact that not one of Portugal's numerous political parties
questioned the country's membership in NATO, including the PCP.
Internationally, Portugal found its requests for economic assistance shunned. The
point made clear in private and public was that Portugal could not count on
economic support from the West unless it established a "pluralistic political
system." This message was passed through the Socialist International, the EEC,
and a number of states.6
Politically, widespread fragmentation existed. At the time of the first
elections to the Constituent Assembly, held on 25 April 1975, 12 different parties
ran- only four of which were to the right of the PCP (PS, PPD, CDS, and PPM).7
The only party, besides the PCP, having any semblance of organization was the
Portuguese Socialists (PS) under Mario Soares. 8 Soares helped found the PS in
exile in West Germany and through the Socialist International the party received
.. massive amounts of financial and other types of support. This was an informally
orchestrated effort by certain bodies in the West to counter the growing communist
6Bruneau, Politics and Nutionhood, p 53.
71bid., p 45.
8it is advanced that despite not commanding the power they held in 1975, the Communists
from 1975-1979 remained a key political actor such that "the other parties were forced to define
themselves in relationship to the PCP." The Socialists remained popular because they represented
the only viable option to the l)CP; as suggested by Thomas C. Bruneau's "Popular Support for
D)emocracy in Postrevolutionary Portugal: Results from a Survey," in In Search of Modern
Portugal, The Revolution and Its Consequences, edited by Lawrence S. Graham and Douglas L.
Wheeler (Madison and London: The University ofWisconsin Press, 1983), p 127.
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influence. Portugal saw itself faced with increasing economic deprivation,
international isolation, and possibly yet another authoritarian regime.
It was under these circumstances that the 25 November counter-coup
occurred. The remaining two platforms - democratization and development - of the
"three Ds" of 25 April could clearly never have been realized under a communist
government. Equally important, the country would not stand for another
dictatorship, whatever the political orientation. In the words of Ramalho Eanes,
the military planner (and future President) behind the successful counter-coup,
...on 25 November, we gave an answer supported by the will of the Portuguese
people; we gave an answer by saying, decisively and simultaneously, no to left-
wing totalitarianism - -no to 24 April.9
The removal of the communists from government did not include a
simultaneous normalization of the military. On 26 February 1976, the main
political parties agreed that the MFA would maintain a supervisory role over
politics for a period of three to five years, in the form of the Council of the
Revolution (CR) - a supreme military watchdog which oversaw the smooth
transformation of power from military to civilian rule. More specifically, as one
member saw their role,
The Council of the Revolution acted as a political cushion between the
different sectors of the armed forces and the President of the Republic and the
government. We tried to pacify the armed forces and we brought to the
"9Eane.s Addresses Armd Forces on 25 November Anniversary, LD251950Y Lisbon Domestic
Service in Portuguese 1029 GMT 25 Nov 78 LD, translated in FBIS WEU, 27 Nov 78, p MI.
IAddress by President Ramnilho Eanes 25 November to the armed forces at the Marine training




attention of the military chiefs any undercurrents of opinion that had not
reached them by the normal channels.lO
'This' aberration in democratic rule proved necessary for President Eanes to
implement reductions in the armed forces, reductions which saw their size drop
from 200,000 to around 75,000 in just two years.
NATO and the United States played an instrumental role not only in
diplomatically supporting the results of the 25 November coup, but more
importantly in helping to define a role for the reduced Portuguese Armed Forces.
General Eanes maintained close contact with the United States and NATO and
achieved support for a Portuguese Mixed Brigade to be used in Northern Italy.
NATO provided both military equipment and training to the Portuguese Army as
P it proved ill-equipped to fight a conventional defense on NATO's southern flank.1 I
Beginning in 1979, the Portuguese sought to define their NATO and bilateral
agreements in terms of increased economic and military aid. As General Nuno
Viriato Tavares Melo Egidio, Portugal's Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces stated,
Thus taking into account the armed forces' basic and minimum requirements,
and in view of the high cost of military equipment, which considerably exceeds
the nation's capabilities regarding the economic and financial situation, and
since these costs are designed partly to satisfy Atlantic alliance objectives,
outside assistance was requested within the context of the alliance and of
bilateral relations. 12
l0Charais in Hugo Gil Ferreira and Michael W. Marshall, Portugal's Revolution: ten years on
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p 126 [Interview with General Francol.
SI !Bruneau, Politics and Nationhood, p 7 9.
12Mehl, Egidio Interviewed on NATO, Spain's Entry, PM231 101 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 12 Oct 81 pp 7-8, translated in FBIS WEU, 27 Oct 81, p M., ISilva Costa interview
with Portuguese armed forces chief of staffGen Nuno Viriato Tavares Melo Egidio: -Armed Forces
Must Make Top Appointments"1.
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This political move contributed greatly toward defining a strategic mission of
sorts for the Portuguese Army - a mission that they had been without since their
withdrawal from Africa. Therefore, in the strictest sense, since 1975 Portugal's
Armed Forces lacked a strategic mission. The obvious ramifications were a loss of
prestige and a decline in motivation among the armed services. As a "fallback"
position, Portugal viewed an increased commitment to its NATO responsibilities
as the means by which to placate its Armed Forces. As a result, the new,
P- -reinvigorated, post-Revolution missions encompassed the more general goals of
protecting Portuguese national sovereignty and supporting coalition defense.
While it can be argued that these had already been Portugal's post-war
commitments, the latter failed to receive precedence until after the departure from
the colonies. As the civilian Defense Minister Adelino Amaro da Costa stated in
/ 198o,
What really existed before 1974 was a real discrepancy between Portugal's
traditional loyalty to NATO, as far as the overall political and strategic
framework are concerned, and the actual military defense effort for which
national resources were earmarked.1 3
The Armed Forces missions prescribed by the government became more
succinct, but yet general in nature. In a statement before Parliament in 1981,
Professor Freitas do Amaral, Portuguese deputy prime minister and minister of
IJAmarodua Costa InterviewedOn DI'fense Policy, LD210935 Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
5 Nov 80 pp 12-13 (Review Section) linterveiw granted in l.isbon to Spanish journal DEFENSA
editor Vincente Talon by Portuguese Defense Minister Amaro da Costa: 'Government Would Very
Gl-dly Welcome Spain's Entry Into Atlantic Alliance"--date or interview not given), translated in
FHIS WE', 21 Nov 80, p M2
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defense listed, among others, the following principal responsibilities of the
military:
0 The fundamental task for the Portuguese Armed Forces is to ensure national
independence, the unity of the state and the integrity of the territory. Any
other tasks, such as cooperating in economic and social development, are
positive but accessory.
* In the present circumstances, national security is not compatible with any
kind of neutral status. In addition to ensuring Portugal's defense, the
Portuguese Armed Forces should participate--within the framework of the
Atlantic Alliance--in the collective security system of our geopolitical
region.14
Reliance on military funding through bilateral agreements with the United
States, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany also enabled the government
to placate the armed forces without increasing the country's defense budget. In
this way, Portugal's national security interests became dependent, at least in the
military sense, on specific Western security interests and policies.
1). THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MALAISE
The successful 25 November coup also opened the floodgates of previously
denied economic assistance from the West. Loans came in from the World Bank,
IMF, EEC, and individual countries.I5  Despite some resistance, achieving
economic stability became the first order of business for the young democracy,
14Minister of Defense Adresses Parliament, LD161438 Lisbon in Portuguese to Europe 1230
GMT !6 Sep 81, translated in FBISWEU, 17 Sep 81, p MI.
15 Concerning multilateral aid, the World Bank is by far the largest donor, making available
approximately $900 million since 1976. Substantial amounts were also provided by the EEC (about
$60f) million) and the IMF (about $500 million). Rainer W. Rupp, "Burden Sharing and the
Southern Region of the Alliance," in Poll!its and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic
Alliance, edited by Douglas 'T. Stuart (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1988), p 39.
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surpassing that of normalizing relations between the military and civilian
leadership. As one author commented,
As a result of the fact that economic priorities prevail over political and
strategic objectives, a 'normalization' of the relationship between politicians
and the military is only a secondary aim of the political leadership. On the
other hand, influential sectors of the armed forces consider it essential to
define a broad concept of national security that should be adopted in every
aspect of political and social life.16
In conjunction with requests for economic assistance, Prime Minister Mario Soares
applied for Portuguese membership to the EEC on 28 March 1977.17 EEC
membership along with successful integration into Europe were viewed as
essential determinants of Portugal's economic future. Devoid of the colonial
albatross which brought down the former regime, the "new democratic" Portugal
hoped for a fresh start, a new national life. But numerous inherited political and
bureaucratic deficiencies remained.
Political instability dominated the late 1970s and early 1980s as successive
governments unsuccessfully tried to tackle Portugal's economic woes. There are
numerous reasons behind Portugal's fiscal difficulties.including loss of the
colonies, inefficiencies, and civil unrest, but the two most prominent reasons are
the unstable nature of Portuguese party politics and an inadequate constitution.
As mentioned earlier, Salazar banned political parties. This prevented any sort of
16 AIvaro Va.sconcelos, "Portuguese Defence Policy: Internal Politics and Defence
Commitments," in NA TO'., Southern Allies. Internal and External Challenges, edited by John
Chipman iLondon and Ne%. York: Routledge, 1988), p 133.
17Although the European Comnmunity agreed to Portugal'- accession in April 1978, it would
take almost eight more years until both Portugal and Spain became Community members on I
January 1986. Thomas C. Bruneau, "Portugal Fifteen Years After the Revolution," in UFSI Field
Stuff R,'lrts, 1989 96 1 No I, Europe, p2.
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constructive political dialogue. Therefore, in the immediate post-revolution period,
the consolidation of political parties became the overriding concern of the elites.
Predictably, the formulation of economic strategies and the overhaul of
bureaucratic inefficiencies and corruption took a back seat to the consolidation of
viable political parties. This problem continued into the 1980s, owing to the
weakness of the political system. As one author said,
Under these circumstances, the modernization of public administration and
the corresponding discipline of operations management have received a
subordinated priority so far.18
The Portuguese bureaucracy maintained its overstaffed and inefficient
qualities handed down from the Salazar regime. For example, the number of civil
service employees between 1979 and 1984 rose from 380,000 to approximately
"500,000 (with less than 2,000 holding managerial positions). The highly
centralized nature of Portugal's government further frustrated reform efforts.S /!
E. CONSTITUTIONAL ABERRATIONS
The 1976 Constitution was a product of its time, written not as in the United
States by a small group of elites but rather by a large body of 252 in the public eye.
For this reason, it strongly reflected the revolutionary mood and hoped to "ensure
18Joao Cravinho, "The Portuguese Economy: Constraints and Opportunities," in Portugal in,
the_ 198s,, Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation, edited by Kenneth Maxwell INew York,
Westport, Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Press, 1986), p 154.
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* that the then existing reality should remain forever untouchable." 19 It soon
became clear that the 1976 constitutional mandates , such as its prescription for
transforming the society towards socialism, were unworkable. In the words of
former prime minister Francisco Pinto Balsemao (January 1981 -April 1983),
The constitution remains, therefore, too programmatic and unrealistic. The
final result of this is that any government is limited in its action by the
constraints of the constitutional text. The most obvious example is the
irreversibility of the nationalization. The second reault is that there are
several articles of the constitution which could probably be complied with in
1975,76 but cannot, in realistic terms, be applied now. One clear example is
the creation "of a universal, general and free national health service."2 0
These are just a few examples proving that economic recovery necessitated a
thorough restructuring of the Portuguese government and, subsequently, stability
of the political system. Unfortunately, in the early 1980s the likelihood of
obtaining the necessary 213 vote to revise the constitution, was remote. In turn,
foreign investors expressed reluctance to invest in Portugal. This hesitancy was
fueled by the Socialists' promotion of a "workers management" business formula,
governmental protection for strikers, nationalization of key industries, and a
strong communist influence in the labor unions.2 1 As a result, Portugal's economy
19Francisco Pinto Balsemao, "The Constitution and Politics: Options for the Future," in
Portugal in thth 9YSOs, Dilemmas of Democratic C,,nsolidation, edited by Kenneth Maxwell (New
York. Westport, Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Press, 1986), p 2 01.
10lb(id p 20 2
21For niorv rtvding on Portuguese industries in the post-revolutionary period see Nancy
Bermeo, "Worker Management in Industry: Reconciling Representative Government and
Industrial Democracy in a Polarized Society," pg. 181-197; and Harry M. Makler, "The
Consequences of lhe Survival and Revival of the Industrial Bourgeoisie," pgs 251-283, in In Search
of Modern Portugal, The R,'Ututzon and Its Consequences, edited by Lawrence S Graham and
Douglas L. Wheeler (Madison and London. The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983).
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remained idling in neutral, its political parties in disarray, and its population and
military increasingly dissatisfied.
It took until 1982 before the political leadership proved capable of passing a
revision to the original constitution, and while its effects were positive, many
conservative politicians felt that they did not go far enough. In particular, the new
center-right coalition named Democratic Alliance (AD) labored intensively to open
up the Portuguese economy by restricting the central role of the state, namely by
removing restrictions on the denationalization of key industries. AD governments
attempted three times between 1980-1983 to pass privatisation legislation. All
three times the legislation was deemed unconstitutional by the CR. The CR
allowed the military a privileged position in the government, namely that of a
"state within a state."22 It was this privileged position that the AD government
sought to restrict in accordance with President Eanes' promise that the the CR
would not last, more than three to five years. Finally, the AD decided to achieve
the long-sought after normalization of the military by doing away with the CR, an
act which it hoped would give it the necessary leverage to revise the constitution
and amend the restrictions on privatisation. Unfortunately, the Socialists, who
votes were necessary to pass legislation, failed to support the entire AD platform
on constitutional changes. 23 Instead, the final draft of the 1982 revision was
limited to organizational and structural changes between the military and
government including the long-waited abolition of the CR, but it failed to address
the inherent economic maladies of the original constitution.
22
'Balsemao, 'i'he Constitution and Politics," p 205.
23Bruneau, "Portugal Fifteen Years After the Revolution," p 9.
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Oddly enough, in some respects the military suffered a great deal under the
CR due to the lack of a central policy-making branch for long-term strategic
planning. Issues such as long-range modernization or restructuring plans were
instead supplanted by a rather ad hoc approach, with little inkling of a grand,
concerted strategy. One official stated publicly that
...Portugal has a plan for the modernization of its armed forces but its
implementation will hinge on the revision of the constitution and on the
approval of the law on national defense.24
Following acceptance of the 1982 constitutional revision, the government passed
the National Defense Law that created a Ministry of Defense. Proponents of the
National Defense Law hoped to define a coherent role for the military in society.
Under a Ministry of Defense the government, instead of the military, would have
complete control of security policies. It would also remove the military from
defense procurement and allow the government to approve the Armed Forces' long-
term strategy. Although President Eanes vetoed this measure, a concerted AD /
Socialist vote overrode the veto. The promise of normalization of the military to
civilian rule appeared fulfilled, and with it, the arrival of true democracy in
Portugal.
Although authorized by law, the reform effort embodied in the National
Defense Law proved difficult for successive civilian leaders to implement.
Deprived of political consensus, Portugal's civilian leadership since 1982 by and
large maintained an arms-length approach to military matters and their decisions,
2441nister Transits Mudrid, Comments on NATO, LD220044 Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 2300 GMT 21 Mar 82, translated in FBIS WEU, 24 Mar 82, p MI, [Manuel Lopes report
from Madridl.
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and allowed the Chiefs of Staff relative independence in matters concerning
military procurement and budgetary priorities. 25 Kenneth Maxwell described this
phenomenon as follows:
It is not surprising perhaps that ambiguity of Spain and Portugal security
relationships prior to Democratization, has made the foreign policy and
defense areas one of the last areas to be normalized in the process of West
Europeanization which both countries have undergone over the past decade,
and an area where curious holdovers and continuities from the old regime
remain. 26
Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Rui Machete in 1985 put it in
slightly different words:
...there is not as yet a ministry of defense and this requires stability and
political will which will make it possible to perform this task, which is very
considerable. It is here that medium- and long-term strategic planning, which
defines the major defense aims and is not a specifically military problem,
should be affected. The problems connected with technological innovation, in
which defense ministries usually have a major role to play, the need to
promote industries in order to ensure that a certain kind of innovation is
applied to Armed Forces equipment - - all these are things which do not exist
in Portugal. 27
However, the legal implications of the National Defense Law should not be
minimized. While perhaps that which was achieved on paper was not completely
actualized, the following achievements represented landmarks in Portugal's
25Vasconcelos, "Portuguese Defence Policy," p 123.
Kenneth Maxwell, 'Spain, Portugal, and Their Contribution to Western Security: The




-Machete Discusses Varioue Defense Issues, PM261621 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 12 Aug 85 pp 2, 5, translated in FBIS WEU, 28 Aug 85, p M1, lInterview with Deputy




ongoing democratization process. According to the 1982 revision: 1. The
President is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces with the right to
declare war; 2. All service Chiefs of Staff nominations require Presidential
approval; 3. The President chairs the National Defense Council composed of
cabinet ministers, two members of Parliament, the four Chiefs of Staff, and the
presidents of the Azores and Madeira; and 4. Parliament is responsible for
legislative and supervisory defense matters.28
Besides failing to enact greater economic reforms, the other weakness of the
1982 constitutional revision centered on its failure to change the electoral system.
Portugal's system is based on proportional representation. Proportional
representation in the immediate post-revolutionary period proved invaluable for
the consolidation of political parties that heretofore did not exist.29 However, with
consolidation achieved, the system unfortunately promoted political instability by
allowing large numbers of major political parties and their outgrowth, coalition
governments. Weak coalitions and minority-ruled governments became the rule
rather than the exception through 1987, with the average duration of governments
during this 13 year period being 11 months.30 Portugal found itself caught in a
"catch-22." On the one hand, the government lacked the necessary two-thirds
votes in parliament to revise the constitution. On the other hand, without a
constitutional revision it could not institute a nonproportional electoral system
which could gain a guvernment a two-thirds majority. Analyses suggest that if a
2m Vasc"nce Itp, .Portuguecse Defence Policy," p 124
"
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nonproportional system had existed in 1983 the Socialists would have gained an
* outright majority in parliament.31 Arguably, the 1987 elections disproved the
need for a nonproportional system. However, until the results from the next
election are in, 1987 must be considered the exception rather than the rule.
F. REDEFINING ALIGNMENTS
The fundamental cornerstone of Portugal's foreign policy has always been its
Atlanticist tradition. As Salazar used to proclaim, Portugal is an Atlantic country
"as only England can be." 32 However, with its progressive emergence out of
Salazar's enforced isolationism, Portugal looked increasingly toward Europe in
formulating its foreign policy throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Development
of new avenues of cooperation and integration in Europe manifested itself in
several different political as well as economic ways.
As explained earlier, Portugal applied for admission to the European
Economic Community in 1977. Nearly nine years later they, along with Spain,
became the Communities' newest full members (although the Portuguese were
given a grace period in which to bring their escudo in line with the other European
currencies). While discussion of Portugal's integration into the EEC will be dealt
•-- with in more detail in the next chapter, the significance of Portugal's admission
and its effect on the country's morale cannot be overstated. Besides the monetary
benefits, EEC accession gave Portugal international prestige and a fresh outlook
J'Vasc~mcelos, "Portuguese Defence Policy," p 109.
32 AIbano Nogucira, "Portugal's Special Relationship: The Azores, the British Connection, and
NATO," in NATO and thi Mediterranean, edited by Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and




and confidence for the country's economic future. As Foreign Minister Pinheiro
once expressed,
Purtugal has "an almost aristocratic position," which it should assume on the
world s scene, because of history and culture. We are among the poorest in a
rich men's club which is the EEC, but... we belong to that club. 33
The West European Union (WEU), to which Portugal applied for membership
in 1984, offered a second medium for greater European integration. While the
exact benefits to be derived from membership are as limited as the organization's
-' charter, application nevertheless proved Portugal's determination to become
"more European," without harming relations with the United States. Much like
the EEC, WEU membership would not come without that of Spain's simultaneous
admission, which would not take place until 1988. Formal association with the
Eureka project represented yet another pro-European development in Portuguese
foreign policy. Portuguese officials initially expressed skepticism about this
European high technology forum and about possible participation in the United
States' Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). In the words of Figueiredo Lopes,
Secretary of State for Defense, "Portugal has little to give and little to gain, both
with the SDI and with Eureka."34 This skepticism finally waned. By the summer
of 1985, Portugal announced that it formally accepted these challenges.
33 Foreign Minister Pinheiro Surveys Poliy Aims, PM160955 Lisbon l)IARIO l)E NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 21 Feb 88 p 4, translated in FBIS-WE'U-88-051, 16 March 1988, p 6, ICarlos Albino
report on (Oporto speech by Foreign Minister Joao de Neus Pinheiro, "Portuguese Diplomacy Sends
'Messagt.s.' to United StAteb, Spain, and WEU;" date not giveni.
;4Gana. L.;p'z Discuss EIREKA. 'Star Wars,' INM071055 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 28 May 85 p 2, translated in FBIS WEU, 12 Jun 85, p M2, 'Luis D)elgado article:
"Portugal IIlas Not (Yetl Said Eurcka"l.
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K IPortugal must make a qualitative leap forward so as to reorganize and
modernize itsproduction apparatus and meet the challenge posed by European
integration. For this reason the government has decided that it should take
advantage of the opportunities offered by the Eureka project and agree to take
part in the research stage of the Strategic Defense Initiative.3 5
Throughout the early 1980s, Portugal wanted increased participation in N
European initiatives, but not exclude itself from its traditional Atlanticist role.
Portugal stresses that its interests have always been seaward, but not including
the Mediterranean. The Atlantic Ocean is the medium by which Portuguese
seafarers have made their living, explored the world, and protected their national
security interests and this is why NATO and CINCIBERLANT are natural
reflections of Portugal's proud heritage. Portugal continued throughout the 1980s
to improve its participation with NATO, such as the Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) program.36 But, despite its past, it appeared logical
that Portugal's progressive development should not be confined to its Atlantic
past, but should consist of a greater balance of the remarkable potential further of
. -- European integration together with the benefits of being a signatory to the North
Atlantic alliance.
The early to mid-1980s also ushered in changes to the make-up of Portuguese
political parties as well. New leaders appeared as those with vivid memories of
the events of 1974-1975 became increasingly fewer in number. Mario Soares, Sa
•s -a•chete Discusses Deense Capability Needs, PM261352 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Pr-tuguese 21 Sep 85 p 24, translated in FBIS WEU, I Oct 85, p M3, lUnattributed report:
"Autonomous Capability for Defense of Portuguese Strategic Triangle"].
3
*iAlvaro Vasconcelos, "Portugal in Atlantic - Mediterranean Security," in Politits and Security
in :he Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance, edited by Douglas T. Stuart (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1988), p 125.
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Carneiro (died in an airplane crash), and Freitas do Amaral no longer head their
own parties. Instead, younger politicians have emerged who tend to be
...more technocratically minded, more concerned with economic development
* and European economic integration than with sustaining a great anti-Soviet
campaign. 37
G. CONCLUSION
Based on Portugal's past, an obvious fear persists that continued political
instability might hinder the ongoing normalization of the Portuguese Armed
Forces. There are still many in the military who see political instability as a
national defense problem with the strengthening of "political power at the center"
as the government's primary responsibility. Others, of course, place economic
development as the top priority. 38 It seems that the two are not mutually
exclusive. Where there is political stability, economic viability may well follow,
and with it a normalization of the military. The implementation of all three is
essential. Unfortunately, in the first 13 years of Portugal's democratic experiment
the unly full achievement in terms of the original MFA platform was
deculonizatiun. The remaining "Ds" were only satisfied in degrees. Democracy
had been ushered in, but its unstable condition prevented it from being considered
a complete success. Similarly, economic development was yet to be realized, with
EEC membership not coming until 1986. Fulfillment of the original mandate
rested on a further revision of the constitution and full implementation of the
"National Defense Law. Despite the domestic optimism and increased linkages
J7\'dsconcelos, "Portuguese Derence loficy," p 11.




with Europe, Portugal proved once again unable to vote in a majority government
in the 1985 elections. It would take an additional two years before Cavaco Silva,
the heir apparent to Sa Carneiro, would achieve what no politician before him
could - an outright majority in Parliament. From that point Portugal would





V. PORTUGAI'S TIES WITH FRANCE ANI)THE FRG
A. INTRODUCTION
As highlighted in the previous chapter, Portugal is increasingly aligning
itself with West European social, economic, and political trends. This is a new
development for a country traditionally concerned with colonial or internal
matters. Aside from trade with its former overseas provinces, Portugal's largest
export market was not a Continental European country, but rather the United
Kingdom (until 1985).0 Historically, convergence between Britain and Portugal
developed not out of common European interests but rather shared overseas
colonial interests. Portuguese colonies overseas offered ports-of-call to English
ships while the Portuguese in return accepted English military protection. The
Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1373 remains the longest standing alliance in the
modern world. This chapter, however, focuses not on the United Kingdom, but on
the development of Portuguese relations with two other European countries -
France and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). French and West German
ties with Portugal are unique in the sense that they alone (in addition to the
United States) have use of military facilities in Portugal.
This intent of this chapter is to examine Portuguese-French and Portuguese-
West German relations in order to draw comparisons with those of the United
States and Portugal, which are considered in the following chapter. It was
IAs listed in d review from 1959-1989 of principle Portuguese trading partners, according to
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hypothesized that there might be differences in the ways Portugal conducts base
negotiations with the United States, France, and the Federal Republic of
Germany, and that these differences might involve factors outside the domain of
security assistance. In an attempt to examine the most pertinent of the wide range
of variables that together make up bilateral relations, this chapter is comprised of
the following sections: cultural / social / educational ties, governmental ties,
visibility of the foreign bases, emigration preferences, emigrants' remittances,
balance of trade, foreign direct investment, reliability of foreign aid, and the origin
of military equipment. In order to enhance U.S.-Portuguese relations a better
understanding of Portugal's cooperation with its European "base-rights" neighbors
becomes valuable. It may well be that the degree of social (cultural links,
immigration) and economic (trade, direct investment) ties between Portugal and
its three "base-rights" countries inauences the amount of security assistance
/ requested by Purtugal to secure base rights.
/-
/
7-, B. BACKG ROUND OF PORTUGAL'S EUROPEAN BASES
The principal French military base in the Azores is located on the island of
Flores. This remote outpost on the western edge of the island chain serves as a
tracking station for French ballistic missile experiments. The cooperation
agreement was signed on 7 April 1964 and the station was officially opened on 6
October 1966.2
The Federal Republic of Germany concluded a bilateral defense agreement
with Portugal on 14 October 1963 after a series of secret negotiations. According
2'uc Crullen, Portugal, the U.S. and NA TO (Belgium: Lueven University Press, 1973), p. 65
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to the agreement, West Gcrmany obtained the use of the National Air Base No. 11
at Beja. The Beja base, located in the southern regickn of the mainland, was
initially intended to serve as a reinforcement and command center in the event of a
Warsaw Pact incursion into Western Europe. Instead, the base eventually became
a training camp for Luftwaffe Alpha jet pilots. 3
C. CUILTURALISOCIALIEDUCATIONAL TIES
It is difficult to measure and compare the exact degree of cultural ties
between nations accurately. Cultural linkages are amorphous "gray areas" that
are rarely clearly defined. After all, one must consider what time periods are being
considered. What are the measurement tpols? What value can b. placed in purely
subjective opinions which could obviously differ greatly depending on the degree of
objectiveness of the observer, not to mention the person's nationality? Cultural
ties, in this cursory analysis, will be viewed in the context of the 20th century. The
emphasis will be on comparing the degree of shared historical experiences,
religion, education, and the arts.
French-Portuguese cultural, social, and educational ties are extremely
strong. Parallel colonial experiences in Africa and the Far East along with the
painful process of decolonization forged unique and conciliatory relations between
the two countries. The two countries naturally came into repeated contact in the
management of their overseas possessions and thereby shared common
experiences. To this day both France and Portugal remain actively involved in
3(,,rmun Pilots To Train ut Beju; Agreement Renewed, LD212058Y Hamburg DPA in German
1946 GMT 21 Dec 78 LD, translated in FBIS WEU, 22 Dec 78, p MI.
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Africa, not so much militarily, but rather diplomatically. For example, French
President Francois Mitterrand and his Portuguese counterpart General Ramalho
Eanes discussed the possibility of establishing tripartite relations between France,
Portugal, and the Portuguese-speaking African countries in December of 1981.4 It
is not surprising, according to a reputable source, that French sympathies exist to
the greatest degree in the 45 + Portuguese age group. This is the generation
before the Revolution that shared in the colonial experience and it was during the
1960s that Portuguese immigration to France reached its apex. Roman
Catholicism is the predominant religion of both countries. Approximately 90
percent of the Portuguese population and 80 percent of the French population
express spiritual loyalty to the Vatican. 5 The French Embassy in Lisbon
reportedly designates one person working a part time job to information activities,
including press and and distribution programs. The cultural program includes a
French Lycee (secondary school with an excellent reputation); and the Alliance
Franscaise offers language courses, lecture programs, and a library housing 8,000
volumes. The embassy also sponsors film showings, art exhibitions, and guest
appearances by French artists. Recently, a new Luso-French Institute opened,
expanding the information services already available. 6 The high number of
emigrant workers in France, numbered at 850,000 in 1986, provides yet another
4Ramalho Eanes, Frenth President Hold Talks, LD120252, Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 0000 GNIT 12 Dec 81, translated in FBIS WEU, p MI, 14 Dec 81.
5The Europa YearBook, 198, A World Survey, p 1060.
6Counfri Data, Portugal, Information Paper published by the United States Information
Agency, p 6t provided by M. L. Asquinod EU/868, United States Information Agency.
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avenue of cultural exchanges between the two countries.7 Former Portuguese
President General Ramalho Eanes summed it up best when he referred to France
as "being for the Portuguese their second country, in the cultural and the human
sense."8
West German-Portuguese cultural, social, and educational ties are also
strong. Although technically neutral during WWTI, the Portuguese received
repeated overtures by Nazi Germany aimed at obtaining basing rights in the
Azores. While Salazar rebuffed these overtures, he nevertheless held some degree
of sympathy for Nazi Germany and its dictatorship. Portugal was one of only two
nations - the other being Eire - to lower their flags to half-mast at the news of
Hitler's death.9 Relations after the war became more tangible with Portugal, as
charter member of the North Atlantic Treaty, lodging the proposal for West
- IGermany's admittance into the Western Alliance.n0 Roman Catholicism is
obviously not as strong in the heartland of Luther's Reformation as it is in France.
Roughly 45 percent of the West German population are Roman Catholics, with the
* percentage greatest in the southern regions - coincidentally the area where the
largest number of Portuguese emigrant workers are located.! 1 Much like France,
"the West German Embassy is active through the press in distributing cultural,
7MItterrand Commnents on Ariane, AU070724 Paris AFP in English 0458 GMT 7 Apr 87, in
FBIS WEU, 7 Apr 87, p M2
IFrance Seen As Natural Ally for Portugal In EEC Negotiations, LDI 11625 Paris Domestic
Servict in French 1200 GMT1 11 Ckt 79 I.D, translated in FBIS WEU, 12 Oct 79, pg K4.
9Crullen, Portugal, p 13 1.
'OPortugals President .Altri, Soares Visits, l.D9 1101 1lamburg DPA in German 1014 GMT 19
Apr 88, translatud in FBIS \WEU 88-078, 22 April 1988, p 4 .
I'The Europa Year Book., A Wurld Survey, p 1174.
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informational, and commercial materials. In addition, the German Goethe
-Institute in Lisbon has a 7,500-volume library, film library, lecture program,
exhibits, and an active theater program. Educationally, there is a private West
German school, chairs at the Faculty of Letters, and a leader visitor program to
West Germany.12 Large movements of immigrant workers into West Germany
also act as a cultural cross-pollenization of sorts. According to a former resident, it
is not out of the ordinary to see small Portuguese villages embracing Bavarian and
French architecture to such an extent that the unknowing tourist would believe he
was standing somewhere north ofthe Alps.
1). GOVERNMENTALTIES
Governmental ties constitute an area perhaps as difficult to measure as
* cultural linkages between nations. The measuring tools for the purposes of this
study are historical precedents, commonality in the forms of government, official
visits, and friendships. French-Portuguese relations have been characterized as
being influenced by the "Gaullist dream of grandeur," or in other words, national
pride and greatness through independence of action, military prowess, and a
developed economy. 13 This perception of de Gaulle's France serving as a political
role model for Portugal is perhaps equally justifiable in the present day. Francois
Mitterrand's election to Presidency in 1981 was a victory not only for French
Socialists but for International Socialism. The first person to travel to Paris to
- meet the President-elect was Portuguese Socialist Party Secretary General Mario
1 2 (.70untry Duta, Portugal, p 6.
13Crollen, Portugal, p.130.
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"Soares, a close friend of Mitterrand, an active member of the Socialist
International, and the future Portuguese Prime Minister and President. 14 The
Soares-Mitterrand friendship remains solid. Another governmental linkage is
that both countries have established and well-organized communist parties with
which to contend, although Portuguese Socialists do not condone duplication of the
the French Socialists' position of sharing power with the Communists as took place
between 1981 and 1984 (notwithstanding their 1974/1975 experience). The French
form of government serves as a role model for the Portuguese. The Portuguese
looked toward the French model when structuring their Defense Ministry's
civilian services and attempt;ng t6 draw up mid-term military spending plans,15
and it is the French who have already charted the proposed Portuguese path for
economic revitalization. In an interview Gerard Longuet, former representative to
the European Parlia .ient and currently representative for the Meuse Department
and general delegate fur the Republican Party, spoke at length of how, while
formidable, Portugal'ti economic challenges are no different than those successfully
confronted by France three decades ago. He said,
We accepted decolonization in a context as difficult as that experienced today
by Portugal and the European perspective represented an alternative
ambition...Portugal is going to experience two development stages and the real
difficulty will not occur immediately but 10 years from now. That is exactly
14 President-Elect Meets With Portuguese Socialist, LDI30148 Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 2230 GMT 12 May 81, translated in FBIS WEU, 13 May 81, p KI. It is implied that the
/Sa&dres Mitterrand friendship extends ba,:k a, least to 1974 when, for a period of five years, Soares
wa.- "exiled" in France This time in seclusion away fron Portugal's military dictatorship is
referenced in Mitterrand Comments on Ariane, AU070724 Paris AFP in English 0458 GMT 7 Apr
87, FBIS WEU, 7Apr 87, p.M2.
l'Military Agreement With France T'o Be Drafted, LI)062046 Lisbon in Portuguese to Europe





the situation France was in between 1955 and 1975: for 20 years we built our
industrial development on cheap labor from the rural areas. Then, in a second
stage, we had to convert our quantitative industry into a qualitative one. A
difficult operation when one does not have adequate training facilities at one's
disposal.16
Just as President Mario Soares requested that Mitterrand be Portugal's first
"official state visitor following its admission into the Common Market, so are
.-. C. French-Portuguese political relations likely to remain of the most cordial nature. 17
West German-Portuguese political relations in the post-war period have been
characterized by peaks and valleys. As mentioned earlier, Portugal advocated
West German integration into NATO, followed up by z basing agreement at Beja
and a myriad of other military compensations in return for West German arms
sales which supported Portuguese war efforts in Africa.1I The relationship soured
with West Germany before the 1974 revolution while Willy Brandt was in power
(1969-1974). It was not until after the revolution and during the chancellorships of
Schmidt (1974-1982) and Kohl (1982-present) that more amenable relations were
"restored. It is significant to note that when West German President Karl Carstens
visited Portugal on a state visit in 1980 it was the first official visit by a German
head of state in 75 years!19 Increased West German-Portuguese political
interactions are a development of the last decade, especially in the sphere of
economics - e.g. Portuguese admittance into the EC. One of the more promising
.16Country's Preparedness for 1992 Deemed Poor, 35190164 Paris LE QUOTIDIEN in French 19
Jun 89 pp] 6 -17 , translated in FBIS-WEU-89-162, 23 August 1989, p 19.
17Mitierrand on Relations With Portugal, Chad, PM141334 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 6 Apr 87 p 5, translated in FBIS WEU, 15 Apr 87, p K 1.
18For a more thorough description of the numerous Luso-West German negotiations in the
1960s and 1970s ee Luc Crollen's, Portugal, The U.S. And NATO, pgs 131-133.
19GIenscher Views FRG-Portuguese Relations, Other Issues, LD220835 Lisbon EXPRESSO in




bilateral accomplishments was the signing on 15 July 1980 of a fiscal agreement
that would avoid double taxation 2 0 - an agreement that still eludes U.S.-
Portuguese economic relations. The Federal Republic also continues to pursue
greater cooperation with Portugal through a visitor program by which Portuguese
legislators travel to nfeet their West German counterparts and other high
officials. 21 The degree of West German-Portuguese political dialogue is likely to
continue to increase throughout the 1990s.
E. VISIBILITY OF THE FOREIGN BASES
The basis behind examining the "visibility of the foreign base" rests on the
.1 hypothesis that the more visible the foreign military facility is to the general
public, the more likely will it be a source of friction between nations. The U.S. Air
force Base at Hellenikun in Greece is an excellent example. Located not far from
Athens, the facility shares its airfield with the international airport and is
predica bly a bone of contention between the U.S. and Geece. In Portugal, only
one of the three foreign military facilities is on the mainland, while the other two
are in the Azores.
S V o France's principal military facility in the Azores is located on the island of
Flores, although in accordance with the 1984 agreement the French are also
allowed to station aircrbft and ships on the islands of Sao Miguel, Terceira, Santa
2hportughi, s RG Sign T ai Agreement; Cfarsteins Departs, 1.1)161726 Lisbon in Portuguese to
Europe 1230 GMoT l6eJul 81l, t bnslated in FiS WEX, 18 Jul80o, p MI.
2 1Gensrher R'cevie's PA~ritguese Legislators, 1.1)131907 Hamburg l)PA in German 1153 GMT
13Maore86, translated in FilS AIeX 17 Mar 86, pJ3.f, .' r in the Aores
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Maria, and Faial. 22 The French military holds a remote presence in the
archipelago, well out of the public eye. Interestingly, the French have conducted
military expeditions into Africa from Azorean bases, such as during the Shaba
conflict in April 1977.23 However, despite this episode, a survey of Portuguese
radio and literature translated by FBIS uncovers scarcely a half dozen references
to the Flores base, with none of them expressing any type of hostility or
displeasure towards the French presence on the islands.
The West German air base at Beja holds none of the benefits of the French
facility on Flores. Highly visible, heavily criticized, and not adequately subsidized
in Portugal's opinion, Beja cannot help but maintain a presence in the local press.
The West German contingent permanently stationed at Beja includes
approximately 600 Bundeswehr servicemen, 18 Alpha jets, and two rescue
helicopters. 24 The problem with Beja is simple: its mission. Both the West
German and Portuguese Air Forces use National Air Base No. 11 as a training
facility, which includes low-level flights. Tnere are numerous low-level routes
" .- throughout the country with the principal one being the route between Beja and
the Alcochete firing range. Recent accidents like that at Ramstein, while having
no resemblance to normal training missions, nevertheless heightened Portuguese
public awareness of the inherent dangers of low-altitude flights. As far back as
22 Mlsiile-Trucking Station Pact Signed With France, LD041447 Lisbon in P(;.ugu-se to
Europe 1230 GMT 4 Apr 84, translated in FBIS WEU, 5 Apr 84, p Ml.
2 3Alvaro Vasconcelos, "Portuguese Defence Policy: Internal Politics and Defence
Commitments," in NATO's Southern Allies, Internal and External Challenges, Edited by John
Chipman, (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), p 115.
24German Defense Minister Arrives for Visit, Lt24154a 9 Hamburg DPA in German 1235 GMT
24 Mar 88, translated in FBIS-WEU-88-05825 March 1988 p 7 .
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1987 one thing was clear - Lisbon was not interested in expanding the facilities at
Beja, given the 'evel of military assistance offered by West Germany as a quid pro
quo.25 This observation appear- ,qually valid today.
F. EMIGRATION PREFERENCES
Portuguese emigration patterns changed dramatically after the 1974
Revolution. In addition to the sharp decrease in Portuguese immigrating to other
countries in Western Europe, due to a rise in European legal restrictions, there
was a tremendous wave of Portuguese returning from the former colonies. Legal
restrictions on the part of France and West Germany prevented these returnees
N "from settling in these countries, which were popular with previous Portuguese
emigrants. Another factor that may have possibly contributed to drops in
Portuguese emigration was the promise of a better life that came with the
country's transition to democracy. Regardless of the causes, the end result was
that in 1974 there were over 43,000 Portuguese immigrating worldwide; in 1988
the number stood at under 10,000.26 The current trend is especially visible among
today's young, whose ambition and optimism is a stark contrast to the "lost
generations"of Portugal's past. In a poll of 2,000 young people between the ages of
"15 and 29, the results confirmed overwhelmingly that the younger generations are
"patriotic, optimistic, consumer-minded, reformist, and family-oriented." Uzilike
those of the turbulent 1960s (who experienced the colonial wars), Portugal's
"
25GoL'ernment To Redefne FRG Air Force Pact, LD271628 .isbon International Service in
Portuguese 1105GMT 27 Oct 87, translated in FBIS-WEU-87-209, 29 October ,987, p 17.
"
26Special thanks to Feriindj Andrade, Economic Assistant at !he United States Embassy in
Lisbon, who gathered from Portuguese documentation (from Banco de Portugal figures) on
emigrant remittances, emigration statistics, and foreign investment.
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younger generation today is inclined to believe that its future lies in Portugal and
not in other countries. The same poll could only find 20 percent who would answer
affirmatively to the question, "Would you agree to emigrate?" 27
As seen in Figure 7, the number of Portuguese immigrating to France since
/ ,1966 has dropped considerably. In 1966, 61.1 percent of the more than 120,000
Portuguese immigrated to France, while in 1987 only two percent of over 8,000
Portuguese chose likewise. 28 France, while still the country of choice for emigrant
workers, neither encourages nor attracts permanent Portuguese settlers.
There appears to be little interest or opportunity for post-Revolution
x Portuguese to settle permanently in West Germany. Between 1973 and 1976 the
percentage of Portuguese emigrating to West Germany dropped by 38.1 percent!
The percentage since 1978 consistently rests at less than one percent.29 As
mentioned earlier, restrictive emigration laws barring many Portuguese from
moving to France and West Germany on a permanent basis are largely to blame
for this phenomenon. However, the connection between the trend seen in Figure 7
and a poll cited in the next chapter (page 110) suggests that there are additional
reasons behind the Portuguese aversion to settling in West Germany. For now, the
only conclusion that can be drawn is that the Federal Republic of Germany is by
and large a haven only for Portuguese migratory workers.
/
2-'.1l Show., Youth Optimism, Patriotism 35420063 Lisbon 0 INDEPENDENTE in
Port uguese 13 Feb 89 pp 15 17, translated inFBIS-WEU-89-057, 27 March 1989, p 11.
2 iljanco de Portugal data 1976-1988
29lbid
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G. EMIGRANTS' REMITTANCES
Portugal annually receives considerable amounts of revenues from
emigrants' remittances, especially from those individuals working in France and
the Federal Republic of Germany. Unfortunately, the ability to measure
emigrants' remittances accurately is suspect. As noted by Thomas Straubhaar,
...only money remitted by direct bank or postal transfers can be recorded with
any degree of reliability...with standard deviations of 10% being the norm. 30
Nevertheless, any discussion incorporating emigration statistics would be remiss
without citing the best available data concerning trends in the flow of money from
emigrant workers.
The growth of remittances grew rapidly in the 1960s along with the demand
for foreign workers from Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Then in the
1970s, demand fell as restrictions on emigration grew. However, throughout this
period and up to the present day the importance of remittances to Portugal's gross
domestic product significantly exceeds that of j.s Mediterranean neighbors: a fact
typical of lesser developed countries.3 1 Portuguese emigrant remittances between
'* 1960 and 1981 added 3.89 percent to the national income.3 2 Typically, emigrant
remittances from Europe have allowed Portugal to cover its outstanding trade
"* deficit with both France and West Germany. Unfortunately, reliable data citing
the exact amounts of emigrant remittances from France, the Federal Republic of
Jt..-n•jor s Strauhhaar, "Migrants' Remittances and Economic Activity," in Intereconomics, Vol
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Germany, and the United States are not available. Instead, Figure 8 represents
the percentage of total remittances from all of the European OECD countries, the
"United States and Canada, and then the sum total of the previous two categories.
7 France, with the largest share of Portuguese emigrant workers, responded
favorably as early as 1979 to Portuguese calls for fairness towards their citizens
"working in France. On the occasion of the new Portuguese ambassador to Paris,
Siqueira Freire, presenting his credentials, President Giscard d'Estaing stated
that no sort of discrimination against Portuguese workers in France would take
place. 33 Three months later during a state visit to France, President Ramalho
Eanes placated a crowd of thousands of Portuguese emigrants with his personal
"belief in d'Estaing's promises, stating, "a president's word is his bond."34 Prime
Minister Pierre Mauroy expanded French cooperation in this area in 1984 with the
assurances that France would assist in the retraining of those emigrant workers
who opted to return to Portugal, and furthermore, that all Portuguese laboring in
France could stay indefinitely. 35
Unfortunately, there is scant information available concerning West German
attitudes and official policy positions regarding Portuguese emigrant workers.
The only information that can be gleaned from published West German and
Portuguese interviews is that in 1981 nearly 50 percent of the Portuguese annual
trade deficit with West Germany was made up by emigrant remittances and
33Portuguese Ambassador To France Meetes With Giscard, 1.1)122330 Lisbon Domestic Service
in Portuguese 2206 GMT 12 ,ul 79 LD, translated in FBIS WEU, 13 Jul 79, p M4.
J4Eanes Obtains Guarantees For Compatriots In France, LDI 12233 Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 1930 GMT 11 Oct 79 LD, translated in FBIS WEU, 15 Oct 79, p MI.
35French Prime Minister Concludes Visit. Departs, LD212322 Lisbon in Portuguese to Europe
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tourism and that it has continued to rise annually. 36 It is undoubtedly a
Portuguese priority to ensure the well-being of their citizens residing in other
countries, like those in West Germany, both from a legal and fiscal point of view.
H. BALANCE OF TRADE
Portugal is by all definitions a developing country with a GNP that
consistently ranks among the lowest in the Atlantic Alliance. According to the
"World Bank, Portugal's GNP measured at average 1985-87 prices stood at $2, 890
per head.3 7 In comparison, Spain's was $4,860,38 Greece's $4,350,39 France's
$12,860,40 and the FRG's $14,460.41 Portugal slowly made headway towards
economic recovery in the 1980s following two IMF guaranteed loan packages and
"between 1980 and 1987 its GNP per head, in real terms, rose at a yearly rate of 2.2
percent -one of the highest in Europe.42 Still, there is an unmistakable pessimism
among the Portuguese about the current state of affairs. In a revealing January
1989 poll 54.8 percent of the businessmen interviewed felt that 1989 would be
economically worse than 1988, while only 16.7 percent held a more optimistic
view. 43 Similarly, in an October 1989 poll, only 26 percent of the respondents
4"FRG' Lambsdorff lnt,.rvie,'ued On Trud,' Relations, PM041643 Lisbon l)IARIO DE
NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Nov 81 p 3, translated in FBIS WEU, 7 Dec 81, p M3.
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agreed with the IMF's labeling of Portugal as an industrialized country. 44 Yet
"despite the rather discouraging polling results, there can be no doubt that
Portugal's economy is doing far better today then a decade earlier. The future of
Portugal's economic recovery will hinge on the degree of EC generosity and
governmental liberalization. For the purposes of this study, the trends in
Portuguese trade with France and the Federal Republic of Germany will be
analyzed in an attempt to measure the comparative impact that these two
countries have on the Portuguese economy. Figure 9 lists the trends in Portuguese
"trade balances, followed by Figures 10 and 11 which depict trends in Portuguese
imports and exports, respectively, as a percentage of total trade.
As sean in Figure 9, Portuguese trade balances with France since 1974 follow
an unpredictable path. Despite the shifts from deficits to surpluses and back to
deficits, the overall magnitude of the balance is not of an alarming level. The most
contentious aspect of French-Portuguese economic relations revolved around the
-issue of Portugal's membership in the EC. It took nearly seven years for Portugal's
and Spain's membership to be approved. This delay was caused in large part by
French hesitancy over the sudden influx of comparatively cheaper Portuguese
agricultural produce affecting its corner of the market. (It should be stressed that
Spain - whose simultaneous entry into the Common Market was deemed
politically necessary - and its much larger agricultural industry concerned the
French the most.) A 1981 source held 32 percent of the Portuguese population
44Pull Minority Views Country as Industrialized, 90ES0068A Lisbon 0 JORNAL in
Portuguese 13-19 Oct 89 p 10- E, translated in FBIS-WEU-89-229-S, 30 November 1989, p 91.
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employed in the agricultural sector 45 and their wages far below those of European
I,
counterparts. Portuguese frustrations mounted with each annual delay in its
application for EC membership. The issue by October 1983 became so contentious
that Prime Minister Mario Soares, issued tike following ultimatum via a live radio
interview on French radio to the French President, who at that time held the
rotating title of President of the EC:
Portugal cannot wait indefinitely, because we have the right to join the
Community, and if Europe is unable to overcome its economic difficulties over
"questions of tomatoes, oranges, and sardines, if it places such questions above
the geopolitical and strategic interests of the continent and hinders the bids of
Portugal and Spain for EC membership, than this means that Europe lacks the
capacity for being truly European...Another alternative will be found if
Europe closes the door on us. Only the Atlantic separates us from America.46
Figures 10 and I I reflect the effect of EC membership on Portuguese imports and
exports. As to be expected, remarkable growth in the percentage of total trade
going to the EC countries occurred beginning in 1986. What is perhaps more
interesting is the shift away from French trade in comparison to that of other EC
, ' countries. Less dependence on the volume of a-ade with France can be interpreted
as a gual of the Common Market and a positive development in Portuguese trade.
The Portuguese trade balance with West Germany, a country that firmly
V, supported Portuguese admittance into the EC, is less satisfactory. As seen in
Figure 9, after nearly equalizing in the mid-1980s, the trend recently points to an
enormous trade imbalance in favor of West Germany. This imbalance, which
45Stewart Menual, The' Geo-strutegic Importance of the Ibtrian Peninsula, Conflict Studies,
Numtwr 133 1981, London Institute for the Study of Conqict, 1981, p 6.
46Soares: Tough Worrnng' To France on EEC Entry, !.D142211 Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 1900 GMT 14 Oct 83, translated in FBIS WEU, 18 Oct 83, p B3.
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existed to a lesser'degree in the past, is a source of constant friction between Bonn
and Lisbon. The problem, as FRG Minister of Economics Otto Lambsdorff
described in 1981, is essentially of a structural nature. While a plethora of high
price and high technology West German products penetrate Portuguese markets,
Portugal relies heavily on the same traditional exports of beverages, foodstuffs,
and cork. 47 Despite the fact that the total volume of trade between 1983 and 1987
rose by 42.5 percent, the growth was tilted decidedly in West Germany's favor.48
In April 1988, Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl confessed that a number of things
will have to be done to correct the worsening trade imbalance. 49 Figures 10 and 11
lead to the same conclusions as mentioned earlier with respect to France; namely
that there are signs of a gradual diversification away from trade with West
Germany, measured against total trade within the EC. While these trends will not
alter the trade imbalance immediately, they are nevertheless good long term
signs.
I. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Portugal went to great lengths since the late 1970s to promote the country as
a lucrative and safe haven for investors. The reluctance by foreign investors to
take financial risks in Portugal is predicated mainly on problems with the state
constitution, as noted in Chapter IV. The constitution, written in 1976 and revised
47FRG's Larnbsdorff Interviewed On Trade Relations, PM041643 lisbon DIARIO Dl,
NOTICIAS in Portuguese 19 Nov 81 p 3, translated in FBIS WEU, 7 Dec 81, p M3
48Purtugal's President Arrives for5-day Visit, LD171723 llamburg DPA in German 1612 MIT
17 Apr 88, translated in FBIS-WEU-88-074, 18 April 1988, p 7.
49 Portugal's Mario Suares Visits - Encourages Cultural Exchanges, LD191426 Hamburg 1)PA
in German 1344 GMT 19 Apr 88, translated in FBIS-WEU-88-078, 22 April 88, p 4 .
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in 1982, promotes a socialist society in which the rights of the workers are
sacrosanct and includes the principle of "transforming the essential means of
production into common property."5 0 Portugal tries to mitigate these fears by
asserting that, as Piime Minister Cavaco Silva candidly stated in March 1986,
The Constitution and constitutional reality are two different things. T.,e
Constitution does not hinder us from liberalizing the economy every day. It
can be done, although the second article of the Constitution says government
measures should lead to socialism. In practice we do exactly the opposite.Sl
While the present form of the Constitution is ineffective, the requirement for a
two-thirds vote to change it proved impossible to achieve until Cavaco Silva's
majority government enacted economic liberalizing legislation in the 1989
revision of the constitution. The passage of time and Portugal's acceptance into
the EC seems to have swayed reluctant investors. Figure 12, shown below, depicts
the explosion in foreign direct investments by France and the Federal Republic of
Germany beginning in 1986. An interesting note is highlighted in Figure 13,
listed below. The percentage of total direct investments by France and the Federal
Republic of Germany tapered off while those from all European OECD countries
are also at approximately the same level in 1988 as they were in 1978. This is an
indication that new countries outside the traditional pattern are investing in
Portugal, a healthy sign as Portugal is understandably apprehensive about any
one country acquiring too many assets. In 1989 the government placed a five
50Soares, D)'lhgation Depart for Cologne Visit, LD171547 Lisbon International Service in
Portuguese 1400 GMT 17 Apr 88, translated in FBIS-WEU-88-075, 18 April 1988, p 15
51Ca,,act On NA TO Rul', Trade, Politics, Africa, DW270831 Bonn DIE WELT in German 26
Mar 86 p 6, translated in FBIS WEU, 28 Mar 86, p MI.
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percent ceiling on non-Portuguese acquisitions, although it is believed that many
companies know how to circumvent these restrictions.5 2
French direct investment in Portugal continues to grow. France placed 11.79
million contos in 248 business projects in 1988. In comparison, 4.8 million contos in
139 projects were invested in 1987. Additionally, although its total share of direct
investments remained relatively constant, from eight percLnt in 1987 to ten
percent in 1988, it rose to 21 percent in the first six months of 1989.53 It must also
be noted that both France and West Germany, among others, invest a large sum of
money into Portugal through EC structural assistance funds such as the European
Regional Development Fund (FEDER), the EC Social Fund (ESF), FEOGA-
Guarantee, and FEOGA-Orientation. The total inflow of these funds to Portugal
reached $670 million in 1987. Another assistance package, the Specific Fund for
the Development of Portuguese Industry (PEDIP), allocated over $2.4 bil]ion to be
administered between 1988 and 1992. In the words of Prime Minister Cavaco
Silva, "It won't be for lack of funds that we will not take a large step towards
modernization." 54
Much like France, West German direct investments in Portugal were
virtually nonexistent in 1975. Apprehension over Portugal's constitution, labor
laws, political instability, and bureaucratic red tape overshadowed the more
positive aspects such as low wages, few strikes, tax advantages, and adaptability to
52Alan Riding, "Portugal i Leaving its Poor Past Behind," The New York Times, 7 May 1990, p
C7.
53 Reusons for Expanding Foreign Investments, 90ES0386A Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in
French 7 Dec 89 p 47, trans!ated in FBIS-WEU-90-028, 9 February 1990, p 23.
54 LUntitled paper by Chris Webster, Economics Officer, U.S. Embassy, Lisbor, dated 3 March
1988
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new technologies. 55 When West German entrepreneurs asked President Soares
what guarantees they might receive should they decide to invest in Portugal,
Soares rebuffed them with the remark that no such guarantees were necessary:
Just ask the big German companies that invest here and have been working
here for many years. Ask Hoechst or Siemans, for example, or others, they will
tell you that you can come to our country with a relaxed state of mind.56
SoaresV appeal failed to inspire many West German investors and in 1988 the
percentage of FRG investments in Portugal, while increasing, continued to lag
behind that of its industrialized peers. Currently, there is a some concern on the
part of the Portuguese over developments in Eastern Europe and how it may affect
future foreign investments. Statements by various governmental figures give a
flavor of the current mood. Prime Minister Silva is confident that Portugal will
not be abandoned. Recently he stated,
...I do not accept that the Community can fail to honor commitments
previously undertaken with respect to countries such as Portugal, Spain,
Greece, and Ireland. I regard this as settled. I acknowledge that some foreign
investors, who could perhaps have had Portugal in mind as a priority location,
could now also have other countries in mind; but, in view of the considerable
inflow of foreign investment into Portugal, I do not believe that this will be of
any great importance or that what particularly concerns us will be affected.5 7
M5 Cavaco On NATO Role,, Trade, Politics, Africa, DW270831 Bonn DIE WELT in German 26
Mar 86 p6, transldted in l"BIS WEU, 28 Mar 86, p Al1.
5 6Soares, De&.gation Depart for Cologne Visit, I)W181051 Bonn DIE WELT in German 16-17
Apr 88 p 6, translated inFBIS-WEU-88-075, 19 Apr 88, p 16.
57 Premier Discusses East Bloc Changes, Angola, PM220316219 Lisbon EXPRESSO in
Portuguese 3 Feb 90 ("A lit vista" section) pp 4-11, translated in FBIS-WiELT-30-057. 23 March
1990, p 17, lInterview with Portuguese Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva by Jose Antonio
Suraiva and Joaquim Vieira, place and date not givel.
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Other governmental officials agree with Silva and quite correctly assess that the
economic revitalization of East European economies will not take place overnight.
One Portuguese official (not named) stressed that,
At~ ~ ~ ~ o te omnEsenErpean countries are not ready to absorb a lot ofmoney... It will take them for or five years to catch up to us. But after that,
Portugal is in danger of becoming more peripheral a player. That's what we
have to prepare for now.58
West Germany, in particular, made it a point to assure the Portuguese that even
the eventual reunification of Germany would not harm European unity. On a trip
to Portugal,
... Von Weizaecker sought to dispel Portuguese fears that FRG firms with
factories in Portugal or planning further investments in our country might
close the former or desist from the latter to better concentrate the efforts and
renowned efficiency of the FRG economy in the reconstruction of the GDR.59
Portugal's successful economic policies in the late 1980s and 1990s are driven by
the constitutional revisions and the subsequent liberalization of the economy.
Consistent with these changes is the European economic dimension which will
continue to be the key to Portugal's future fiscal viability.
J. RE~LIABIITY OF FOREIGN AIl)
Portugal uses foreign aid from France and the Federal Republic of Germany
for either economic development, purchases military of military equipment, or
both. In one form or another, be they governmental loans, grants, or private
58Riding, "Leaving Past Behind," p C7.
59President Reaussures Portu gal on Reunification, LD2103232390 Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 1900 GMT 21 Mar 90, translated in FBIS.WEU-90-057, 23 March 1990, p 6 .
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enterprises, both of these countries have provided quid pro quos for the continued
unencumbered use of their military facilities in Portugal.
There are few details available in open sources on the terms of the French-
Portuguese basing agreement for Flores first signed in April of 1964, renewed in
February of 1977, and renegotiated in April 1984 and February 1989. For
example, no date is available as to when France first began providing
compensation to Portugal fur the use of Flores. Presently, only the text of the April
1984 agreement has been obtained. According to Article 8 of the agreement,
/
France agreed to pay 500 million escudos (roughly $3.5 million in 1984 dollars)
over a period of seven years to Portugal for the use of its facilities on Flores. Of this
total figure, 300 million escudos would go toward economic development in the
Azores while the remaining 200 million escudos would be earmarked for the
acquisition of French military equipment by the Portuguese Armed Forces. 60 The
merits of this type of agreement reside not so much in its magnitude in escudos,
but rather its long-term and unalterable conditions. Portugal does not need to
worry about what size the next French payment will be. It appears that the 1989
agreement departs from the previous one in that Portugal will receive only
military equipment in return for French use of the base. 61 Questions concerning
the length and magnitude of the recent agreement are unresolved.
The West German government began providing "compensation" to the
Portuguese for use of the Beja facilities beginning in 1978, as seen in Figure 14.
64Journal Of/i iv'/ de' la Repuhlique Francaise, 21 Janvier 1986, p 1021.
6lFrench Contributi,,r it, Flore.s Base Srna!1,'35420065b Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 21 Feb
P9 p 7, transited in FIRS WEU-89 064, 5 April 1989, p 17.
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These allotments were dispensed every 18 months, beginning with DM34 million
in May 1978 and then at the fixed rate of DM45 million 62 (roughly $20.5 million in
1978 dollars) from December 1979 to present day. The peculiar feature of West
German assistance is that it is comprised entirely of military equipment. The
relatively constant amount of West German aid is beneficial for military planning
purposes, but its level is far below that which Portugal believes it is entitled to. In
past negotiations the Portuguese negotiating position reportedly stood at four to
five times the West German offer. 63 The Portuguese allowed the agreement to
lapse for six months in 1984 and again in 1988, but in the end apparently conceded
each time to West Germany's initial offer. Current negotiations on a revised
agreement are once again stalemated due to differences of opinion. An informed
source claims that the West Germans reportedly want to expand the scope of their
present operations at Beja to include Tornados and helicopters, but the Portuguese
government has gone public stating that there will be no expansion of the present
facilities.6 4 The Portuguese are also demanding "substantially" increased levels of
assistance for continuation of the current agreement.
K. ORIGIN OFMILITARY EQUIPMENT
The final variable which will be measured and compared is the origin of the
sundry types of military equipment in the current inventories of the Portuguese
62 Allliuary Aid To Portugal, brief frum Hamburg DPA in German 1345 GMT 7 Dec 84,
translated in FBIS WEU, 10 Dec 84, p J2.
133Negotiations With FRG on Beja Base Continue, 3542001 lb Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese I I
Oct 68 p 28, translated in FBIS-WEU-88-230 30 November 1988, p 2 1.
64lilurmation provided by Major Javier Garza, Jr., USAF, Assistant Air Attache in the Omce
of the Defense Attache, United States Embassy, Lisbon, letter dated 16 May 1990.
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Army and Air Force. As is evident in Figure 15, a potpourri of military systems
exists presently in Portugal's Army and Air Force. Only major pieces of equipment
will be measured with small arms left out. The following is a list of the weapon
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The Portuguese Navy is not included in this study due to its small numbers and
near obsolescence. Only the significant German contribution to the MEKO frigate
program will be highlighted. While there is obviously some overlap between this
and the previous variable, "reliability of foreign aid," this section allows one to
garner a better understanding of who provides the Portuguese Armed Forces with
what they really need.
The most significant transfers of French military equipment were prior to
1975, when the French arms industry proved itself a reliable financier to the
Portuguese war efforts in the colonies. But, French military assistance since the
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Revolution has been minuscule. The high numbers of French armored personnel
carriers (APCs), reconnaissance vehicles, and helicopters are largely holdovers
from the African wars. After all, few modern major weapon systems can be
financed on a foreign assistance budget of only $2.1 million annually. However, as
mentioned earlier, the February 1989 cooperation agreement apparently changed
the agreement such that all of the aid would go to purchases of French military
equipment. In April 1989, Lisbon announced that 18 Epsilons - propellor-driven
trainers - were being shipped to Portugal in compliance with the agreement.
These planes would replace the aging T-37 and T-33 Chipmunks presently used for
flight training by the Air Force.6 5 It is unlikely that significant changes will occur
in the magnitude of French arms transfers to Portugal.
West Germany also actively supplied Portugal military hardware in the
1960s and early 1970s in return for guarantees regarding the West German
military presence on the Portuguese mainland. This support increasingly
dwindled for political reasons.66 As described in the previous section, Bonn
underwrote the Portuguese military throughout the 1980s at a level of DM45
million. The curious aspect of the agreement is that 1/5th of the military hardware
would be from surplus, or used, Bundeswehr stocks. 67 Apparently, the actual
percentage of obsolete or used equipment is far higher. According to a military
informant, the supply of German equipment is "scandalous." He went on to say,
65 French Contribution to Polres Base 'Small,' 35420065b Lisbon 0 I)IABO in Portuguese 21 Feb
89 p 7 . translated in FBIS-WEU-89-064, 5 Apr 11989, p 17.
S66For more details into West German Ostpolitik under Willy Brandt see Luc Crollen's,
Portugal, the U.S, and NAT()
67Defens,, Aid To Portugal Will Not Be Increased, LD200953 liamburg DPA in German 0920
GMT 20 Dec 83, translated in FBIS WEU, 20 Dec 83, p J 1.
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The equipment arrived in a wretched state...Almost all the equipment is old.
Only about 15% was new equipment and the secondhand Fiat aircraft proved
to be only good for cannibalization. 68
Figure 15 tends to conf~rm Portuguese complaints as there is a noticeable absence
of West German military equipment. Therefore, while the FRG is the second
leading supplier of military equipment to Portugal, it most likely comes in the
form of secondary weapon systems.
The FRG is, however, making a sizable contribution to the Portuguese
MEKO frigate program, which is being funded by a consortium of NATO countries.
In mid-1986, West Germany announced that it would earmark a total of DM394
million between 1986.1992 to Portugal for the construction of three MEKO 200
class frigates. The funding, by year, was expected to be: DM61 million in 1986,
DM61 million in 1987, DM60 million in 1988, DM65 million in 1989, DM55
million in 1990, DM46 million in 1991 and DM46 million in 1992.69 The expected
delivery dates are November 1990 for the first frigate, May 1991 for the second,
and November 1991 for the third. 70
L. CONCLUSION
Initially, it appeared that the degree of social, cultural, political, and
economic links between the two European "base-rights" countries and Portugal
"•FRG Want. Increased Facilities at Beja Base, PM131019 Lisbon DIAR10 DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 6Jul 8 7 p translated in FBIS WEU, 13 Jul 87, p K1.
69D.1IS Market InteIligente Report, Market Overview, NATO & Europe, Portugal, Security
Assistance, p 3
7OAdmiral Antonio Andrade L Silva, "The Frigate Programme for the Portuguese Navy," in
NATO's Sixteen Nations, September 1989, Vol. 34, No. 5, p 7 2 .
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has little influence on the outcome of base negotiations. The traditional belief that
basing rights are solely a matter of monetary compensations appeared validated.
However, other factors soon emerged. The differing Portuguese popular reactions
to the French base on Flores stand in contrast to reactions to West Germany's base
at Beja. This suggests that the visibility of foreign bases influences the outcomes
of basing agreements, with the less visible base being the least contentious. It also
appeared that France, the country with the greatest degree of commonality in the
other variables explored, maintains the most trouble-free basing arrangement.
Pushing this finding to its logical conclusion would mean that West Germany's
arrangement would be the most problematic, and that this could well result in
demands for increasing levels of aid. Once again, this does appear to be the case, as
Portugal habitually complains about the lack of adequate aid from West Germaly.
How then can Bonn rebuff these demands year after year and still maintain its
facilities? Perhaps the degree of social, cultural, political, and economic links
plays an influencing role. In other words, when nations cannot agree over the
specific financial arrangements, subtle underlying interests and linkages defining
their relationship come more into play. The weaker these links, the more likely
that negotiations over basing rights will be problematic, thereby increasing the
polarization between two countries. This appears to be the case today with
Portugal and West Germany.
French and West German ties with Portugal have continued to develop since
the 1974 Revolution, especially in the economic sphere. Portugal appears
committed to rely predominantly on Europe for its economic future. European
influence on Portugal's armed forces appears minimal, especially in comparison to
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the size of the United States' contribution. The future of base rights in Portugal
does not appear in jeopardy for France. Additionally, it is uncertain, but possible
that the Flores base will become superfluous with technological advances in
France's satellite program. For the Federal Republic of Germany, however, base
negotiations with Portugal over Beja are once again stalled. It appears improbable
that Portugal can command a higher price for the facilities given the events in
Eastern Europe, the decrease in the Soviet threat, and the government's
unwillingness to expand the scope of the present agreement. All of this points to
the conclusion that Portugal is in a poor negotiating position vis-a-vis France and
West Germany and that its national interests are best served through promotion of
increased European economic cooperation, while continuing to rely on the United
States as its primary supplier of military assistance.
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VI. PORTUGAL'S TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES
A. INTRODUCTION
The United States holds an important position in the development of
Portuguese democracy through 16 years of unabated support, both in the form of
military and economic aid. This chapter outlines the extent of U.S.-Portuguese
relations and complements the previous chapter, which focused on the European
dimension of Portugal's post-revolutionary consolidation of democracy. The U.S.-
Portuguese relationship is largely based on security assistance, in contrast to the
more multifaceted relations between Portugal and its European neighbors. The
outline of this chapter is similar to that of Chapter V, with the exception that
increased attention is given to the nuances and specifics of the Portuguese-
American defense relationship. In the end, consideration is given to what the
future U.S.-Portuguese relationship should look like and how the United States
should arrange its foreign policy priorities with regard to Portugal.
B. CUI.TURAL /SOCIAl / EI)UCATIONAI TI ES
In contrast to most other West European nations, Portugal does not have a
strong historical relationship with the United States. The explanation derives
mainly from Portugal's past interests in other areas of the world such as Africa and
South America, where neither clashes nor cooperation with U.S. interests were
-likely. In part, the limited contact also resulted from Portugal's descent from its
previous colonial power status. Portugal had little to offer the United States.
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Likewise, the degree of cultural interaction remained limited. This section will
explore the growth in the last two decades, and in particular after the 1974
Revolution, in U.S.-Portuguese cross-cultural ties.
In the area of religion, there is little commonality between the United States
and Portugal, with Roman Catholic Americans being a distinct minority in a
largely Protestant country. In contrast, as mentioned in the preceding chapter,
Portugal is approximately 90 percent Roman Catholic. However, religion is rarely
a divisive issu- in international relations, at least between Western countries.
More important in international relations is the degree of cultural
interactions.1 The United States, under the auspices of the USIS, administers the
USIA's (United States Information Agency) cultural and educational programs.
Programs include the International Visitor Program, the Voluntary Visitor
Program, the American Participant Program, and the Fulbright Program. The
International Visitor Program, a 30-day visa for Portuguese community leaders, is
considered quite successful. According to an informed source, Prime Minister
Cavaco Silva gained immeasurable insight into American society when he came to
this country as a visiting scholar and fully supports the program. The Fulbright
Scholarship Program, formed in 1946, likewise became increasingly active in
Portugal in the years after 1974. There were a total of 126 grants to U.S. citizens
towards studies in Portugal in the 28 years between 1949 and 1977. In the next 12
years, 177 grants were awarded. In comparison, between 1949 and 1977 there
IThe author recognizes that "culture" i6 transmitted to a large degree by non-government
activities such as I lollywood, business, media, popular music, etc., and that, particularly in the case
iof the United States, these non-governmen' transmitters have been far more successful than any
official agency. For the purposes of this study, however, emphasis is placed mainly on official
transmitters of national culture.
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"N. were 279 grants to Portuguese nationals, followed by 366 in the next 11 years.
"These figures also appear positive in comparison to those of Spain. Even though
grants to Spanish nationals increased from 913 between 1949 and 1977 to 1,940 in
the next 11 years - three times the number of grants between Portugal and the
United States - Spain's population is nearly four times that of Portugal. Another
satisfactory development is the progressive shift in Fulbright burden-sharing
away from the United States toward Portugal. Whereas in 1976 the Portuguese
bore only 16 percent of the shared costs, in 1988 its contribution equaled 29
percent. 2 A further achievement towards strengthening bilateral relations was
the founding of the Luso-American Development Foundation (LADF) was
established in 1985. The LADF is a non-profit, private sector entity designed to
promote scientific, cultural, educational, and private sector cooperation between
the two countries. It draws U.S. contributions via ESF funds and to date is two-
thirds of its way toward its pledge of $150 million in reserves. 3
The general belief from reputable sources is that the shortcomings in U.S.-
Portuguese cultural relations exist because: 1. the United States fails to make
inroads into the Portuguese educational system (a system dominated by its
European partners), particularly in the social sciences; 2. there is a problem of
transferring college degrees from the U.S. universities to Portugal; 3. the
Fulbright program is underutilized and underfunded; 4. the LADF expenditures
"
2Information on the Fulbright Program gathered from: Board of Foreign Scholarships, Report
on Exchanges, December 1977, Fifteenth Annual report, pgs 8, 34, 35; and Board of Foreign
Scholarships, The Fulbright Program 1988, Twenty-Fifth Annual Report, December 1988, pgs 6,
18,19.
S3l)ata package with no title, provided by Captain Larry Juhlin, U. S. Navy, U. S. Department of
Defense, OASD ISP, March 1990.
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on cultural programs are too small (6 percent 4 ) and; 5. the average Portuguese
citizen has little true knowledge of what American life is really like. The most
widely held Portuguese beliefs concerning life in the Uniter! States still originate
from old U.S. television series and those magazines known more for their
sensationalized depiction of American life than for their accuracy. On the
educational level, an informed source told the author a particularly revealing story
involving a Portuguese woman who earned an MBA and PhD from Harvard only to
discover upon returning to Portugal that the degrees would not be accepted! This
same source also mentioned the fact that none of the curators of the major
Portuguese museums has ever visited the United States while the same cannot be
said of their trips to major European cities.
C. GOVERNMENTAl'LTIES
Until recently, the degree of political interaction between the United States
and Purtugal was a function of the Lajes basing agreement. Portugal, as Luc
Crollen aptly titled chapter two of his book, existed as a U.S. "strategic necessity
and a political liability." Portugal remained too heavily involved in colonial wars
to devote adequate resources toward NATO obligations of patrolling its "strategic
triangle," and with the absence of Spain in the alliance, the United States filled
this void in the Atlantic. Much like France and West Germany, the United States
offered political support in the tense period following the 25 April 1974 Revolution,
with Ambassador Frank Carlucci serving with distinction between 1974 and 1978.
41,uso-American Devtelopment Foundation, Inform-tion paper provided by M. L. Asquino,
EU/868, United States Information Agency, p2.
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In many ways it was the Carlucci link that forged stronger U.S.-Portuguese
relations. Carlucci served as both Deputy Defense Secretary as well as Secretary
of Defense in the Reagan Administrations and proved to be a vital mediator in the/
1988 basing consultations. In addition to Carlucci, the Portuguese were generally
pleased with the level of support from President Reagan and his Administration.
Defense Minister Azevedo Coutinho remarked as early as May 1981 that,
The Reagan Administration is showing itself to be far more understanding
than the Carter Administration with respect to the Portuguese Armed Forces'
reequipment needs. 5
Portugal expressed its appreciation in 1986 by giving Reagan one of the few warm
welcomes that he received during his tour of NATO nations. The fact that
President Soares personally met the last four U.S. presidents - Nixon, Ford,
Carter, and Reagan - also cannot help but add stability to U.S.-Portuguese
relations. 6  Still, it must be stressed that international politics and the
preservation of national interests rarely depend ultimately on the degree of inter-
governmental friendships. As Portuguese Foreign Minister Jaime Gama once
said,
Political solidarity is not the magic elixir of international relations, nor does
international life depend upon personal relationships. 7
5Defense Minister Sees Reagan Team As "Understunding,' LD201057 Lisbon DIARIO DE
NOTICIAS in Portuguese 15 May81 p3, translated in FBIS WEU, 21 May 81, p M1.
bMario Soures Interviewed On U.S. Relations, LD030700 Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 1900 GMT 2 Mar 83, translated in FBIS WEU, 3 Mar 83, p M1.
7Guma Discusses Foreign Policy in Interview, PM241115 Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 19
Jan 85, Review Section pgs 12-15 Ilnterviev, with Foreign Minister Jaime Gama by Clara Ferreira
Alves. Joao Carlos Espada, and Vincente Jorge Silva - - date and place not givenl, translated in
F1i1S WEU, 25 Jan 85, p N 1.
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"Nonetheless, diplomatic rifts can strain good relations. Two recent episodes have
threatened to damage otherwise close U.S.-Portuguese ties. The first case involved
the nomination of former USIA director Frank Shakespeare as ambassador-
designate to Lisbon in 1985. Shakespeare's comments during Senate confirmation
hearings about Portugal's democratic "problems" were interpreted as arrogant,
paternalistic, and a possible harbinger of ambassadorial interference in internal
Portuguese affairs. 8 A second, more serious affair involved the failed nomination
of Richard N. Viets as ambassador to Portugal in 1987. Viets' nomination was
passed by the Senate in committee, but questions concerning unpaid state taxes,
improper uses of government vehicles, and loans from embassy employees, among
others,9 swayed the full Senate to reject his nomination.10 The U.S. went without
an ambassador to Portugal for close to a year - a sore point as well as an
embarrassment for the Portuguese.ll The bottom line is that, although distant
allies with little commonality in their forms of government, the United States and
Portugal recognize the mutual benefit to improved relations and for the most part
have overcome past differences.
811 S Ambassadr.I.'signate's Remarks ('rticized, PM221359 Lisbon DIARIO I)E NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 7 Aug 85 p 6 lUnattributed report: "Shakespeare's Mistake"l, translated in FBIS
WEU, 26 Aug 85, p MI.
9Congiess, Senate. Committee on Foreign RIlations, Nomination (if Richard N. Viets,
ENecutive Report 100 5, looth Cong., Ist sess., 31 July 1987, pgs 1-14.
1
--il)vid B. Ottdway, "Sidetracked Nominee Opts for Retirement," The Washington Post, 25 l)Cc
87, p A35
I I U S Ambassador-Designate's Remarks Criticized, PM221359 Lisbon IiARIO I)E NOTICIAS
in |Pirtuguese 7 Aug 85 p 6, translated in FBIS WEU, 26 Aug 85, p Nil.
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D. VISIBILITY OF A FOREIGN BASE
As mentioned in Chapter V, including the variable "visibility of a foreign
base" is based on the presumption that the more visible the foreign military
facility, the more likely it will be a source of friction between nations. In this
respect, the presence of U.S. military facilities in the Azores should be of little
consequence to the Portuguese "mainlander," but a bone of contention to the local
Azoreans. It is paradoxical, therefore, that just the opposite is true.
U.S. base rights in Portugal are confined largely to the Lajes base on the
island of Terceira. Unofficially referred to as the "Hawaiian Islands" of the
Atlantic, the Azores provide the U.S. military and NATO an invaluable strategic
location. It is precisely because of this unique geographic setting that attention is
drawn to the base. As mentioned in Chapter H, it was from Lajes that the United
States was able to resupply Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. However,
less publicized out-of-area uses of Lajes include the movement of troops toward
Iran during the hostage crisis, possibly the landing or refueling of aircraft involved
in the 1986 raid on Libya, and most recently, logistical support to the U.S. fleet
involved with escort operations in the Persian Gulf. Officially, Portugal holds the
right to restrict the use of Lajes for missions outside the realm of NATO
operations. Unofficially, Portugal is quite forthcoming. For example, in 1979
Prime Minister Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo admitted that Lajes might be used in




We would not consider the possibility of the base being used by the United
States in an indiscriminate manner; a judicious use, yes, but not otherwise. 1 2
7" It is most likely that the same "judicious use" screening criteria lecides current
U.S. requests which are reviewed on a case by case basis.
While Portuguese on the mainland are less sympathetic to U.S. global
responsibilities, Azoreans are largely pro-American. This is primarily the result of
the number of Azoreans immigrating to the United States, but also because of the
economic support that comes into the Azores as a result of the U.S. presence. In
addition to U.S. Economic Support Funds annually earmarked for the development
of the islands, roughly an additional $100 million is generated through wages and
contracts as seen by the financial impact statement in Figure 16. The net result is
that geography helps to dilute the reality of a U.S. presence, but only to a limited
degree. It is instead the popular support of the "islanders" that allows the United
States to maintain less problematic base rights there. However, the fact cannot be
overlooked that Washington's out-of-area interests often strain relations between
the two nations by placing Portugal's government in the difficult position of
supporting U.S. overseas interests. Portugal is understandably keen on protecting
its sovereign rights and is not interested in being, in the words of former Foreign
Minister Goncalves Pereira, "a kind of aircraft carrier or airport for foreign forces,
even friendly forces."13 Additionally, the country needs to preserve its relations
with moderate Arab states which supply all of its petroleum needs. On the other
121U.S May (;,-I "udicie'us Use' Of Lajes Airbase In Iran Crisis, LD221958 Litxbn Domestic
Service in Portugzuese 18311 G MT 22 Nov 79 .1D, translited in FBIS WEU, 23 Nov 79, p Z2
13l',,r,,ign MAhnster Clurifics Use of Lajes Base, PM241025 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguest 18 MY 82p 1, translated in FBIS WEU, 25 May 82, p M2.
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hand, Portugal cannot overlook the fact that the modernization of its Armed
Forces is dependent upon continued cordial relations with the United States.
E. EMIGRATION AND EMIGRANTS' REMITTANCES
There is a strong Portuguese desire to immigrate to the United States.
Historically, the Portuguese have settled in communities along the New England
seaboard, California, and the Hawaiian Islands. The greater percentage of these
emigrants have come from the Azores. In fact, by 1976 over 700,000 Azoreans
resided in the United States - a total more than twice the population of the nine
islands. 14 As seen in Figure 17, despite slight fluctuations, around 25 percent of
the total number of Portuguese emigrants since 1975 have chosen the United
States as their new home.15 This pattern is consistent with the results of a 1989
poll, listed below, in which individuals were queried as to which country they







Federal Republic of Germany not listed (presumably < 5%)
14Alvin J. Cottrell and Thomas If. Moorer, U.S. O(verseas Bases: Problems of Projecting
American Military Power Abroad, The Washington Papers, Volume V. #47, The Center for
Strategic and Internatonal Studies, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., Beverly Hills /
London: Sage Publications, 1977, p 14.
'
5 Special thanks to Fernanda Andrade,' Economic Assistant at the United States Embassy,
Lisbon, who gathered from Portuguese documentation (namely from Banco de Portugal figures) on
emigrant remittances, emigration statistics, and foreign investment.
16Poll Shows Youth Optimism, Patriotism 35420063 Lisbon 0 INDEPENDENTE in
Portuguese 13 F, 89 pp 15 17, translated in FB[S-WEU-89-057, 27 March 1989, p 11.
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While the United States ranks as the country of choice for immigration, there is
little available data concerning amounts of emigrant remittances from America.
What data is available is skewed by the inclusion of Canadian levels. The only
certainty about these statistics is that the overall level of remittances sent to
Portugal from the United States and Canada is far below that originating from
Western European countries, which is logical given the differences in geographic
proximity. Throughout the 1980s the level of combined emigrant remittances from
the United States and Canada made up approximately 20 percent of the total. 17
F. BALANCE OF TRADE
The balance of trade between the United States and Portugal represents yet
another way of studying the overall development of U.S.-Portuguese relations.
This approach was used in Chapter IV as well with rather interesting results. The
United States traditiunally carried a large positive balance of trade with Portugal
as seen in Figure 18. In fact, by the early 1980s this huge imbalance represented
the largest that Portugal maintained with any non-oil supplier. After peaking in
1981, the large surplus diminished to such an extent that a future negative
balance with the United States seemed likely. 18 The United States resisted this
turn of events in the mid-1980s with increased protectionism. The response to this
from Portuguese Foreign Minister Jaime Gama in August 1985 was not
surprising:
17funco de Portugal
iChris Webster, Trend1s In U.S -Portuguese Trade - 1983.87, Economics Officer, American
Emba.sy., Lisbon, 161747Z Nov 88, p2.
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I gave Secretary of State Schultz a memorandum which expresses the
Portuguese Government's displeasure in a clear and straightforward manner
at the protectionist measures recently adopted by the U.S. Administration
affecting Portuguese exports in areas such as textiles, steels, and the footwear
industry. We are of the view that the friendship between the United States
and Portugal -- a friendship that is at the root of our profound cooperation in
the diplomatic, economic, and military 3pheres -- makes such measures totally
baseless. This is a policy that we not only fail to understand but indeed to
which we express our profound displeasure.19
As seen in Figures 19 and 20, the trade tables have turned in Portugal's favor
since 1985 with exports to the United States doubling between 1983 and 1987 and
U.S. imports in the same time period falling.20 The prime reason for the shift was
Portugal's entry into the EC. In particular, U.S. agricultural exports to Portugal
suffered as of late. EC directives (like that issued in 1986 restricting the import of
U.S. cereals into Portugal and Spain 21) combined with tougher competition from
Common Market and other suppliers will continue to force the United States away
from its traditional favorable trade patterns with Portugal. Protectionist
tendencies on the part of the United States should therefore be judged prudently.
Helping to create an economically viable Portugal has been, after all, a U.S.
foreign policy objective.
G. FOREIGN i)IRECT INVESTMENT
The United State, continues to invest heavily in Portugal, holding a larger
percentage of the total foreign investment than either France or the Federal
19Garna On Helsinki AlMcting, U.S. Ties, S. Africa, LD030211 Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 2230 G MT 2 Aug 85, translated in FBIS WEU, 5 Avg 85, p M1.
2
oWebster, Trends in U. S.-Portuguese Trade,p 1.
21Daily Calls Ban on U.S. Sailors 'Show of Force,' LD282041 Lisbon International Service in
Portuguese 1108 GMT 28 May 86, translated in FBIS WEU, 30 May 86, p M I.
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Republic of Germany. as seen in Figure 21, and second only to the United
Kingdom. More impressive is the fact that the United States rec(,n'ly had the
highest percentage of change in direct investments, even greater than the average
rise in the overall total investment. In 1986/1987 there was a 263 percent incrcase
in U.S. dire,4t investinent followed in 1987/1988 by a 179 percent gain!22 One
factor which perhaps diminishes the significance of the high U.S. figures is that 72
percent of the 1988 investment figure was in the form of equity increases by
Citibank and Manufacturers Hanover.23 Portugal imposed this increase on all
bank- in 1987 and Citibank responded with a $37.7 million increase in equity
while Manufacturers Hanover answered with $57 million.24 A distinguishing
characteristic about t'.S. overtures of direct investment in Portugal is that it
includes attempts to penetrate the Portuguese defense industry (other countries
expressing similar interests are Israel. Brazil, and Finland). The nations of the EC.
utj, thlrugh No)vember 1989, hate not done so. It ought to be added that these
American interests in establishing cooperative agreements with the Portuguese
dv1cn.fe, industry have failed to be actualized. According to General Mateus da
Silka. chairman for the Commission for the Restructuring of the Defense Industry.
2-' , :lt.e t ,l" , , j,estment V1 *'d," 3542006ti Lisbon TEMPO. ECONOMIC()
I'll 11 t1 .,(. It Feb 89 p 2 . 1 in.Jtted in FHIS WEU-89-075, 20 April 1989, p 26 larticle by Clar.s S
2:s "hri. ('tj.-,js .r , F r,:,,; l•e'st.mnt,',l in P),rtugul - Culendur year 19M0, Economics Officer, U S
L.ish'n, 19 5 . p 4
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So far, and generally speaking, the proposals presented have not been
worthwhile to Portugal. 25
The reluctance to settle a cooperative production deal with the United States in the
defense sector rests in part on the strict end user policy enforced by Washington; it
prohibits salet- of military equipment to third nations without the permission of
the Department of Defense. 26
H. RELIABILITY OF FOREIGN All)
Traditionally, the policy of the United States is to appropriate foreign aid in
the form of security assistance along the ratio of 35 / 65 for economic and military
assistance. respectively. Beginning in the late 1970s a trend developed whereby
"base-rights" countrieb linked levels of U.S. security assistance to base access.
What predictably happened was the subsequent encroachment of Congress into
bilateral security matters traditionally handled by the Administration. The
purpose uf this section is not so much to delve into the deliberations within the
confines of the Congressional Appropriations Committees and Subcommittees. but
rather to examine the level and terms of the foreign aid allocated to Portugal.
Figure 22 is a snapshot of trends in U.S. security assistance, both economic and
military (total FMS = tttal of all non-ESF in Figure 22), to Portugal since 1979.
Consistency is clearly nut the hallmark of U.S. economic and military
assistance to Portugal. Figure 22 shows the uncertain trend of U.S. assistance
between 1979 and 1989. The initial agreement by which the United States
2-( ,,erwul on lt I),bij, Indus.try Restructuring, 35420144a Lisbon EXPREiSS in Portuguese It;




promised to offer "compensation" for the use of the Lajes base was signed by
Portuguese Foreigi. Minister Freitas Cruz and U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance in June 1979. Under this agreement the United States allocated $140
million for four years - $20 million annually for economic assistance in the Azores
and $60 million worth of military equipment. 27 The renegotiated 1983 agreement
changed the rates. The United States hereafter agreed to make its best efforts at
providing about 24 million contos annually for a period of seven years (slightly
more than $20o million in 1983 dollars); roughly one-fifth of which would go to the
Azurean regiunal governinent. 28 As seen in Figure 22, the United States only
lived up to thin pledge in 1985, after which time funds for Portugal consistently
decreased (1989 being a special exception to be explained later).
The lack of conzi-tency in U.S. assistance levels is a negative influence on
U.S.-Purtuguese bilateral relations. The Administration frequently blames
Congress, and especially its Appropriation Committees, for failing to support the
foreign aid budget. Illustrative of the current mood of Congress is the response by
Chairman David R. Obtcy 0. the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations
to Secretary of State James A. Baker IlI's proposed increase in the 19911 foreign aid
budget. He replied ten'•v.y
Well. with all due respect, Mr Secretary, if you really think that there is
a possibility that thtý Congress is going to pass, in either House, a bill
that increa:nes foreign aid in the teeth of domestic cuts like this, somebody is
-".\',-u .-4.r,'e,,.t i I S A.z-'rtes Buse" To Be Signe'd. 1.11180428 Libibon D),omestic Servict. in
Po,ri I ,, -I ' ) 230(;IT 17 .,,, 79 1.1), tiinslii ed in FitIS WFU, IS Jun 79, p MI
"Gay;fl,,a. Shull. Inta. .l Agreeme'nt On l.ajes Base. I.D131939 Lisbon Domestic Sermict- in
~ i ua-:-. 1900 G\IT 13 1)t. 83, trA.ltieI in FIBISWELU, 14 l)ec83, pU3
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smoking something that ain't legal. I mean, it just cannot happen. We both
know that. We are both pros.29
The hostility runs deeper with a blatant divergence in opinion over the activities of
Portuguese lobbyists in Washington. The Portuguese recently blamed
shortcomings in U.S. aid on their Foreign Ministry for failing to follow
Congressional proceedings closely. An editorial note in a 1989 issue of DIARIO DE
NOTICIAS highlighted this diplomatic deficiency by claiming that,
..congressmen and members of the various specialized committees of the two
houses of Congress...have expressed surprise at the lack of attention the
Portuguese authorities pay to safeguarding their interests in those bodies. 30
This same opinion, however, is not shared by those like Chairman Obey who at
one point in the 1990 hearings said,
.. I'm amazed at the way the Portuguese lobby cries all over the floor about
how they are not getting enough bucks from Uncle Sam.31'
FThe Administration began using the Southern Region Amendment (SRA)
beginning in 1987 as a means to make up for shortfalls in Congressionally
approved levelý. The SRA provides the president with the authority to transfer
surplus military equipment to countries along NATO'S southern flank. Portugal
accepted $14 million of SRA in 1987 (two different SRAs) and $80 million in
2 9 ('0.ngress. IIHouse, Suiwommnittee of thk. Committee on Appropriations, Foreign ()peratlons
-itEport bhtnunczn,,. and R,lui.d l'ruLran'. Appropriatns fir 1990: learing before a Subcommittee
S.... -of the Commnittee 'f AppruJp ijitions, Part 5, 101fst Cone , 1 st sess., p 459.
M;b',r igt AIMistrv I.%a..., Note, on Ovar Base lsuf, PM 1409091489 Lisbon i)IARltJ 1)1.
Nt)IICI.\S ii, Portuguese 2 Sep 89 p 4, translated in F!BIS-WEU-89-117, 14 September 1989, p 16




1989.32! As seen in Figure 22, the large 1989 SRA contribution, a response to
Portugal's request for consultations provided by the terms of the 1983 agreement,
allowed the t,,tal amount of U.S. aid to exceed the previous high of 1985.
Unfortunately, the uncertainty surrounding SRA allotments (a measure which
must be appro\ ed annually by Congress) leaves prospects for mutually agreeable
levels (f U.S. security assistance to Portugal in question.
I. OI{IGIN OF MILIT'rARY EQUIPMENT
The final comparative variable under examination is the amount of various
types of U.S. military equipment in the current inventories of the Portuguese
Army and Air Force. The Portuguese Navy is not included in this graph because tu
date the U.S. cmntribution to the active fleet is insignificant, except for the three
ME KO frigates currently under construction. These ships will be heavily financed
by American aid; roughly $235 million of the $742.4 million dollars pricetag will
come from the United States.33 Figure 23 lists current contributions by NATO
nations to the program. When commissioned, the MEKO frigates will
dramatically improve the capabilities of the Portuguese Navy. As is evident in
Figure 15. numerous countries contribute, in varying degrees, to the arsenals of
Portugal'z Army and Air Force. This study considered only major pieces of
equipment with equipment in the category of small arms and below left out. The
"3'-Primimt,. ';,o btilit 1 ) u,1,,rtl'• and Ii ,a,, i( I)pportunttA. 0 gur t(.- extracted /frr. f In it, •
ipook pit-parcd Ir tctit i oi j\ bv t-,rt: the Il uut- Apprupriation. Subcummittci t. , FFitreign
(Operadti.n. E t\pi i , ,nd Finrancing, 15 March 199(1
J3/nitr'nlttl,: Puper on Ow, Iurtuit'.ese ."'rout," Prgramn, prepared I.. Captain J F Do.% le, Chief
Na.vy Sicti,). MMAAG Purtugl, Tvyped by Carmen Ortiz, 8 Januar.ý 1988.
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The United States is by far the leading supplier of military equipment to
Portugal. Its assistance in this area covers the entire spectrum of major military
systems in the Portuguese Army and Air Force and dwarfs that of any other
outside supplier, as reflected in Figure 15. The only "big ticket" item which the
United States has noit yet contributed toward is helicopters; Portugal signed a
letter of intent tI.OIt with the United States towards the purchase of five Kaman
SH-2F Sea Sprite helicopters on 16 February 1989 before unexpectedly balking. 34
"Overall, the Portuguese are extremely pleased with the quality of the American
,S4(',,ntr,,cLtrs. ( )er tlhcopt,', Purchus, DIetadfdd - U.S. Voices Uncern, 90ESo267A L.isbo,
I)IARIU0 IJ NOTICIAS in Ihrtuguebt! 27 Nov 89 p 6, translatd in FBIS-WEU-90-008. II Januar.)
1990, p 2 5
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equipment in their inventories. The most glaring shortcoming is the lack of
interceptors in the Air Force. This problem is expected to be resolved with the
delivery of 20 General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons. These 20 aircraft are of
the newest version, block 15s, and will include 17 F-16As and three F-16Bs.35
While Portuguese requests continue to exceed U.S. capabilities, the present
situation is satisfactory to both sides and detailed plans are being drafted by both
sides toward a workable modernization program, as will be explained below.
J, THE UNITEI) STATES' ROILE IN MODERNIZATION
Questions that ticd answering include, does the Portuguese government
have a clear idea of the preferred final architecture of its Armed Forces? What
exactly are the aspirations of the individual services in Portugal's Armed Forces?
Are they realistic? Are they and governmental priorities mutually exclusive or
complementar.'.' What rule should the United States play towards these ends?
Portugal is a relatively new recipient of U.S. security assistance. Under
S, faLz•r. the Prtuguese government refused to accept any sort of aid in connection
wt: U.S. presence in the Azores. The United States was by and large an
unwvlcome guest whom Portugal knew it could not force to leave, but at the same
time did not want to encourage it, stay by accepting "gifts" or "rent-. Then, with
Portuguese military involvement in African liberation movements, the United
States imposed an arms embargo, on the country. It took the withdrawal from
Africa and the establishment of a democratic government before the United States
began providing substantial amounts of military and economic assistance to




Portugal. Therefore, unlike any other NATO nation, Portugal is barely beginning
to modernize its armed forces, with large amounts of economic support coming
from countries like the United States only in the past ten years. Portugal is quick
to remind NATO nations about this point and the country's long-standing loyalty
to NATO when lodging requests for increased military assistance. As Secretary of
State for Defense Figueiredo Lopes stated in 1985,
...Portugal, whose loyalty to NATO's ideas and virtues has never been
questioned, unlike Greece and in contrast to Spain's qualms about entering
NATO, has well deserved greater attention on the part of the more developed
allied countries in terms of economic and military assistance.3 6
"Unfortunately, this point is often overlooked by U.S. policymakers, who are
convinced that Portugal is "taking the United States for a ride," and demand
instantaneous results on the ten-year U.S. investment. Nevertheless, the United
States remains Portugal's greatest supplier of military equipment and its role in
the short- to mid-term is indispensable to the modernization of the Portuguese
Armed Forces.
The modernization needs of the Portuguese Armed Forces, while legitimate,
are vast. Some have likened the process of bringing the Portuguese military up to
NATO standards as a "root and branch reform."37 Below is a detailed list of the
military's modernization plans cited in 1988 in the Portuguese tabloid 0 DIABO.
"" r' iiful 'W :' NA To ' ' n N.'t'd ;ur (Greauter Asstsarcn,, PM270909 Lisbon DIARIO D)E-
0N •11CI.NS in P0r1 Unguvst 23 Sep 85 p 7. tranlated in FBIS WEU, 1 Oct 85, p M2, [Unattributed
"rcp,,,t "l't rtugal I e-,ervc Greater Assibtance From NATO"].
*-Kcnneth M.ax%%ll, 'sipain, Portugal. und Their Contribution to West'ern Securitv: L/1 ,




Despite questions related to the credibility of this typically sensationalized source,
the list appears accurate.
Army:
* Complementing the equipment for the separate mixed brigade. BMI: self-
propelled M-109 guns: M- 113 armored transport vehicles; self-propelled M-106
mortars; antiaircraft defense systems with Chaparral short-range missiles and
multibarrel rapid-fire Vulcan guns, purchase of more M-48A5 combat vehicles
with night vision firing equipment.
* Purchase of helicopters for antitank warfare and transport of assault troops
(Augusta-Bell A-109 or units transferred by FAP).
* Purchase of medium-range antiaircraft units such as the HAWK missile
system.
* Laser equipment for operational simulators.
* Readaption of the AA Bofors artillery pieces.
* Reinforcement of the existing antitank units.
• Requipping the Special Forces Brigade and the Light Paratrooper Brigade.
Navy:
* Modernization of the frigate "Juao Belo" (with helicopter pad and missiles of
the Exocet or Harpoon type).
0 Modernization of the corvette "Baptista de Andrade"(with modern
antisubmarine weapons and "helos").
0 Purchase of the MEKO 200 frigates.
* Purchase of 6 to 10 Lynx helicopters, with antisurface and antisubmarine
weapons.
* Modernization of the submarines and their replacement, or supplementing,
in the midterm future.
* Purchase of more modern operating equipment for the Marines.
Air Force:
* Final readying of the Corsair A-7P squadrons.
* Placement in operation of the Orion P-3P antisubmarine fleet.
* Purchase over the midterm future of new classes of helicopters.
0 Continuation of purchases of antisubmarine weapons and Maverick air-tk,-
surface missiles.
* Modernizationof the Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.
* Purchase, in the midterm future, of a new class F-16A orF-18 interceptors.
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* Modernization of the antiaircraft, antitank, and armoreed equipment for the
paratroopers and the Air Police.
0 Additions to the radar detection network and radar interception conduct
network.38
The obvious conclusion about Portugal's defense requirements is that what
each service would like and what the government's budget will allow are
incompatible. Given these fiscal realities, Portugal looks to NATO (collectively),
the United States, West Germany, and to a lesser extent France for military
assistance. It would seem that given the current levels of foreign military
'7 assistance the modernization of the Portuguese Armed Forces will proceed only at
a modest pace. There did not appear to be a concerted effort among Western
nations - either singularly or collectively - to provide Portugal with military aid
based on a logical and thought out formula. For this reason, following the 1988
base agreement consultations Secretary of Defense Carlucci proposed to
Portuguese Minister of Defense de Melo that a joint planning group consisting of a
DoD team and the Portuguese General Staff meet to discuss Portuguese defense
requirements and prioritize the most urgent requirements. Bilateral planning
would help to ensure that each dollar of security assistance received would be
maximized. This meeting on 1-4 March 1988 resulted in six modernization
priorities. The mutually agreed upon priority list consisted in the near term of F-
16A/B aircraft, three dimensional radars, helicopters, and tanks. Two additional
.'bArmed Forces Problems, Modernization Plans, WA2011I45688 Lisbon 0 DIABO in
Portuguese 23 Aug 88 p 3, translated in FBIS-WEU-88-203, 20 October 1988, p 6; for another
detailed description of the Army's short and medium term restructuring and reequipping plans see,
Paper Reports Army Modernization Plans, PM1304142489 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 10 Mar 89 p 2, translated in FBIS-WEU-89-071, 14 April 1989, p 18, [Eduardo
Mascarenhas report: "Army in 'lligh-Flying' Restructuring Now Wishes To Integrate
Paratroops"].
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requirements which could not be met until 1994 at the earliest were the I-Hawk
air defense system and M113 armored vehicles. As part of the modernization
proposal the United States offered the second and largest of its three SRA transfers
to date. The SRAs continue to play a significant role in the modernization
program. Figures 24, 25, and 26 list the extensive number of weapon systems
included in each of the three SRAs and the Portuguese interest in each of the
items.39
Despite the large level of U.S. commitment to Portuga!s defense needs, there
is a recurring debate over whether these commitments are indeed the "best efforts"
promised to Portugal in the 1983 basing agreement. Because of the general
uncertainty involved with annual levels of security assistance, there is support for
moving the defense relationship beyond the transfer of money and equipment for
4 /base access.
K. CFE WIND)FALI?
A great deal of speculation is being heard concerning the possible transfer of
frontline NATO equipment out of Central Europe and into the hands of less well off
NATO countries such as Portugal, Greece, and Turkey, following the successful
conclusion of a CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty. This arms control
windfall would allow NATO the opportunity to bring all partners up to a more
equal footing in terms of capability. According to Secretary of State for Defense
Eugenio Ramos a CFE-imposed reduction,
•1)ata provide.d by Major Javier Garza, Jr., USAF, Assistant Air Atucl.e in the Office of the
Defen.,e Attache, United States Embassy, Lisbon, letter dated 16 May 1990
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...could permit a reallocation of weaponry within NATO. Instead of destroying
military equipment to meet the ceilings, the more modern countries' most
sophisticated weaponry could be moved to countries such as Portugal, whose
Armed Forces are being modernized and which could in turn destroy their
oldest weapons.40
There is still reason to believe that this military equipment bonus, if ever
actualized, would hold only moderate benefits towards the modernization of the
... Armed Forces. The Portuguese Army, in particular, w uld stand to gain the most
from transfers of equipment formally designated to fight a conventional war on the
Central Front. Most likely this would mean more tanks, personnel and armored
carriers, and artillery pieces, to name a few, in the Portuguese inventory. Benefits
for both the Army and Navy would be far less satisfactory. This raises the question
of which service is in the greatest need of improved weapon systems. Based on its
traditional Atlanticism, any CFE transfers appear to have limited benefit toward
the serious upgrading of the capabilities of the Portuguese Air Force and Navy and
Portugal's ability to defend its strategic triangle would not be enhanced. The one
benefit to a CFE transfer, however, might be that it would free up funds
earmarked for the Army's modernization to be transferred to the other services.
That governmental decision, of course, is by no means a given. The government
might find far better ways of spending its "peace dividend" than greater military
procurements.
4 (Dtefnie, Official Suggestion on NATO WeaponrY, PM2010151689 Lisbon DIARIO DE
NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Oct 89 p 4, translated in FBIS-WEU-89-203, 23 October 1989, p 16,
[Unattributed report: "NATO Should Send Portugal Materiel, Says Eugenio Ramos"].
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L CONCLUSION
Portugal is by no means ready or able to go it alone in terms of modernizing
its Armed Forces. The United States is the only supplier likely to maintain a large
interest in Portugal's military developments due in part to its continued interest in
base access in the Azores. However, relations built primarily upon defense
agreements are precarious, especially in light of current events. Conflicts may
appear as Portugal attempts to follow a modernization plan that the United States
is increasingly reluctant to sponsor. However, the future of Portugal's military
modernization plan is for the most part dependent on the priorities established by
the national budget, not by the level of U.S. security assistance. There is a need,
therefore, to expand the present level of U.S.-Portuguese relations by building up
the degree of social, cultural, technological, and financial relations. These are
areas in which the United States is deficient, especially in comparison to
Portugal's other "base-rights" countries discussed in Chapter V (France and West
Germany). The world is rapidly changing and bilateral relations without firm
roots in many areas are in danger of erosion and decay.
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Vii. PORTUGUESE DEMOCRACY AND THE ARMED FORCES
A. INTROIDUCTION
Portugal is faced with all the inherent problems of a young democracy. As
discussed in Chapter IV, the Salazar regime stymied political opposition,
frustrated economic reform efforts, and pursued the African wars on three fronts.
The military, along with bureaucratic cronies, held a privileged position in the old
regime. The military today, however, although the impetus behind the 25 April
Revolution, has shrunk from this past position under Salazar to one of virtual
exclusion. This, in part, was the intention of some making the 25 April
Revolution. The military advocated the relinquishment of power to civilian
authority and their subsequent obedience and loyalty to the same. However, what
the military leadership did not foresee was the degree to which their views in the
decisionmaking process of their own institution would be curtailed. Today, with
the military represented in government by a civilian Minister of Defense, there is
a general consensus among high ranking officers that the government is
insensitive to defense issues. 1 The government's challenge in the near future is to
promote greater harmony and consensus with the military. The overall stability of
the country necessitates a general revision of the mission and purpose of the
Portuguese Armed Forces in today's dynamic international environment.
lReasons for Military Discontent Analyzed, 35420042 Lisbon 0 INDEPENDENTE in
Portuguese 30 Dec 88 p3, translated in FBISWEU-89-029, 14 February 1989, p 32.
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The future of Portugal's new democracy is in part a function of the reliability
of the Armed Forces and the extent of their exclusion from politics. These indeed
were the embodiments of the 1974 Revolution and the 1982 amendments to the
Constitution. It is a formidable and constant challenge for the government. As
President Ramalho Eanes stated in 1981,
The armed forces are a national institution at the service of the Portuguese
people, and the future of democracy in Portugal will depend to a large extent
on their conduct...The path ahead of us will not be without difficulty, given the
circumstances which in our country have always surrounded relations
between political power and the armed forces. But, it will enable us, through
an open, constructive and permanent dialogue, to achieve the goals which will
best suit the country and the armed forces.2
The specter of another military coup appeared periodically in the press throughout
the late 1970s and early 1980s, although in reality there is little reason to bdieve
that a credible threat ever existed. The military question locking towards the
1990s centers on the following issues: 1. the role of the military in society; 2. the
growing political-military schism; 3. the strategic mission of the armed forces; 4.
unrest in the ranks; 5. modernization efforts; 6. Portugal's military ambiguities;
and 7. the WEU option.
B. ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY
Portugal's constitutiun allows for the military to remain active participants
in the democratic process, for example through voting rights, but to remain
2President, Armed Force• Chief On Military Power, LD052356 Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 1930 GMT 5 Mar 81, translated in FBIS WEU, 9 Mar 81, p MI.
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separated from political power; in other words, to adopt a non-partisan role. As
President Ramalho Eanes stressed,
There is no more room, in theory or in practice, for the military institution or
any group of military men to claim the role of interpreter of the people's will
when the people, in discernment of the democratic rules, find their own
expression with no need for any intermediaries. 3
However, immediately following the Revolution, the military played a central role
in government through the Council of the Revolution. The Council of the
Revolution was a military caretaker body formed after the 25 November
Revolution to ensure Portugal's smooth transition to democracy. Its abolition in
the summer of 1982 could be considered Portugal's ascension to true democracy.
Another important constraint on power agreed upon almost simultaneously
with the ending of the Council of Revolution was the restriction of the head of
ntate's military power. The revised constitution allowed the President to retain his
title of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, but, as in some other Western
democracies, the title was mostly symbolic. True control of the military was
transferred to the Minister of Defernse. By far the most important and hotly
contested issue centered on who should have the power to appoint and dismiss the
members of the General Staff of the Armed Forces - the government or the
president? In the end, President Eanes acquiesced to the government's demands. 4
In the future the President could only appoint top military chiefs at the proposa' of
3Eunc., Reminds Army OfRolt, Of People, LD251551 Lisbon in Portuguese to Eurpoe 1500 GMT
25 Jul 81, translated in FBIS WEU, 27 Jul81, p M I.
4Thomas C. Bruneau and Alex Macleod, Politics in Contemporary Portugal, Parties and the
Consolidation ofDLemocracy (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1986), p 17
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the government.5 Thus, through a self-limiting motion the military effectively
placed itself outside the decisionmaking process and into a subordinate position to
the civilian government. The question that remains to be answered is whether I e
government has exacerbated the military's exclusion from the governmental
process to such a degree that a potential backlash may be possible.
C. TIHE GROWING iPOI.rTCAL-MILITARY SCHISM
Near the end of his presidency, General Ramalho Eanes described his overall
relations with the Armed Forces as "excellent" and proclaimed that he had
achieved two major objectives:
...ensuring that political power is not subordinate to military power, and
calming the armed forces. To this end I work constantly to ensure that they do
not feel excluded .... 6
If this was indeed an accurate assessment, then relations since have worsened
tremendously. In fact, alienation between the government and the military
appears to be growing. This breach is most pronounced on two. levels: 1.
gov,'rnment to high-level officers, and 2. government to military personnel as a
whole.
Poor relations between the government and the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff
revolve predominantly around levels of funding for each service. It is a typica! case
of inter-service rivalries.
5 Prestdent'b MAlitury Powers To Be Curtaile'd, LD150156 Lisbon Domestic Service in
Portuguese 2300 GMT 14 Jul 82, translated in FBIS WEU, 15Jul82. p MI.
6Eunes On Domestic, Foreign Political Situutions, PM2614-19 Barcelona LA VANGUARi)IA in
Spanish 22May 83 pp 18 19, translated in FBIS WEU. 27 May 83, p M2.
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The Air Force has perhaps the least justification to complain about its level of
gw•,:rn.icntal support. As of 19b9 it had the largest number of four star flag
6ffi,.r.-i with four, outdistancing both the Army (3) and the Navy (1), and it has
Vt'iwiaiy been represented at the highest levels of government and the military. In
Leras of equipment, the Air Force, which until recently was the only service with
pilots, received the newest equipment with the FMS purchase of A-7s in 1983 and
the receipt of P-3 Orions (formerly belonging to the Australian Air Force) in 1986.
Furthermore, although the deal is running into complications, the United States
approved the sale of block 15 F-16s with an expected delivery date beginning in
1991. These interceptors are the most modern block of the F-16s and have
consistently been assured priority one status on Portugal's modernization list.
Most recently, the Air Force pulled a major inter-service coup with the selection of
General Mendes Dias as deputy chief of the Armed Forces General Staff,
effectively frustrating the Navy's aspirations for greater representation among the
services. According to one despondent Navy source,
We don't want to think that this situation has something to do with an
exchange of favors, which might be the case since General Mendes Dias was
not even on the list of six names submitted for the post for which he has just
been picked. But we consider this appointment odd, since he is the youngest
general currently on active duty.7
One possible explanation for General Dias' nomination may be precisely his age.
The government appears interested in introducing new thinking in the Armed
Forces.
7 Unrest Seen at Top, Bottom of Armed Forces, 35420095b Lisbon 0l) IABO in Portuguese 18
April 89 p 7, translated in FBIS-WEU-89-107-S, 6 June 1989, p 24.
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The Army's struggle with civilian authority scems more problematic, despite
the recent selection of Army General Soares Carneiro as Commander in Chief of
the Armed Furces General Staff. Cavaco Silva's government caused a major
"uproar with its proposal to implement a cutback in ground troops not to exceed
30,000 men. The outspoken Army Chief of Staff General Firmino Miguel openly
criticized the reduction and claimed that such a move would make the Portuguese
Army, in relation to the country's population and size, "the smallest force in any of
the Western states."8 Relations between General Miguel, a holdover from 1974,
and Minister of Defense Eurico de Melo were far from cordial. Both de Melo and
Prime Minister Silva were critical of Miguel's apparent unwillingness to
restructure the Army. Despite popular sentiment, he was not replaced. 9 The
Army's frustration today is understandable, given the overall decline in prestige it
has suffered since the end of the African wars. Its total commitment to NATO
consists primarily of one mixed brigade - certainly not a pivotal contribution. The
Army is looking for a justification for its existence.
It could be argued that the Portuguese Navy is the most overlooked of the
three services in terms of both amounts of modern equipment and political clout.
The Navy's few frigates and even fewer submarines are 1960-vintage;
minesweeping forces are nonexistent; and only in the past year, and after a bitter
fight with the Air Force, was the decision made to give the Navy its own helicopter
HArmyv Discontent Seen in Cavaco-Fermino TeWar,'35420144c Lisbon O JORNAL in Purtuguese
15 21 Sep 89 p 36, translated in FBIS-WEU-89-205, 25 October 1989, p 24 and Army Chief
Criticizes Pace of Modernization, 35420124b Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 26 Jul 80 p
2, translated in FBIS-WEU-89-181, 20 September 1989, p 15.
ýPiecunfirmatiin of Chief of Staff Reported, 90ES0420B Lisbon 0 JORNAL in Portuguese 5-11
Jan 90 p 13, translated in FBIS-WEU 90-041-S, I March 1990, p 46 .
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squadron with naval aviators. As it stands today, the Navy is incapable of
performing its primary NATO mission of patrol and control of the "strategic
triangle" between the mainland, Azores, and Madeira. The immediate future
holds a dim outlook for improvement, despite modernization plans for the Joao
Belo class frigates and the delivery later this year of the first of three NATO-
funded MEKO frigates.
After ten years of negotiations it appears that the frigates will finally make it
to Portugal, and with their helicopter capability they will certainly enhance the
present afloat force posture. But it is doubtful that the addition of these three
ships will solve Portugal's maritime problems, given their small number and the
vast expanse of the Navy's operating area. A more realistic program would include
the development of a viable conventional submarine fleet to replace the obsolete
Albacora, Barracuda, and Delfim. This is precisely the path advocated by Navy
Chief of Staff Admiral Andrade e Silva. In June of 1989 he stated that submarines
...are the only naval vessels capable of operating successfully in areas where
surface capability does not exist, since they create the atmosphere of
uncertainty which is essential to deterrence...because of their cost-
effectiveness ratio, submarines provide countries having limited naval power
with the best means of denying an opponent use of the sea. 10
Given a blank check, perhaps this is the direction in which the Portuguese Navy
would direct itself, especially since there is little need for force projection and
because submarines can arguably fill the ASW role equally, if not more,
effectively. The frigates' selling points include a more visible platform to patrol
I10Purchase of Conventional Submarines Studied, 35420095c Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 16 April 89 p 4, article by Eduardo Mascarenhas, translated in FBIS-WEU-89-017-S, 6
June 1989, p 23.
132
the EEZ (Economic Exclusion Zone) and consistenc with the tradition among
maritime nations of having a surface fleet in being. However, the P-3s can
arguably fill the mission of patrolling the EEZ. The Portuguese surface fleet is
thus left with a mission that could be done more effectively by other platforms.
The political leadership has been criticized for its handling of military
matters. The general theme is that the government appears either unwilling or
unable to make some hard choices over the future of the Armed Forces. In the
recent past the government allowed the future of nearly all of its military
modernization efforts to ride on the annual American and West German foreign
aid packages. The number one priority of the 1980s was economic recovery, which
did not allow for large military appropriations. In fact, the defense budget actually
decreased from 1980 through 1984 and up until 1986 its failed to keep up with the
annual rate uf inflation. Despite modest increases in the defense budget since
1986,11 the government still displays a certain lack of sensitivity toward military
matters.
This insensitivity was displayed most recently in the search for a successor to
deputy prime minister and minister of defense Eurico de Melo. de Melo's tenure
was beset with problems ranging from friction between himself and Army Chief of
Staff General Fermino Miguel, to becoming enmeshed in the Air Force 'Navy battle
over who would have operational control over the new Lynx helicopters that were
purchased to be deployed on the MEK•K frigates. Even the choice of helicopters
was an issue and resulted in Portugal losing face with the United States by
IlFdctS on inflation and defese budgets INATO defined) are taken from the past ten yearS of
The MsliturJ BIa.nre (London: Published by lBrassey's for the International Institute for Strategic
Studies,
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defaulting on a previously approved sale of Kaman SH-2Fs. The end result was a
reported lack of confidence in de Melo by Prime Minister Silva and his subsequent
request to to be relieved. 12
What made matters worse between the government and the military was de
Melo's chosen successor - Carlos Brito. Remarks attributed to military sources by
EXPRESSO objected strongly to the nomination of a man who "lacks any
experience in the military area" and thereby perceived as "another insult to the
Portuguese Armed Forces."13 (emphasis added) Whatever was the reasoning
behind this choice, it only deepened the military's distrust of Cavaco Silva and his
cabinet, especially with sensitive base negotiations currently underway with West
Germany and soon to begin with the United States. It is certainly understandable
that the military would expect to see an individual well versed in military affairs
representing them. This does not appear to be their perception of Carlos Brito. On
the other hand, the military's frustration with the government does not apparently
include President Mario Soares. In fact, Soares has aligned himself with the
military in their quest for fairer compensation. 14 Perhaps Soares sees this as his
duty as supreme commander of the Armed Forces or maybe it is purely a political
move, but whatever the case may be, it is apparent that the level of dialogue
between Soares and the service chiefs exceeds that of Silva. The widening
political-military schism is exacerbated by the general apathy by the majority of
12D1,fnse Minister Resigns, L)0201 185890 Lisbon Radio Renascenca in Portuguese to Europe
1800 GMT2 Jan 90, translated in FBIS-WEU-90-002, 3 January 1990, p 12.
13 Mililtry 'Negative' on Defense Ministry Changes, 90ES0420A Lisbon EXPRESSO in
Portuguese 6 Jan 90 p 14, translated in FBIS-WEU-90-041 -S, 1 March 1990, p 44.
14Presidential Intervention, 90ES0463B Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 20 Jan 90 p A20,
translated in FBIS-WEU-90-041-S, 1 March 1990, p 43.
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Portuguese on matters regarding international security issues. An isolationist
attitude is still pervasive throughout the majority of society, and it is recognized
that the public is more indifferent towards international issues than any of its
European counterparts.1 5
1). STRATEGIC MISSION OFTtHE 11ORTUGUESE ARMEID FORCES
One of the most vexing and unresolved questions troubling of the Portuguese
Armed Forces is what exactly are their strategic missions. For centuries, the
preservation of overseas possessions was the Armed Forces' strategic mission.
With the Army's withdrawal from the colonies and the subsequent large-scale
demobilization, NATO allowed a viable option. However, the Portuguese Army
was ill-equipped to carry out a NATO mission, and therefore military hardware
was far different from that presently in Portuguese inventories. Equipment used
in Africa against insurgents did not translate well to that needed against the Red
Army in northern Italy. Therefore, Portugal's Armed Forces remained largely
incapable of carrying out these duties and responsibilities, both from a national
and a collective security sta-idpoint. It appears that there is still some question as
to the military's strategic mission. A recent article in 0 DIABO likened the unrest
in the military to a "hot potato," the dimensions of which the political power ought
not realize too late. The interesting point of the article was the lead cause of this
15AIvaro V'.sconcelos, "Portugal in Atlantic Muditerranean Security," 'n Politics and Security
in the Southern Regin ofth, Atlantic Alliance, edited by Douglas T. Stuart (IBaltimore: The Johns
Hlhpkins University Presh, 1988), p 128.
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unrest; a decline in motivation in the military establishment following the
termination of its strategic mission. 16
It is natural enough for the Portuguese to view events 15 years ago as if they
happened yesterday, but that nevertheless leaves behind an enduring problem of
morale and motivation. There is little debate that the greater percentage of
Portuguese are conservative in their political outlook and display much more
patriotic tendencies than their European neighbors. However, a disturbing trend
is evident among the young who, despite espousing these nationalistic virtues, are
increasingly uninterested in serving in the Armed Forces. A prevalent belief is
that a military career holds no real future. A recent poll organized by the
Portuguese Association for Economic Development (ELO) found civilian service to
be a preferred option to military service by the majority of Portuguese youths
(Current law allows civil service in place of compulsory military duty for
conscientious objectors). In this survey, 73.3 percent of those queried responded in
favor of the civil service option.1 7
E. UNREST IN THE RANKS
A movement is afoot to right the perceived injustices to which military
personnel are being increasingly subjected, and it cuts across all services, affecting
both officers and enlisted personnel. This is a step down from the flag officer level
and the political infighting described earlier, but it is nonetheless important. The
16Troubles Among Military Seen as 'hot Potato, 35420105 Lisbon 0 DIABO in Portuguese 13
Jun 89 p 3, translated in FBIS-WEU-89-152,9 August 1989, p 21.
17Po11 Results on Military Service Alternatives, 90ES0647A Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 14 Feb 90 p 4, translated in FBIS-WEU-90-055, 21 March 1990, p 15.
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first public display of unrest by the enlisted community occurred in the winter of
1988 when approximately 200 Navy petty officers passed a motion to create a joint
representative body among the three services that would result in a list of
grievances being placed before the Assembly of the Republic. (It must be stressed
from the start that the NCOs are wary of actions that may be interpreted as
breaches of discipline and their complaints are not directed against the military
services, per se, but at the "insensitive" government.)
The key grievance was lack of pay. Military pay is failing to keep up with the
rate of inflation. 18 There are many other sources of friction, the most prominent of
which are: minimum time period in each post, access to officers' training courses,
and early retirement. The Navy's discontent took the lead again in August 1989
by sponsoring a "Day of Protest" in which approximately 2,000 sergeants refused
to leave their individual units after the 1700 call to quarters and remained there
until after evening colors. 19
This mild form of rebellion was repeated in August by all branches of the
Armed Forces, a move supported at the first general assembly of the newly formed
"National Association of Sergeants (ANS) - a legal body.20 The degree of unrest
appears to be increasing. It is only natural that the lower echelons of the military
would want to blunt attempts to streamline the military through necessary force
14.VCO's Estublish Refrpresentative B,,d.v 35420007b Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 8 Oct 88 p 2, tranblated in FBIS WEU-88-224, 21 November 1988, p 11.
I1Sergeants' Strike Ptws.ible, 35420116 Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 15 Jul 89 p I],
trinslet(d in FBIS-WEU-89 160,21 August 1989, p 2 4 .
20Controvers) Seen in Military Over Pu.i, Status, 90ES0328B Lisbon 0 JORNAI. in Portuguese
15 21 Dec 89 p 23, transiatted in FBIS-WEU-90-018, 26 Janudry 1990, p 18-
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reductions and freezes in pay, because, as in tihe past, they will be the ones most
affected.
Responsibility for defusing the Sergeants' Movement is being tossed back in
forth between the military and the government, with neither side taking a firm
stand. The most that the military has done is to state the official policy that
"military personnel in the permanent cadres, on active duty or in the reserve, may
not be members of associations of a political, party, or trade union nature.'"21 The
governments' official policy is even more difficult to pinpoint. One indication is the
following, rather terse paragraph cited in EXPRESSO and reproduced in its
entirety.
The "concerns to ensure equivalency" between the military and other state
employees are among the topics dealt with in the proposals being discussed, as
is the "modernization and Europeanization of the Portuguese Armed Forces."
But since the structure in question, being derived from the still-recent colonial
wars, is regarded as excessive and includes military men from various strata
who are considered more or less "surplus" and even "poorly trained and
, unlikely to qualify for promotion in the hierarchy," the task does not appear to
be an easy one.22
"So long as the military remains a bothersome appendage to the governments'
budget, there is little reason to believe that the problems will go away on their
/
own. The friction between the government and the military is even more acute at
the mid-grade officer level, particularly in the Air Force. The issue concerns the
lack of bonuses to pilots, The scenario is certainly not unfamiliar to most Western
2
-General Staff Criticizes Sergeants' Mves, 35420120a Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 22
Jul 89 p 10 1article by Rui Pereira1, translated in FBIS-WEU-89-175, 12 September 1989, p 47.
22-Three Cadres Planne'd, 35420149 Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 16 Sep 89 p 20,
translated in FBIS WEU-89-205, 25 October 1989, p21.
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nations who are forced to compete with the commercial airlines by offering their
pilots annual bonuses to stay in. But to date, Portugal has declined to offer similar
financial incentives to its pilots ane the results are predictable; in 1987, 36 pilots
switched from military to civilian occupations, 61 left the following year, and in
the first half of 1989 another 30 pilots. Recently the Air Force has opted to sit on
the reqaests of another 36 pilots who requested transfers to the reserves. The hope
is that Parliament will approve the pending legislation concerning the
implementation of flight bonuses. The Air Force cannot afford to see its pilot corps
depleted any further, especially given the financial losses - it reportedly costs the
military approximately 200,000 contos (or $1.3 million23) to train each pilot.2 4
However, the issue is not strictly limited to pay. While a mid-grade officer
can nearly double his salary in the commercial market, it appears most pilots are
equally frustrated by the lack of flight time they are getting in the military. While
normal training reportedly requires that each pilot have no less than 20 flight
hours per month, the average in the Portuguese Air Force has been less than 10
hours per mn,,rth. 25 The causes behind these shortfalls in readiness are traceable
once again, as in the case of the Navy, to declining operating budgets. Not only is
there a lack of fuel, but also a lack of spare parts which, according to the
23I4sed on a conversion rate of 153.79 escudos = $1, as listed in, The Military Balance t1989-
1.90) tlamndon: Published b.) Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 19891,
p 7 3
24 t,,s'.sgnution of Air Fort, Pildts Discussed, 90ES05471 Lislbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10
Feb 90 pp 181 22H [Article 1,y NJose Manuel Saraiva: "The Desire for Different Wings"I, translated
in FBIS-WEU 90 055,21 March 1990, p 13
25 Air Force Pilots Criticize Training Procedures, 90ES0328D Lisbon OJORNAL in Portuguese
8 14 Dec 89 p 5 lArticle bY llerminiv Santosl, translated in FBIS-WEU-90-018, 26 January 1990. p
19
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disgruntled pilots, results in only half of a squadron of 12 A-7s to be in "ready to
fly" condition. 26 The United States is apparently attempting to intervene in the
matter by, according to a reputable source, "opening up the gates" with regard to
spare A-7 engines to Portugal. Whether this contribution, or the tempting
incentive of possibly piloting one of the F-16s that are on order, are enough to stem
the flood of dissident pilots is uncertain. What is certain is that there is an
undeniable need for major reforms to the Air. Force's present policy on financial
compensation.
The bottom line is that while most observers would agree that a
restructuring of the Armed Forces is necessary, the political will is lacking. As
Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Rui Machete stated in 1985,
Now I repeat that the restructuring of the Armed Forces has not yet been
effected, because it requires something that has not yet been achieved, which
is political stability and a political power capable of carrying it out, because
this is done with costs. Restructuring means saying that there is nojustification for the development of certain sectors of the Armed Forces, which
should disappear or dwindle while at the same time others must be developed.
All this requires determination and political authority, because in most
instances those who are sacrificed will disagree with this solution. 27
Hard choices certainly lie in Portugal's future. The picture looks gloomy
given the degree of divergence between the government and the military and the
inability of either side to make significant improvements to the present system.
Indicative of this malaise is the fact that even with the strongest government since
26 Pil,t-Cundidates Protest Air Force Delays, 90ES0328A Lisbon 0 JORNAL in Portuguese 15-
21 l)ec 89 p 12 [Article by Jose Placido Juniorl, translated in FBIS-WEU-90-018-S, 26 January
1990, p 18I
27Marchete liscusses Vurious Defense Issues, PM261621 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in
Portuguese 12 Aug85 pp 2, 5, translated in FBIS WEU, 28Aug85, p M3.
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the Revolution, Cavaco Silva's outright majority, the military's shield against
restructuring and reform held firm. Perhaps it will take the retirements of old
stalwarts like Army Chief of Staff General Fermino Miguel before convergence
between governmental and military defense priorities will be realized. More
likely, however, inter-service rivalry will continue to trump the governments
greater ambitions.
The recent "fraternal gathering" of over 2,000 Portuguese officers - the
largest gathering of military officers since 25 April 1974 - is possibly cause for
governmental concern. Although the only outcome of the gathering was the
expressed interest in forming an association of Military Academy alumni, there is
the fear that the group's members might take on a more politicized agenda. 28
The first meeting of what eventually became the Captain's Movement began
under similar pretenses in July 1973 . It is imperative for Portugal's democratic
future that the military maintain its present degree of involvement in
governmental affairs, yet there is also an undeniable need for increased levels of
cooperation in long range planning. A prerequisite, therefore, to reducing the
present friction is to increase the low level of dialogue between the military and
the government.
F. PORTUGAL'S MIILITA RY AMBIGUITIES
Portugal appears both reluctant and unable to support the most basic defense
"need - a prepared force. The size of Portugal's contribution to NATO is acceptable
2SAss.ociation Estoblish,'d, 90ES0463A Lis•on TAL & QUAL in Portuguese 19 Jan 90 p 6,
translated in FBIS WEU-90 0-11 S, ! March 1990, p 42.
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given the present security environment, but it is troubling that readiness is being
sacrificed. What Portuguese Defense Minister Adelino Amaro da Costa stated in
1980 is equally valid today:
The options are clear: either we drastically reduce the volume and quality of
duties entrusted to the military, or we must provide it with the minimum of
means of ensure that its activity is not futile, unproductive or ineffective. 29
This concise appraisal cuts to the heart of the matter. Without a reappraisal
of national priorities there is sure to be a growth in disturbing trends such as
conducting national exercises without using live ordinance. Orion-89 involved
Army, Air Force, and Republican National Guard forces, but no training with live
ammunition was allowed due to the "lack of financial resources." 30 The Navy is
also finding the scope of its exercises increasingly constrained by budgetary
restrictions. In the words of Captain Carneiro da Silva, the director of the Naval
Tactical Training Center,
The Armed Forces have been faced with increasing budget restrictions, and
this situation is affecting the exercises which need to be carried out in order to
test our ships, to give them the capacity to respond to the various demands...It
has taken a great effort and commitment to its mission and to service in order
for the Navy to adjust to the circumstances which are being imposed upon it, so
as to be able to continue to respond effectively and to carry out the missions
entrusted to it.31
"29Minister Asks Parliament For hligher Defense Spending, LD120825 Lisbon DIARIO DE
NOTICIAS in Portuguese 30 April 80 p 3, translated in FBIS WEU, 14 May 80, p M4.
; 0 AAmmunition Unavailable for Orion Manuevers, 35420120b Lisbon JORNAL DE 0 DIA in
Pur','ueuse 14 Jul 89 p 28, from article by Revela Viana Baptista: "Orion-89 Exercise Will Involve
No Actual Firing," trarnslated in FBIS-WEU-89-174, 11 September 1989, p 25.
311ludgetary R-,,strictions Affect Naval Manuevers, 90ES0464B Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 22 jan 90 p 28, translated in FBIS-WEU-90-048-S, 12 March 1990, p 15.
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Althvugh much pride and emphasis has been placed on the Portuguese
Navy's imminent receipt of three long awaited MEKO frigates (funded largely by
NATO), their arrival will only exacerbate present operating costs that are already
underfunded, rather than add substantially to Portugal's defensive capabilities.
Additionally, the Portuguese have consistently failed to address their shortcoming
in mine warfare capabilities. The Portuguese currently have virtually no mine
warfare capabilities and no plans to construct or purchase minesweeping and
minehunting ships, despite offers by both the Dutch and West Germans to assist
them in any research and development efforts in the mine countermeasure (MCM)
area. 32 The weakness is apparent given the fact that in an East-West scenario the
main threats against Portugal are not only the interdiction of shipping by Soviet
submarines, but also the closing of sea lanes and ports by mines deployed by these
same platforms.33 If a Soviet mining operation were successful then the ability to
resupply and reinforce NATO's Central Front through the Iberian bridgehead
would be lost.
G. THE WEU OPTION
There are reasons to believe that the modernization of Portugal's Armed
Forces will nut be fulfilled given the present strateg of relying on outside
assistance primarily from the United States while holding down defense budgets.
As discussed in Chapters I1. and VI, the domestic pressures may well force the
31rkfformation provided by Major Javier Garza, Jr., USAF, Assistant Air Attache in the Office
orthe Defense Attache, United States Embcns.y, Lisbon, letter dated 16 May 1990.
3JM.,x G. Manwaring and Alan Ned Sabrosky, "Iberia's Role in NATO's Future: Strategic
Ru.urrvc, Reinforcement, and Redoubt," in Parameters, Vol. XVI, No. 1,Spring 1986, p 4 9 .
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United States to sharply decrease it past levels of security assistance to foreign
countries, including Portugal. At the same time it appears that the projected
normalization of the Portuguese Armed Forces is far from being realized as even
Portugal's recent economic recovery has failed to substantially raise their defense
budgets. Given the government reluctance, the United States' unreliability, and
the Armed Forces obvious needs, a prudent measure might be for Portugal to
promote greater participation in the WEU as a long-term modernization strategy.
According to Mr. Charles Goerens, President of the Western European Assembly,
the three principal goals of the "reborn" WEU are,
. Improve its activities on out-of-area issues, particularly in the Persian Gulf.
* Inprove armaments cooperation among its member countries.
* Coordinate European participation in the broader framework of the
Atlantic Alliance. 34
An expanded WEU, while still a distant goal, would be in Portugal's best
interests for two reasons. First, active participation in out-of-area operations
would give the military a greater role, serve as a justification for increased defense
budgets, and improve the morale of the Armed Forces. A possible untapped
mission area might be increased Portuguese participation in the United Nations
Peacekeeping Forces. Troops from the 1st Mixed Brigade might well profit from
this secondary international role. Second, Portugal's dependence on the United
States' military assistance could be reduced if the WEU promoted greater
3 4 Michdel C. Radt, "Cooperation in the Western Mediterranean: a New Role for NATO's
Southern Flank Allies," in RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1990, London, 1990, p 165.
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cooperation in research and development among its members (along the lines of
the Dutch and West German MCM offers). It must be stressed that a military
reorientation as described above would in no way constitute a step towards
dissolution of present U.S.-Portuguese military ties. As Prime Minister Cavaco
Silva explained in March of 1988,
I believe it (WEU) is a political forum for the discussion of European defense
but that the strengthening of this European NATO pillar should be done
mainly within NATO .... 35
Instead, much like the WEU's stated policy of strengthening NATO's
European pillar, it would allow Portugal to complement present and future U.S.
assistance levels. The pursuit of such a policy would also be a step forward for the
government towards achieving the normalization of the military as a content
military requires both a clear mission and the capabilities to perform it. The long-
term integration and advancement of the three WEU principles could go far
towards satisfying these Portuguese military needs, conceivably even at reduced
manpower levels.
H. CONCLUSION
Portugal's defense problems remain largely structural in nature. An
inordinate amount of the defense budget continues to go towards personnel
expenses rather than the operational and procurement portfolios. For example,
the Army has more high- than low-ranking officers and the present distribution of
"35 Cavcui Sgiuc, Discu.,e .'ATO Surnmit. WEII Efforts, L!IX41513 Lisbon International
Scrvict in Portuguese 1152 GMT 4 Mar 88, translated in FBIS-WEU-86&044, 7 March 1988, p 12.
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the Army budget allows only nine percent for the acquisition of new material.36 In
order to reverse the growing unhealthy trend towards military dissatisfaction, the
government needs to fully implement the National Defense Law and coustrict the
size of its military while at the same time improving both the quality of its
equipment and the training of its personnel. Long-term successful normalization
may well rest on the full participation and integration of Portugal into a
"revitalized" WEU. It is understood that presently the WEU offers little such
hope, and the United States will continue to be the primary supplier of military
assistance up to the end of the century. But, it is ;n the United States' (as well as
Portugal's) long-term best interests that Portugal diversify its military suppliers
and thereby improve its defensive capabilities. Portugal needs to obtain an/
improved military capability not only for self defense and collective Western
security, but also for political and social harmony. A reduced U.S. contribution
towards Portugal's defense needs does not necessarily have to equate to a loss of
political influence and prestige. Instead, and more importantly, it would signify
the attainment of the United States longstanding goals of the successful
consolidation of Portuguese democracy and the country's accession out of the U.S.
security assistance program.
UtAlvaro Vasconcehos, "Portuguese Defence Policy: Internal Politics and Defence
Commitments," in NATO's Southern Allies, Internal and External Challenges, edited by John
Chipman (London and New York: Routledge, 1988, p 128.
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Vill. CONCLUSION
The near future promises to unveil dramatic challenges to the international
security environment. Events in Europe, in particular, will force NATO to
reevaluate its collective defense function and in turn strain U.S. overseas basing
interests. It seems in some ways that the future of the European continent stands
before a crossroads similar to that contemplated by British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill several days after the Yalta Conference, "What will lie between
the white snows of Russia and the white cliffs of Dover?"1 Will it be a continent of
stable democracies or one of regional political instability as in the post-1919
period? Will the United States completely disengage from the continent after
being its guarantor of freedom for over 40 years? Currently, few certainties exist.
Unknown future changes in the international security environment warrant
prudence as well as increased cooperation between the United States and its
NATO allies because, in the words of Portuguese Prime Minister Cavaco Silva,
"Nobody right now has a clear idea about Europe's final architecture." 2
This thesis has explored the U.S.-Portuguese relationship in order to develop
a prescription for increased consensus in future bilateral basing agreements
'Churchill cited in Michdel Stuermer, "h, NATO Still in Europe'b Interest?," in NATO in the
I1.4Os, edited by Stanley I Slodn (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense
Publishers, 1989,, p 112.
"
2Premier Discusses Fast Blow Changes, Angola, PM2203162190 Lisbon EXPRESSO in
Portuguese 3 Feb 90 1"A Revista" section) pp 4-11, translated in FBIS-WEU-90-057, 23 March
1990, p 17, llnterview with Portuguese Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva by Jose Antonio
Sarai'a and Joaquim Vicira; place and date not givel.
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between the two countries. Traditionally, such an approach would have focused on
on the dominant area of mutual interest - bases and military assistance. While
military-related matters represent a significant portion of the relationship, many
other factors could significantly enhance or degrade U.S.-Portuguese relations.
Therefore, this thesis has presented a comprehensive, albeit less detailed, analysis
of the historical evolution of the political, economic, social, and military factors
which define Luso-American relations. It is hoped that this widely defined
approach has permitted a more accurate assessment of the relationship's vitality.
Uncertainty over the level of the Soviet threat will continue to complicate
NATO's military planning requirements, especially if the United States adopts a
doctrinal shift from forward defense to one of strategic reinforcement. A doctrinal
shift like this would heighten the need for reliable and safe points of transit and
debarkation between the U.S. eastern seaboard and Europe. The Azores, in
particular, fills these requirements and allows the United States a strategic
alternative to the northern resupply route going through Iceland and the United
Kingdom. There will continue to be a need up into the next century for continued
access to the facilities at Lajes in the Azores - not only in East-West scenarios, but
in contingencies involving the Middle East. Owing to many factors, including
ballistic missile and chemical weapons proliferation and U.S. ties with Israel and
other countries in the region, future United States militarily involvement in the
Middle East cannot be excluded. It is unlikely that any country besides Portugal
would allow the United States access to its bases from which America could
successfully intervene to end a crisis, as was demonstrated in the 1973 resupply of
Israel by way of the Azores. The Lajes base is only 2,500 miles from the U.S. east
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coast and 1,000 miles from Britain, while the Persian Gulf is 7,000 miles away
from the United States. Given the flight range of heavy-airlift craft - 2,140 miles
for the C-141, 3,250 for the C-5A3 - access to this base is clearly vital to the United
States. Another point is that regular deployments of U.S. carrier battle groups to
the Indian Ocean may end, given cutbacks in the number of aircraft carriers that
Congress is willing to fund. Where then will the readily available forces postured
to intervene in the Middle East come from? Barring a major change in foreign
policy by Spain, Greece, and / or Turkey, it is the author's contention that the
Azores will remain our safest and surest way into this operational area. Lajes is
the safest and most accessible base through which the United States can satisfy its
future security requirements in Southern Europe. Therefore, the United States
ought to be looking at how to solidify relations with Portugal and build upon areas
of common interest.
The present security assistance program is flawed in two ways. First, there is
no satisfactory mechanism to monitor an individual country's progress toward
"graduating" from the program. In order to strike a balance between Portugal's
legitimate security needs and U.S. budgetary realities, Congress might consider
approving assistance packages for Portugal (and other countries) based on a given
period of a years, say five years (with due allowances for unforeseen
circumstances), complete with projected milestones. This would help Congress to
track each country's progress and justify adjustments to that country's assistance
levels. Not only would this ease the tension between the Executive and Legislative
3Ah'aro Vasconcelos, "Portuguese Defence Policy: Internal Politics and Defence
Commitments," in NATO's Southern Allies. Intern.l and External Ctallenges, edited by John
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branches, but it would also promote greater harmony between the United States
and recipients of foreign aid. The second shortcoming involves the earmarking of
foreign aid. It is deleterious to the United States' national interests to constrain
the Administration's management of foreign affairs by earmarking the majority of
the foreign aid budget to a select few countries. Levels of security assistance
should reflect the actual needs of foreign countries more than the level of lobbying
and political moods of the Congress.
When critics in Congress chastise Portugal for requesting increasing levels of
security assistance, they fail to fully appreciate the country's history. Portugal is
still a very young democracy and only a relatively new recipient of U.S. security
assistance. Its economy has only slowly evolved in the last couple of years to the
point where it may be considered an industrialized country. U.S. assistance has
proven to be instrumental in allowing Portugal to consolidate democracy while
maintaining a modest defense budget. Unfortunately, Americans expect too much
too quickly in terms of payoffs from foreign aid. Meaningful financial assistance
cannot be absorbed overnight by recipient nations. Similarly, it is unfair to
compare Portugal to Greece, Turkey, or even Spain. Each of these countries which
allow the U.S. access to bases on its territory is unique, and any attempt to
generalize policy considerations pertinent to all is ill-founded. For example,
Portugal received no Marshall Plan aid, and the levels of assistance since then can
in no way be compared to those massive levels allocated to Greece and Turkey.
Furthermore, unlike the others, Portugal has consistently proven itself to be a
reliable friend and ally of the United States. There is no reason to believe that
Portugal enjoys being a major recipient of American security assistance, and if it
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had the economic wherewithal it, like Spain, would prefer to distance itself from
this dependency. It is only a matter of time before Portugal too evolves out of the
security assistance program.
Portugal's consolidation of democracy can be iabeled a success story. Now
more than sixteen years after the 1974 revolution the country is well on its way
toward economic recovery, thanks in part to EC membership and the Commnunity's
outpouring of development funds. As Antonio Jose Mendonca Pinto, a senior
"economist at the Bank of Portugal put it, "We have been given a rare opportunity,
and we want to grab it with both hands."4 While the immediate goals of the
Revolution can be considered achieved, there are new challenges ahead.
"Today, Portugal's three "Rs" - reequipping, reducing, and restructuring
have superseded the three "Ds"- decolonization, democracy, and development - of
the immediate post-revolutionary period. In order for these goals to be achieved,
the military will need to accept a reduced size, but it should be allocated modern
"equipment and the training to properly employ it. The emphasis needs to be on
quality, not quantity. Additionally, outside, but seconuary, mission areas such as
increased participation with the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces and the
training of combat troops in former African colonies will allow the Armed Forces to
maintain a level of proficiency and expertise in small unit combat skills. Only by
giving the Armed Forces a strategic mission and allowing them to contribute to
society in a meaningful way can the government prevent unrest, keep the military




7 out of government, actualize the approved military planning law, and thereby
achieve complete normalization of t~he Armed Forces.
The three case studies analyzed in Chapters V and VI involving France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States provided evidence for the
following observations with regard to base rights negotiations.
First, long-term basing agreements with guaranteed levels of assistance
cause the least amount of tension between nations. In the case of the United
States, the lack of consistent foreign aid allocations hampers Portugal's efficient
use of security assistance and, in turn, long-range strategic planning and force
procurements suffer.
Secondly, the use of only military equipment as a quid pro quo in basing
agreements is inherently unstable. This was demonstrated in the case of the
Federal Republic of Germany. It appeared that whenever either the quality or
amount of equipment received from the FRG declined, so did the relations between
the two. Fortunately for the FRG, other non-military ties seem to have madie up
for these shortcomings.
Thirdly, the less visible the base, the easier the negotiations. This applied
particularly to France whose remote base on the island of Flores sparks little
controversy with Portuguese politicians.
Fourth, the potential uses that a base offers a foreign country are of greater
consequence in negotiations than its size. Therefore, the perceived value of the
base by the host nation dictates the level of compensation it requests. This is seen
most visibly with Lajes and Beja. So long as both the United States and the FRG
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have few other geographic options and a great deal of money already invested in
the facilities, the Portuguese have some negotiating leverage.
A final important finding about these base relationships is the number of
subtle linkages that exist between these four nations and which appear to
contribute, both positively and negatively, to the final outcome of basing
negotiations. American negotiators ought to be aware of (and well-briefed on)
these non-military factors that affect Portuguese relations with France and the
FRG in order to advance American positions that will ultimately produce a
mutually beneficial basing agreement.
In the near future the United States must make some hard decisions over
what overseas bases it should maintain. Lajes appears to be one base that is
invaluable to preservation of United States overseas interests. Yet, it is in the
national interests, and is fiscally imperative today, that access to overseas
facilities be obtained free of any linkages to levels of U.S. security assistance. In
order to meet this objective without alienating allies and friends, increasing the
level and quality of social, cultural, political, and economic ties that the United
States maintains with Portugal must be given the highest priority. For the short
term, however, while monetary realities will not disappear, they perhaps can be
downplayed through skillful diplomacy and a broadening of the current
relationship into areas such as increased educational opportunities, cultural
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Figure 2: IBERLANT'S Strategic Triangle
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Figure 3: U.S. Worldwide SOSUS Facilities
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Figure 5: Growth of Earmarks in Military Assistance Funding
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Figure 7: French and West German Immigration to Portugal
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Figure 9: Portuguese Trade Balance with France and the FRG









Figure 10: Portuguese Imports from Fraace and the FRG
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Figure 12: Foreign Direct Investment in Portugal by Franre and the FRG
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Figure 13: Percentages of Foreign Direct Investment in IPortugal




lot tranche 28/5/76 34.0 Million DH ('59: "*41 percent)
2d tranche 20/12/79 45.0 Million DM ('80:e 20 percent)
(1/l/80-30/6181)
3d tranche 17/9/81 45.0 Million DM ('80: 9*20 percent)
(1/7/61-31/12/82)
4th tranche 20/10/83 45.0 Million DN (*80: **20 percent
(/l/l3-30/1/84)
5th tranche 7/12/84 45.0 Million DN (*80. "*20 percent)
(1/7/84-31/12/85)
6th tranche 28/7/86 45.0 Million DM (*80: *20 percent
(1/1/86-30/7/87) of the 15 million
DH remaining after
30 million DM is
deducted for the
frigate program)
7th tranche 13/10/87 45.0 Million DMI
(1/7/87-31/12/88)
Total 304.0 Million DM***
' Percentage of new material
" Equipment deliveries from excess stocks of the Bundeswehr
(translator's note: used material)
"' Including the contribution in the sum of 60 Million DN for the
Portuguese frigate construction program (see 2 below)
Materiel Assistance
I. Agreement of 15/8/78 about 5.0 Million DM
- vehicles of the first generation
of (Bundeswehr) vehicles
Ii. Agreement of 15/12/80 about 87.4 Million DM
- 74 Fiat G-91 aircraft and
equipment for the weapon system
Total 92.4 Million DM
Figure 14: West German Military Aid to Portugal
SouTL . inI,,rtna n,n pr, ,dted b) MN jurJu % ir Garz a Jr i . 'SA i, AsS]S Us Lt AMr A 1j1he in th e Offi ce of the D lenme

















Figure 15: Foreign. Weapon Systems in the Portuguese Army and Air Force
S-4 •~~Surc': Jun.'. A'trm i.ur an~d..rt.IW r• i9*SJ-9(#, t:nzh tdsuun., t-ditd by ('hrsui~tih~r F Fu• L.K.: Janew% hdi,Irfl~tho,i (rnIup.
1989, Jo'z.:N IIfa'zzr; W•=ap~'i 19,',i 9t,. Jditrd by lili V. ikugj. U K.. Jaiit's Inlurnmdut-h roup, 1989.
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FINANCIAL IMPACT OF MILITARY BASES (PORTUGAL)
(AN•AJI AMOUNTS)
TOTAL PORTUGUESE NATIONALS HIRED 1,543
(includes direct, nondirect, nonappropriated, etc.)
TOTAL WAGES PORTUGUESE NATIONALS $11,931,056
LOCAL CONTRACT / ACQUISITION $43,200,000
DEFENSE FUEL (servicing A/C bunker) $ 600,000
WAGES OF US SERVICEMEN AND CIVILIANS $40,665,307
TOTAL $93,936,363
/
SFigt es p•ovioed at a hearing berofe the House Appropriations Committee on 16 Mar 89. p 4 90
Figure 16: Financial Impact of U.S. Military Bases in Portugal
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" ' Figure 17: Percentage of Portuguese Immigrating to the United States
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Figure 18: Portuguese Trade Balance with the United States














Figure 19: Portuguese Exports to the United States
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Figure 22: Trends in U.S. Security Assistance to Portugal
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The three MEKO frigates will be equipped in the following manner by contributing
NATO allies:
System Country
Cruesot-Loire 100mm (3.9 inch) rapid fire gun France
"Harpoon Surface-to-Surface missile United States
NATO Sea Sparrow Surface-to-Air missile United States
Vulcan I Phalanx Close-In Weapon System United States
Communications Suite Portugal
Search and Fire Control Radar Netherlands
Sewaco-Daisy Tactical Data Computer Netherlands
"APECS II AR 700 Electronic Warfare Suite United States
Super Rapid Blooming Offboard Chaff United States
AN /SQS 505 Medium Range Sonar Canada
MK 46 Antisubmarine Torpedo United States
Helicopter UK*
LM 2500 Gas Turbine Engines United States
MTU Diesel Engines Federal Republic of Germany
,Helicopter decision was decided following publication of this source.
Financing for the frigates is as follows:
Country Million Dollars
U S 235





UK 7*" (Oct 1987--6.1M Pounds)
Norway 4 (Oct 1987 -- NKR.38.7M)
Denmark 0.6
Belgium 0.5
Luxembourg 0.3 (Oct 1987 - - FR.6M)
"Total 7":
"Does tiot include purchase of Lnyx helicopters.
Source. Information Paper, Subject: Portuguese Frigate Program, Prepared by
Captain J F Doyle, Chief Navy Section, MAAG-Portugal Typed by Carmen Ortiz, 8
January 1988.
Figure 23: NATO Contributions to the Portuguese Frigate Program
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SOUTHERN REGION4 IA8l* (Smk)
F N Z13 1(27 JAN 87)
SfMlS OF aEI. (D•r 89)
AIR FORCE
Eqipen gX Status
A-7 engines 42 16 delivered Jum-Sep 88, ;eW Doc 89





M6Ok2 tank 10 8 delivered Feb 89, 2 due Jun 90
(AVLB conversion)
M48A5 tank 20 20 delivered Jan 89
.M49 2-1/2T fuel trk 20 6 delivered Feb 89, 14 inspected by
PA Sep 89 FRG. 8 accepted by PA.Nov 89
M125-81mm mortar carrier 12 12 delivered Feb 89
129-81mm mortar 12 12 delivered Feb 89
bulldozers 10 PA interested, none identifled excess
l/4t Trk M151 25 1b interest
1/2t Trk W80 so0
1060m recoilless rifle 30
NRVY
Hydrographic survey vessel I Delivered Feb 8B
Dokirng fenders 2 Delivered Jun 88
Patrol siap 1 No interest
Mad. 11cirbor T¶g I
Fiv<ure 24: SRA Offer #1
Npurt. Inh-ri;mah,,r r,r'vided by M 1 ir Ja•i'er Garza. Jr.. SAF'..bistant Air Attache in the Otkce ofthe lDtrnw&
AiLauh.. L jwitd ZLtd.- Lnnbasb. ILisbon. Itletterdated It l M 19th
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SCUflMt REGION AMND2M1r (SRA)
OFEIR NO) 2 (5 AUG 87)
STATUS OF OFFER (DEC 89)
ArR FORE
EquimentOtyStatus
T-33 7 Delivery ccxzpleted Jul 89
TF3O-P-408 Eng Tools numerous Delivery onoing
MD-3 Grd Pwr Unit 5 No interest
A-7P Supt Equip 4
R-l05l/URR iF/HF recvr's 4
* AN/URT-2414F/HF transmitters 4
ANN/Wr-1 MF/HF tranoeiver 4
AFqY
Chem prot overgarm~nts 20,000 MAG notified items may be available
in UK Oct 89
MI8K1 Claymore mines 5.000 Located in Hanau; PO working w/F`RG on
trans
Test & diagnostic 250 11 pieces delivered Feb 89
equipment
1RMS 0IFFRIMMS
Roadgraders 19 7 delivered IP1AF
Scrapers 10 7 delivered P OW
Tractors 10 7 delivered PW
Loaders 7 2 delivered P)AF
Flak vests 1,820 Delivery coupleted Oct 88
20t Crane 1 Awaiting trans at Hnum
DU S MAPPING AGENC
mapping equip 1 Delivered Jun 88
Figure 25: SRA Offer # 2
S&,urtv: Inforrmatiun provided by Miaj-jr Javier Larza.Jr., USAF, Assistant Air Attache in the Office oftte Defense
Ati",~hu. United States Enibussv.Lso, letter duted 16i May 1990.
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A-7 Enine spare parts various
J33-A-35 Engines 100




N49A2C 2.5t Fuel Trucks 5 Interest
n151A2 1/4t truck 25
M345 Flat Bed trailer 20 M
'1416 Cargo trailer 40 1
1441GM Cargo trailer 46 $
Truck Crane-shovel 1 "
105mm CMG, IW-T-, 14456 5,000
105mm C518 HP 10,000
105m C503 TPP 5,000
105am C510 TI• 5,000
105mm M392A2 5,000
Tanks M4EA5 60 No interest
tHelicopers UH-lU 40 a
NKVY
USNS 'nompson 1 Interest ,PW says nm)
W4C44 Torpedos 1,000
"1Sr 1178 1 No interest
Recoapressian chambers 7 I
/ tMA/Services working to determine location of items
Figure 26: SRA Offer #3
S.,urr,: Ih,,,rnijtgi~ pruvided I-t |v alipir Javier Garza. Jr . USAF. Assistant Air Atwche in the Offie ,, thr
De.,f t,, At ti fi . United Stair. Einbdsy," Lisbon. letterdated 16 M ) 19M 40.
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